Lately, all terrorism seems to be about Islam, and it all seems to be the same. A snapshot: turn on CNN to watch a gruesome play-by-play of our War on Terror, scan the best-seller list for the newest book on Osama bin Laden, leaf through the newspaper to see the latest suicide terror attack. By all accounts the specter of jihadism looms large. Yet, some unintended trickery is afoot-imagery making the threat to Western democracy, which is frightening enough, seem like the worst kind of Hollywood doomsday movie.

Even if we suspend belief for a moment and simply cast aside all those terrorist groups that clearly have nothing at all to do with the Islamic religion-the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, the FARC in Colombia and the IRA in Ireland (to name but a few)-we are still left with a slew of seemingly similar groups all motivated by and distorting Islam to suit their own ends. Yet the problem is far more complex and, as we disaggregate the threat, we see that although "Islamic terrorism" prevails in many cases, the goals of these terrorist groups are often strikingly different.

Even if all of these terrorists intone various distortions of the Islamic religion, there are no universal agendas. The goal for groups like Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Chechen rebels is "a nation of their own" with tactics reminiscent of the ethnic violence erupting after abandoned colonialism. Groups with traditional nation-state aims-even if they use Islamic rhetoric-have little interest, if any, in the United States. Their goals remain narrow and less fearsome.

 On the other end of the spectrum are groups like Jemaah Islamiya (JI) and Al-Qaeda with its various offshoots, who indeed are looking to rearrange the global order, instigate the now-infamous clash of civilizations and create a Muslim caliphate that spans continents, all the while bringing the West to its knees. Their goals are vast and global. Somewhere in the middle of all this are groups at risk, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET) in Pakistan and the separatist movements in the Philippines and Thailand. These groups are primarily motivated by state-centric goals, but all rest on the cusp of pan-territorial and far more dangerous agendas.

Without doubt, the United States needs to counter Islamic terrorists seeking the ascendance of an Islamic caliphate and the concomitant destruction of the West. But this is not a battle against all terrorists in which the Islamic religion plays a role. The danger in thinking about it as an all-or-nothing war is two-fold: first, that we will miscategorize these state-centered groups and so create inappropriate counter-terrorism strategies; second, that by doing so we will push groups that have constrained goals toward the pan-global agenda of Al-Qaeda-creating the very threat we fear most.

Birds of a Feather?

There is no massive monolith hurtling toward us, razing everything in its path. There are a few big boulders and a whole lot of pebbles. Which direction and how much momentum they take on may be mainly up to us. Terrorist groups can largely be conceived as having two working parts: an identity and an ideology. When it comes to Islamic terrorism, that identity is based in religion, but sometimes the ideology is based in nationalism, while at other times in a more ephemeral, pan-territorial agenda. This difference is most stark between more traditional "ethno-terrorist" movements and the far more globally oriented groups like Al-Qaeda. As Al-Qaeda's top strategist Ayman al-Zawahiri makes clear, there is a significant difference between Islamic national liberation movements and those struggling for a new Islamic global order:

Many of the liberation battles in our Muslim world had used composite slogans that mixed nationalism with Islam and, indeed, sometimes caused Islam to intermingle with leftist, communist slogans. . . . The Palestinian issue is the best example of these intermingled slogans and beliefs under the influence of an idea of allying oneself with the devil for the sake of liberating Palestine. They allied themselves with the devil, but lost Palestine.

Recent statements by Hamas leaders draw a virtually identical distinction. Mahmoud Zahar, now Hamas's foreign minister, once put it this way:

Al-Qaeda is not present here. We are focused on the occupation. We run no operations outside of Palestine, outside of the occupied territories, so we are completely different from Al-Qaeda.

These differences do go beyond mere rhetoric. It is almost impossible to take terrorists' statements at face value, but when those in Hamas argue that their violent acts are poles apart from those of Al-Qaeda they are telling the truth. It is also evident in deed.

