A Real Alternative
Derek Chollet

GIVEN THE tremendous challenges facing the United States, we would be wise to heed Dimitri Simes's call for our leaders and citizens to engage in a vigorous debate about the course and content of American foreign policy. He's also right that this discussion needs to be less about tactics than the overriding purpose and character of policy. Yet his claim that we've never had such a spirited discourse-that both Democrats and Republicans "have displayed little inclination . . . to question the fundamental assumptions of American foreign policy since the Soviet collapse" in 1991-leads one to wonder: Where has he been?

Throughout the 1990s and still today, the United States's role in the world has been the subject of intense, sometimes stifling, but largely healthy debate. After the crumbling of the Soviet Union, many American leaders and analysts believed that the United States was in decline and that we would soon miss the stability and predictability of the Cold War; some politicians argued that foreign policy would take a back seat to international economics and globalization. Questions about how the United States should use its power were intensely debated: from the risks and costs of helping end ethnic wars and genocide through military force, to what was required for such U.S. actions to gain legitimacy and the future of its role in institutions like the UN and NATO. These debates raged in many places, including these pages, where Francis Fukuyama infamously declared the "End of History", Jeane Kirkpatrick argued that the United States should be a "normal" power, and Patrick Buchanan made the stunning call for "America First-and Second and Third."

To be sure, leaders from both Right and Left often came to agreement on certain questions, such as the interventions in the Balkans or the enlargement of NATO (which was almost universally derided by outside analysts). But just because they came to common ground-and, in many cases, made decisions that others disagreed with-does not necessarily mean that they were the result of unreflective or uninformed decision-making. Yet it's true that, however intense these debates were, they remained in the confines of elite circles; the broader public never really engaged in them.

That's changed during the past six years. For many Americans, the September 11 attacks marked a stark turning point for the United States's role in the world. After years in which American leaders seemed to careen from crisis to crisis, none of which quite rose to the level of grave threats to national security, the United States now faced a mortal enemy and a generational struggle. Foreign policy in the "post-Cold War era" finally had an overriding purpose: to defeat Islamic extremism. If history ended in 1989, for many it seemed to begin in 2001.

Or at least that is the narrative President George W. Bush and his team peddle. From the beginning of his presidency, he has prided himself as a decisive figure compared to what came before. To emphasize this point, he frequently frames the tough calls he's making today as correctives to poor decisions and mistakes of the past-choices made during what he described in his second inaugural address as the "years of repose, years of sabbatical." The implication is that what his immediate predecessors did is hardly worth remembering since history is being made today.

It is, of course, absurd to dismiss these years as some kind of holiday from history. Bush is not confronting problems anew, and what came before is not irrelevant. In fact, the roots of all of the problems America confronts today-Iraq, Islamic extremism, North Korea and Iran's nuclear programs, efforts to rebuild failed states, the Middle East peace process, ethnic conflicts and genocides, and economic globalization-stretch back to the period that began with the end of the Cold War in 1989. These challenges and the debates about them did not suddenly emerge after 9/11-they stem from decisions and events during these pivotal years. To be sure, fewer Americans were paying attention to the world than compared to today, and absent a broad narrative like the War on Terror, this history can seem confusing. That's why analysts should pay more attention to it-not only to understand how we got here, but to draw lessons for the road ahead.

Analysts like former National Security Advisor Zbiginew Brzezinski have offered sobering assessments. In his recent book Second Chance, Brzezinski argues that for 15 years the United States has led "badly" and that "after its coronation as global leader [in 1989], America is becoming a fearful and lonely democracy in a politically antagonistic world."

Such criticisms will ring familiar to any casual observer of the past 15 years-and surely, on this score, Simes agrees. But is this really a manifestation of the "collective state of delusion" that he decries? The history of this period is more accurately (albeit simplistically) described as one of confusion. That's not necessarily a comment on the quality or aptitude of the policymakers, but more on the realities of the moment. If there was a delusion at all, it was that the new challenges could be solved with neat and tidy solutions; that America's engagement with the world could be managed with few costs and that, somehow, after the Soviet Union collapsed, it would all get easier.

Think back to the leadership and decisions that shaped the post-Cold War period. President George H. W. Bush and his principal national security advisors, Brent Scowcroft and James Baker, deserve plaudits for their skilled handling of complex events that came at a dizzying pace (in less than four years the Berlin Wall fell, the Warsaw Pact disappeared, Germany reunified, Saddam invaded and was kicked out of Kuwait, and the Soviet Union crumbled), but they failed to translate these huge successes into a lasting strategy. Some of the problem was sheer exhaustion. But Bush's attempt to begin sketching a doctrine-the much-maligned New World Order-was actually a concept borrowed from his former adversary, Mikhail Gorbachev, and was never more than a slogan. The idea quickly became shorthand for traditional stability, not a bold way forward.