Since nationalist movements are focused on creating a state or political freedoms for one group, their strategies are focused on the nation-state from which they hope to gain concessions. Their violence is directed at those inside the state. Whether or not Islam provides the identity, their goals are not apocalyptic. In contrast, religious terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda engage in almost no domestic targeting. Their goals cross continents. They want to destroy corrupt regimes in the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, purge the Western presence in their lands and change the global power order.

This is why the bombers in Bali attack Marriott hotels, foreign nightclubs and beach resorts. When a file was found on a computer of one of the planners of the October 2005 Bali bombings, the instructions and strategies laid bare on these virtual pages were pretty disturbing. Amongst the minutiae of what clothing to wear to blend in with the crowds, and the size of the bombs and backpacks, was the larger thinking about targets. The attacks were aimed at Westerners, specifically foreign tourists. Since it would be hard to figure out where people were from, they simply decided that "all white people [are] the enemy." Even the locations they scouted were Western: McDonald's, Pizza Hut, Burger King. All the other attacks by Jemaah Islamiya were no different. Every one has been aimed at an international target with foreign civilian occupants: the Kuta and Jimbaran tourist areas in Bali, the Australian Embassy in Jakarta and the Hilton hotel in the Egyptian resort town of Taba. As a JI suspect held in the 2002 Bali bombings explained, once an Islamic state in Indonesia was achieved, members would work toward a larger daulah islamiyah nusantara encompassing Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines, and then move on to restoring the Islamic caliphate.

There remain very different forms of Islamic terrorism: traditional struggles for political freedom for an ethnic group trapped in a nation-state run by an "other", and battles to rework the global order, join a communal group across continents and bring down the prevailing culture. These types of Islamic terrorist groups behave differently, pose different threat levels to the United States and require divergent counterterrorism strategies because they have dissimilar goals.

The Hybrids

Only slightly less frightening than Islamic terrorism itself is our incorrect understanding of exactly what is going on, and the inappropriate and potentially counterproductive policies ensuing from our misinterpretations. Initially, no one, including the administration, thought Hamas or the Chechens or any other Islamic terrorist group had anything to do with Al-Qaeda. But, by talking about Islamic terrorism as a monolith, we have fallen for Bin Laden's tricks, and risk pushing many terrorist groups with different agendas closer together.

As Bin Laden's rhetoric becomes increasingly pervasive and persuasive, something quite dangerous is happening. Though there has been much talk of the growth of "self-starter" cells-groups of Al-Qaeda adherents with no actual connection to the central command-it is the established local groups with state-centric agendas we also need to be evermore concerned about. These groups are evolving and their goals are expanding. Most dangerous, their capabilities and infrastructure are already in place. The merger of Zawahiri's Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Al-Qaeda in 1998 led to one of the deadliest terrorist movements the world has ever known. If more local groups join ranks in this larger global struggle, the potential for destruction is almost unfathomable. And these local groups are coming together, turning more lethal and looking more like Al-Qaeda everyday. In December 2004, the Abu Sayyaf Group, yet another Filipino separatist movement, cooperated with Jemaah Islamiya to bomb the General Santos City public market, killing 15 and injuring 58. Hizballah and Hamas colluded in the recent war in southern Lebanon and the LET, once a worry only in Kashmir, is becoming increasingly dangerous, reportedly recently responsible for injuring 625 people in the Mumbai transit bombings. They are even sprouting cells in Virginia.

Making matters worse, the Algerian Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), thought to be primarily concerned with making Algeria an Islamist state, proclaimed allegiance to Al-Qaeda in September, stating it considers itself "one stone in building the coming Islamic nation." Growing unrest in Thailand, Cambodia and Malaysia, and the potential for various Filipino groups to place nationalistic agendas on the back burner in favor of Al-Qaeda's larger Islamic struggle is alarming. Groups keep falling into Al-Qaeda's clutches.