Clinton had the opposite problem: He was full of ideas and had a vision for the future-globalization-but lacked the confidence, attention, acumen and political capital to implement it. During his first few years in office, Clinton's inexperience often showed, and his comfort with using U.S. power (especially military force) to solve problems seemed ambivalent at best. In the mid 1990s, French President Jacques Chirac summed things up with the biting observation that the position of leader of the free world was "vacant."

Yet Clinton got much better with time, and his commitment to enlarging NATO and working through the alliance to end the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo-doing so in the face of fierce criticism and debate from both the Republican Congress and many foreign-policy elites-were brave decisions that are still paying dividends today. NATO's enlargement has helped stabilize Central Europe-a by-product of which is the strong relationship with allies like Poland-and the Clinton team's efforts to develop NATO's capacity to go "out of area" have proved essential to its efforts today in Afghanistan. And while the Balkans still suffer from deep troubles, they are at peace and, incredibly, on the doorstep of joining the European Union.

Unfortunately, these gains and others are being diminished by the policies of the current President Bush. Skewering Bush 43 and his team is certainly not unique-such broadsides have become a cottage industry-but what is notable is that these are now coming not just from the far left but from the heart of the national-security establishment. It is hard to think of any serious policy analyst outside the government that will stand to defend the Bush record. Even those that were instrumental advocates of its most controversial policies (like Richard Perle) are vocal critics of their implementation and the administration's incompetence.

Many expect that in Bush's wake there will be a natural and overdue course correction for American foreign policy-a return to greater realism. Perhaps. Certainly there will be greater scrutiny of intelligence claims, deeper respect for the role of allies and alliances, wider understanding of the limits of military force and the importance of other instruments of American power and influence, and humility about what the United States can accomplish alone. But there's little evidence that that's going to change what Simes describes as the "collective state of delusion" about the importance and capabilities of America's global leadership. And that's a good thing.

Because the United States remains, as Simes quotes Madeleine Albright, an "indispensable nation." Albright's words are often misconstrued by her critics, who misinterpret her statements as suggesting that the United States has a universal writ to act alone always or completely disregard the views of others. Rather, what Albright actually meant is that it is difficult to imagine any global challenge-from global warming, to nuclear proliferation, to the rise of militant Islam-that can be solved without the active involvement, leadership and commitment of the United States. Yet Simes is right to remind us that getting others to act on our priorities often involves a give-and-take that the current administration, as well as many on Capitol Hill, find hard to swallow.

It is also difficult to imagine a world where the United States refuses to stand up for values like liberalism, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. As Simes's essay illustrates, how much U.S. foreign policy should be based on promoting values remains controversial. There is no doubt that such goals have taken a huge hit from the Bush Administration's failures and excesses. In fact, one of the most consequential decisions the next president faces is to choose what parts of the Bush "freedom agenda" he or she wishes to continue. Yet while self-described realists question the wisdom of keeping core values at the heart of U.S. policy, trying to take values out would make American policy little different than the policy motivations of others, like Russia and China. This is an area where many from both the Right and Left agree.

Which leaves the challenge-and opportunity-a new administration and a new Congress will face when they take office in 2009. As Brzezinski argues, they will have a "second chance" to set a new direction for America in the world. He recommends heeding Raymond Aron's injunction that a great power's strength "is diminished if it ceases to serve an idea." Of course, having ideas alone is not enough-the current Bush team believes that they are in the ideas business, although the result has clearly been a disaster. So the debate must continue to be about which ideas-and, importantly, how to manage the risks and trade-offs required to implement them.

Derek Chollet is a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security and is currently co-writing a book about American foreign policy between 1989 and 2001.

Wild Parties
Grover G. Norquist

THE GENIUS of the U.S. Constitution has given America political stability and economic liberty that have combined to create the richest and most powerful nation on the planet-spending only 4 percent of the nation's income on the military. The combination of political cohesion and unrivaled wealth has allowed the United States to survive and thrive despite foreign-policy decisions that might have failed to protect smaller, more fragile nations.

Some have argued that we are, or recently were, the leader in a unipolar world-a hybrid between the British and Roman Empires with better dentistry and plumbing. Still, the experience of the past several years suggests that even a colossus needs a competent foreign policy.

The structures of our two major political parties, the relative strengths of each and the issues that rally the two coalitions do not bode well for getting from here to there.

For several decades following the Civil War, the Republicans and Democrats were regional parties. But during the political life of the beloved Ronald Reagan, they divided along recognizable ideological lines. The Republican Party became the vehicle for a center-right coalition of businessmen, taxpayers, property owners, gun owners, home-schoolers and the various communities of faith that feared the aggressively secular state that primarily wanted one thing from the central government-to be left alone. The Democratic Party became a home to the members of the Left-labor unions, trial lawyers, government workers, contractors-who saw themselves as beneficiaries of government spending and state power.

Neither of the two parties house a major coalition member that votes on foreign policy. During the Cold War, the leave-us-alone coalition included anti-communists, often refugees from Eastern Europe, Cuba, Indochina, the Soviet Union and other nations in contest.

Today the two parties are evenly matched: Note the close elections of 2000 and 2004, and the House and Senate's thin majorities in either direction from 1995 to the present. Each coalition demands complete loyalty from its constituent parts and looks for the silver bullet that will achieve a stable and significant majority. The foreign-policy debate has become a central front in that struggle for majority status-at the expense of designing and implementing a serious and successful foreign policy for a great nation.

This is why the Iraq War and occupation have become the objects of partisan bickering. The Washington Post recently reported that polling showed that views on Iraq were more divided along party lines than those on the Vietnam War. While the Democrats may be seen as the "peacenik" party now, they supported Clinton's bombing of Serbia because the bomber was a Democrat. Meanwhile, the Republicans-playing a role similar to the one now occupied by the Democrats-expressed disinterest in "Clinton's War" in Bosnia. Today, Republicans do not support Bush because of Iraq; they support Iraq because of Bush.

Had Bush decided not to overthrow the Iraqi regime or to occupy the country the Republican electorate would have applauded, and the Democrats would have criticized the decision.

While there were reasons to believe that America might benefit from rethinking its policy vis-à-vis Iraq, all such debate within the Republican Party was shut down for the bulk of 2006 in order to avoid advantaging the Democrats in the November elections. Partisan loyalty has created a stickiness in moving to-or even suggesting-different strategies. On the Democratic side, there is more attention paid to how to damage Bush and the Republicans than to what the United States should and should not be doing in Mesopotamia and its environs.

The blind partisan loyalty of the bases of both political parties is not conducive to creating a serious foreign policy.

It gets worse. The monopoly once held over America's national discourse by the three television networks reciting The New York Times each day has broken up. We now have an America with 500 television stations and thousands of blogs. Every political impulse has its own source of news. Americans see very different situations in Iraq depending on whether they view Fox or MSNBC, or read The Washington Times, Washington Post, New York Times or New York Sun.

Conservatives are understandably pleased that the liberal establishment's monopoly on news has ended. But with millions of Americans getting their understanding of foreign policy from Rush Limbaugh and Sean Hannity, and millions of others learning how the world works from Jon Stewart and MoveOn.org, we have a policy apartheid that makes debate-never mind compromise or consensus-difficult.

There are no forces on the horizon capable of demanding that political leaders become serious about addressing America's position in the world. There is no National Rifle Association or AFL-CIO to draw a line in the sand for one or both parties. There is no national lobby for free trade-although one could certainly see the resources being available for this effort. There is no national lobby for a strong military.

The lobbies dealing with national defense either focus on satisfying individual companies' contracting needs or securing additional benefits for retired military officers-which come at the expense of buying new planes, ships and tanks.

The ethnic lobbies provide the only constraint on the foreign policies of presidents or congressmen. One must check in with the Armenian lobby and the Greek lobby when dealing with either end of Turkey; one must check with AIPAC on Middle East policy; and Republicans have to double-check with the Cuban-American community on all matters Castro. After that, a president or congressmen is free to do or say just about anything on foreign policy.

And with increasingly non-competitive congressional districts gerrymandered for a Republican or Democrat, there are more and more congressmen that can and do "freelance" foreign policy, as Charlie Wilson (D-TX) did in Afghanistan and New Mexico's Bill Richardson did in North Korea. Neither was going to win or lose votes based on their "playing" in foreign policy. They didn't care because they had a majority vote based on party affiliation.