Strategy: One Size Does Not Fit All

Ethnic terrorist groups like Hamas have a tendency to endure because they represent a distinct ethnic "other" with a clear and constrained political agenda. This kind of deep-seated ethnic terrorism only ends with viable political solutions. The state needs to plow through negotiations and keep on track no matter the level of terrorism, while avoiding extreme retaliatory policies. This is evidenced by the sometimes successful Sri Lankan peace process and the cessation of violence in Ireland. The Israeli and Spanish policies of "going it alone" worked in part because they moved ahead with peace programs in spite of spoilers, infighting and competition for power. Violent crackdowns and knee-jerk derailments always fail.

Ethnic terrorists are the oppressed minority's proxy. So, when the groups go too far, lost public support reins them in. Conversely, harsh government measures increase support for terrorism because the sense of oppression is reinforced. Palestinian belief in the need for violence was at its lowest right before the second intifada, but increased as Israel cracked down. The West Bank and Gaza Strip closures created a massive humanitarian crisis. Rather than lessening public support for terrorism, Israeli retaliation added to the animosity-the terrorists were not viewed as the cause of suffering, the government of Israel was. Support for terrorism only ebbed at the end of Israel's Operation Protective Shield in April of 2002. The cycle of violence depends on the behaviors of both parties.

Yes, Al-Qaeda shares "Islamic identity" with groups like Hamas-but not the same sort of political agenda. Groups with nationalistic goals tend to have sea legs; groups with more ephemeral agendas tend to peter out over time. The left-wing movements which wreaked such havoc in Europe during the 1970s and 1980s were destroyed by a disintegrating agenda. The less viable communism looked, the less public support for the "red terrorists." So, one of the main strengths of religious terrorism is also a point of great potential vulnerability. Its pan-territorial appeal makes it possible to tap into the extremist populations of many states, allowing for multiple bases, diverse cells and a large recruitment pool. But, national identity can trump religious affiliation. Primordial urges are strong. And if the nationalist agenda looks achievable, the impetus to fight for a larger religious one fades.

Most of the groups that now cooperate with Al-Qaeda began with a primarily nationalistic agenda. By differentiating between groups with goals of statehood or political enfranchisement that use religion as the communal identity versus groups with aspirations of a religious global struggle, we take the first steps to creating enmity among extremists.

Next Steps

This leaves us with two strategies. The first is to get state-centric terrorist groups back to the negotiating table in an effort to reinforce their nationalist impulses and lessen the attraction of forming a common front with Al-Qaeda. The second is to engage full-force in the battle over ideology central to destroying the appeal and spread of Al-Qaeda over the longer term.

Right now, there is a dearth of competing ideologies. Throughout the Islamic world, religious extremists have a monopoly in the marketplace of ideas. We need to hasten an eclipse of this ideological historical moment because when an ideology fails, the terrorism that sprang from it dies too.

There remains little agreement and great debate over the root causes of religious terrorism. How much education, religious doctrine, the current global political order, poverty and a variety of other variables play a role in creating religious terrorism is unclear. We are unlikely ever to get to the bottom of all of these questions.

But there are a few things we do know. Encouraging the rise of moderate interpretations of the religious tradition, as well as respecting the possibility of religion playing a significant role within the political system, are both critical strategies which can undermine the misuse of religion as a justification for violence and allow for shared norms across religious and political conditions. Opinion polls in the Muslim world suggest there is much more support for Islam playing a larger role in politics than for Osama bin Laden's nasty breed of terrorism. The massive number of casualties and deaths of not only Westerners but also Muslims risks alienating the larger Muslim population from Al-Qaeda and creates an opportunity for more moderate voices to fill the vacuum of ideas.