We tend to remember-or imagine-a more engaged and informed electorate prior to 1991. In fairness, the United States took a while to arrive at a somewhat consistent policy towards the threat posed by the Soviet Union. The world was fairly clearly divided in the wake of World War II, and it was therefore easier to "pick up teams" and identify friend and foe. Voters had decades to learn about U.S. defense and foreign-policy issues on a playing field that didn't change very much and benefited from millions of refugees from communist countries that brought real-time information about that world.

The present partisan stalemate is unlikely to change until one party breaks through and becomes dominant, as the FDR coalition did after 1934. This will free the majority party to create a position devoid of the extreme fringes currently needed to compete in the evenly matched partisan fight. The party out of power will have the time and focus to think not only about foreign policy in the abstract but also to confront and challenge the ruling party's approach to the world.

One can hope that the "think tanks" in Washington, DC-which have too often in this hyper-partisan atmosphere done less thinking and more serving as cannon fodder for competing partisan positions-might hold more debates and fewer monologues, beginning the process of rethinking America's role in the world.

Grover G. Norquist is the president of Americans for Tax Reform.

Kipling Redux
Dov S. Zakheim

LIBERAL INTERVENTIONISTS and neoconservatives share three rather unflattering characteristics. Both have a hair-trigger inclination to promote American unilateral military intervention overseas. Both assume a degree of moral superiority that has much in common with the values of Rudyard Kipling and Benjamin Disraeli. And both make a strong case for promoting democracy abroad even as they ignore or deride a majority of American public opinion that opposes such adventures.

America's vast military superiority over all other states has created new and unprecedented opportunities for policymakers to commit the armed forces to overseas operations with minimal notice and even less forethought. This superiority-powered by both ongoing advances in technology that widen the gap between America's forces and those of other states, and by defense budgets that far outdistance those of any friend or potential foe-is unlikely to disappear anytime soon. Interventionists of both the liberal and neoconservative variety thus face, and all too often succumb to, an ongoing temptation to put their theories into practice by resorting to the military as a first alternative rather than as a default option after all others have been exhausted.

Conservatives, on the other hand, share with the overwhelming majority of American military officers the recognition that good policy is not merely a matter of committing military force to achieve a political end. Equally, if not more important, is the need to determine whether a given political end is achievable without the use of force and, even if it is not, whether force would render that end any more achievable. Moreover, conservatives, being more cautious about the use of force, tend to look more carefully at the nature of exit strategies. Interventionists, on the other hand, appear to assume that the change that they are seeking will, by its very nature, spontaneously generate an exit strategy that is both timely and appropriate.

There is little in American post-World War II history to vindicate the interventionists' assumptions. Few, if any, societies have been transformed by unilateral military action by the United States. That fact has not lessened the interventionists' infatuation with the military as a force for societal change, however.

The assumption that America can and should change the nature of other societies presupposes that those societies desperately yearn to adopt the American way of life. There is little evidence for that assumption. Certainly, those who wish to be like Americans often wish for more than that as well-namely, to be Americans themselves. And wealthy, secular, intellectual, English-speaking elites in many non-Western states appear to encourage the importation of "Western values" into their societies.

Yet American liberals and neoconservatives all too often underestimate the pride and nationalism that reside elsewhere in the world. No doubt the citizens of many states seek freedom and liberty; that, however, does not mean that they seek freedom and liberty as defined by the United States, much less imposed by it. Nor does it mean that America's democratic allies share either its penchant for imposing Western values on others or consider their own political systems to be entirely congruent with those of the United States. Interventionists, in fact, have adopted a 21st-century version of the "White Man's Burden", which is no less elitist-and in some cases no less racist-than its Kiplingesque forebear. They should not be surprised that their intentions are viewed with suspicion around the world, particularly when they are so quick to call upon the military to spread Western values to the politically and culturally unwashed.

Finally, with their penchant for the early use of the military instrument, and their insistence on the expenditure of both human and materiel resources in support of democratic values, interventionists invariably trample upon those very same values with respect to their own citizenry. When the views of the public contradict those of the interventionists, they are ascribed to ignorance and xenophobia. Interventionists appear to act on the basis of the proposition that it is the elites who must "lead" the "common" people (presumably to include the "spineless" military and isolationist conservatives). Democracy is evidently only a product for export.

Dimitri Simes is absolutely correct. It is time to revisit and revise the policies and assumptions that have made interventionism the coin of the American realm for much of the past two decades. It is not a matter of ruling out military intervention in defense of clear American or allied interests. Rather, what is required is the recognition that intervention must be undertaken judiciously, after full consultation with allies and friends. Surely liberals should be able to understand what even the decidedly non-democratic Prussian thinker Clausewitz recognized: War is a government's political tool of last resort, to be undertaken only with the full support of the public and with the recognition that such support is unlikely to be sustainable indefinitely. For it is the public whose sons, and now daughters, will be asked to sacrifice their lives to achieve that government's political aims. And it is the public who, if unsatisfied with the stated aims of a military operation or with the vagueness of its progress, will ultimately say "enough."