Moreover, the research of political scientist David Laitin and economist Alan Krueger suggests the preponderance of the evidence points to strong and compelling linkages between repressive political regimes and terrorism. Though we cannot negotiate a political settlement with existing religious terrorists, political reform may help stem recruitment of new cadres. If political repression is a major cause of religious terrorism, then changes in the political environment should have some effect on support for violence. Terrorism cannot be seen as the only viable and potentially rewarding alternative to a life of thwarted expectations. The more functioning, elected government providing economic opportunity and freedom is experienced as a legitimate possibility within a Muslim society, the less extremism will be seen as the method of only resort. This is why it is necessary to show both the failure of extremist religious states and the possibility of highly functioning nations with representative government. And, there are governments that house large Muslim populations that can serve as examples of both these phenomena.

Afghanistan and Sudan clearly failed to create Islamic states that provided economic, educational and political opportunity. These failures should be publicized. Equally importantly, some governments of Southeast Asia come closest to achieving the kind of governmental structures appealing to many Muslims. The United States clearly faces the problem of supporting repressive, dictatorial Middle Eastern regimes that provide fodder for the Islamic extremists and for the widespread belief throughout the Muslim world that the United States does not genuinely support political reform but rather uses it as convenient rhetoric. Although we must accept the difficulty of cutting off ties with allies in the Middle East that are viewed by many Muslims as running corrupt totalitarian governments, such as in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, genuine efforts to tie aid to political reform are a must.

Another important aspect of the strategy to defeat extremism is to lessen anti-Americanism. We are doing a poor job of publicizing our "good works." In a recent review of public diplomacy efforts led by former U.S. Ambassador Edward Djerejian, Egyptian dislike for the United States was considerable though they receive the second largest U.S. aid package. But everyday people were really grateful for the new opera house funded by the Japanese. The workaday necessities like sewers and water systems built with American money are surely no less important than cultural edification. Aid packages can help create positive views of the United States and eat away support for terrorism-the population just has to know it's happening.

U.S. assistance in the wake of the natural disasters in Indonesia and Pakistan-two serious extremist trouble spots with high levels of anti-Americanism-went a long way toward changing people's opinions about America and terrorism. Following the tsunami in Indonesia, confidence in Bin Laden plunged from 58 to 23 percent while unfavorable views of the United States decreased from 83 to 54 percent. Similarly in Pakistan, favorable views rose from 23 to 46 percent due to American aid following the 2005 earthquake. Meanwhile, confidence in Bin Laden during the same period dropped from 51 to 33 percent. Increasing social welfare packages with concomitant publicity can help reverse the negative view of the United States and dislodge the extremists' position; 78 percent of Pakistanis said American earthquake relief made them more favorable to the United States.

This is a battle for ideological dominance, and one part of the struggle against religious terrorism in the fight against membership in the larger Al-Qaeda schema. The global religious terrorists' multinational appeal and dogmatic ties are frightening enough. The idea that every group bound by some form of Muslim religious tenet is ipso facto a part of Al-Qaeda needlessly complicates our efforts. Hamas, the PFLP, Chechen rebels and the like remain state-centric terrorists, more concerned with strict territorial goals than with the larger Islamic struggle. They are a separate threat, and less of a problem for the world as a whole. But if they are categorized as a part of the larger battle against religious terrorism and swooped up in the net of aggressive U.S. policies, this would likely have the inverse of the intended effect-bringing these groups and their goals closer to those of Al-Qaeda rather than further away.

The political demands of religious terrorists are non-negotiable. Unlike ethnic terrorists, for whom peace will inevitably be tied to real political reform, religious terrorists' goals are too vast and too amorphous for negotiation. The desire to change the global power hierarchy creates an untenable situation. This is why a competing ideology must be addressed: an ideology that can appeal to the same audience, address the same inequities, but one which does not promote a distorted, violent global jihad.

It is our only way out.

Justine A. Rosenthal is director of the Atlantic Monthly Foundation, home to the Council on Global Terrorism, and a visiting scholar at Brown University's Watson Institute for International Studies.