Dov S. Zakheim was undersecretary of defense (comptroller) and the Defense Department's chief financial officer from 2001 to 2004. He is a member of the board of the Nixon Center.

A Realist Responds
Dimitri K. Simes

DEREK CHOLLET wonders where I could have been during the last 15 years to have failed to notice the "intense, sometimes stifling, but largely healthy debate" regarding the U.S. role in the world. I was in Washington. But perhaps we have different definitions of "debate." Certainly there have been interesting and provocative articles in academic journals, presentations on C-SPAN and occasionally fierce, meaningful exchanges on CNN and Fox. There has also been a good deal of partisan sniping. But this is not debate.

Has any major candidate been prepared to subject America's post-Cold War triumphalism to serious examination? Been prepared to acknowledge that in the rapidly changing conditions of the 21st century the United States may need to set priorities and be prepared to accept compromises and trade-offs-whether in addressing trade issues, preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear power or enlisting the support of other states to combat terrorists who threaten America? No. Derek Chollet pretty much admits this when he writes: "To be sure, leaders from both Right and Left often came to agreement on certain questions, such as the interventions in the Balkans or the enlargement of NATO." And, as much as a number of Democrats today would deny it, on the need for "regime change" in Iraq.

But did this consensus come about in the aftermath of a vigorous national conversation similar to the one that took place in the United States during the late 1940s? No, it did not. Rather, a series of propositions were put forward-America is the indispensable nation, America's motives cannot be questioned, America is the sole superpower and does not have to choose among priorities-and unconditionally accepted by significant segments of the foreign-policy establishment, in both parties. Indeed, when Texas Representative Ron Paul raised-in an admittedly awkward fashion-the possibility that America's Middle East policies might have contributed to the September 11 tragedy, something the 9/11 Commission itself acknowledged, he was roundly attacked. Most of today's foreign policy discussion is about how badly the Bush-Cheney team mismanaged policy, not whether their fundamental assumptions were flawed.

And why is the recent brouhaha as to whether Barack Obama would meet with a Hugo Chávez or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad under different circumstances than Hillary Clinton a sign of debate if, in the end, both would insist on compliance with all American priorities and preferences without being prepared to offer anything meaningful in return? One would think that as the opposition party, the Democrats would be able to offer credible alternatives to an administration they claim so vocally to despise. But this has not happened. Not on Iran, not on the Arab-Israeli dispute, not on international trade and not on China.

One cannot escape the impression that many Democrats have come to the conclusion Dov Zakheim outlined-"No doubt the citizens of many states seek freedom and liberty; that, however, does not mean that they seek freedom and liberty as defined by the United States, much less imposed by it"-not because they agree with those sentiments, but because Iraq has turned out the way that it has.

Indeed, while denouncing Bush for his "unilateralism" in Iraq, many Democrats are more than happy to embrace it when it suits their interests. Take Kosovo. Key Democratic foreign policy strategists such as former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Richard Holbrooke and others are indistinguishable from the Bush Administration in arguing for bypassing the UN Security Council should it not immediately comply with American preferences. In a piece in the Washington Post, John Podesta, president of the Center for American Progress and chief of staff in the Clinton White House, has called on the administration to recognize Kosovo's independence even in the absence of a un Security Council resolution. He believes that as long as the United States works with some of its European allies, we will have "international legitimacy to act." Wasn't this the same logic behind the 2003 "Coalition of the Willing" for Iraq? It certainly seems like the same attitude-other states can agree with a decision taken in Washington, and if they don't, the United States is free to override their objections and act anyway. But somehow we expect other countries simply to accept American fiat time and time again without any consequences.

Identifying themselves with the Obama and McCain campaigns, Ivo Daalder and Robert Kagan take a similar view, arguing that support from "great democratic nations" gives the United States international legitimacy to use force without UN Security Council authorization. Daalder, a Clinton Administration NSC official now at the Brookings Institution, and Kagan, a Carnegie Endowment senior associate with close ties to the Bush Administration, argue that notwithstanding Iraq, "the situations in which an American president may have to use force have only grown." Moreover, they continue, these situations include not only attacks on America or its allies, imminent threats that a hostile regime or group may acquire nuclear weapons and genocide, but the much more vague "terrorist threats", "weapons proliferation", "traditional forms of aggression" (against whom is not specified), and "other human rights violations." Where in the world is one of these four things not happening?

The trouble is that both the historical record and current realities demonstrate that very few others would welcome the United States-perhaps with support from some European countries, Japan and Australia-acting like judge, jury and executioner in the international system. This reaction would not be limited to rogue states like Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezuela. It would include non-democratic major powers like China and Russia, important American friends such as Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia and major democratic countries, including India and Argentina. And chances are that at least some would not only object strongly, but view these ambitions as a global threat to which they would respond with a strategic realignment greatly endangering U.S. security, prosperity and values. Yet when America's very destiny is at stake, our major political leaders are blind and deaf, preoccupied by what Grover Norquist has described elsewhere as the "'Survivor' reality show we call presidential primaries."

We must acknowledge that our political process, as it exists today, is poorly equipped to produce a foreign policy appropriate for global leadership. As Norquist notes, "the foreign-policy debate has become a central front in [the] struggle for majority status-at the expense of designing and implementing a serious and successful foreign policy for a great nation."

Significantly, neither of America's two recent presidents made foreign policy a centerpiece of their campaigns. Bill Clinton was elected with the slogan "It's the economy stupid!" by contrasting George H. W. Bush's considerable successes in foreign policy, especially in managing the end of the Cold War and winning the Gulf War, with his seeming inability to secure America's prosperity at home. Similarly, George W. Bush ran for president as a traditional realist conservative disinclined to seek out foreign-policy adventures-and, as Norquist demonstrates, the Republican base was not significantly pressuring his administration to move in the direction of messianic interventionism.

But neither administration was able to resist interventionism-either the Clinton Administration's intervention on the cheap, essentially a "Bush-Cheney lite" foreign policy notwithstanding Hillary Clinton's self-serving revisionism, or the Bush team's post-9/11 notion that the only way to keep America safe is to remake the world in its image, whatever the cost.

And here we cannot ignore the dereliction of duty of the foreign policy "community" and the deleterious impacts of the "permanent campaign" for creating an atmosphere where questioning the limits of American power or raising the need to make difficult compromises was tantamount to defeatism or appeasement. This is not to blame America first for the numerous imperfections, mistakes and misdeeds of other nations. Rather it is to start an honest conversation about what we need to do to rebuild a policy formulation process to protect American security, prosperity and freedom abroad.

BUT, AS long as campaigns and internal politicking rule over foreign-policy decision-making, we should hold out little hope. Think tanks in Washington are littered with scholars jockeying for positions in future administrations. Since campaigns are starting earlier and earlier, this means people are sacrificing meaningful debate for seats on the campaign tour bus years before Election Day. It doesn't have to be this way.

When I started at the Carnegie Endowment some 25 years ago, its then-president Thomas Hughes strongly urged me and other new staff to be very cautious in becoming involved with political campaigns that could even create an impression that we might be serving anyone's political agenda. This is obviously not happening around Washington, DC any longer. Think tanks are cropping up all over the place, each designed to house would-be State and Defense Department staffers. Even some old guard think tanks seem more like partisan halfway houses than places of honest debate.

If the United States government, with the help of the non-governmental foreign policy establishment, cannot come up with new and innovative approaches to coping with the foreign policy challenges of the day, then others must try to fill the vacuum.

Cheers to Warren Buffet, Bill Gates and others who are committing billions to fight global poverty and disease. But private efforts, however noble and well funded, cannot become a substitute for an effective and wise American role in the world, and poor policy decisions resulting from a poor policy debate can quickly undo their considerable achievements.

Money does not determine everything in U.S. politics and cannot buy a high quality foreign policy debate or, for that matter, a high quality domestic debate. But money is necessary to support genuinely independent research and to provide forums for serious thinking rather than cleverly packaged political statements. If existing institutions are not meeting these needs, then it is time for donors to provide incentives for change and, where necessary, to build new institutions that have what it takes to provide the serious analysis America desperately needs to be a global leader. After all, the rationale for think tanks' tax exempt status is that they serve the public good through independent thinking-not partisan propaganda. Many of us in both parties have had enough self-serving moralism and bombastic yet banal posturing. We are ready to have a serious conversation about U.S. interests and values, and the best ways to promote them both. If we put our ideas, energy and-yes-our money together, the realist moment may come sooner than most think!

Dimitri K. Simes is the president of The Nixon Center and publisher of The National Interest.