The transatlantic alliance is America's most important global
relationship. It is the springboard for U.S. global involvement,
enabling America to play the decisive role of arbiter in Eurasia--the
world's central arena of power--and it creates a coalition that is
globally dominant in all the key dimensions of power and influence.
America and Europe together serve as the axis of global stability,
the locomotive of the world's economy, and the nexus of global
intellectual capital as well as technological innovation. Just as
important, they are both home to the world's most successful
democracies. How the U.S.-European relationship is managed,
therefore, must be Washington's highest priority.

In the longer run, the appearance of a truly politically united
Europe would entail a basic shift in the distribution of global
power, with consequences as far-reaching as those generated by the
collapse of the Soviet empire and by the subsequent emergence of
America's global preponderance. The impact of such a Europe on
America's own position in the world and on the Eurasian power balance
would be enormous (see the table on the following page for an
indication of how a united Europe would dwarf the United States),
inevitably generating severe two-way transatlantic tensions.
Presently, neither side is well equipped to handle such potentially
significant change. Americans generally do not fully comprehend the
European desire for an upgraded status in the relationship and they
lack a clear appreciation of the diversity of European views
concerning the United States. Europeans often fail to grasp both the
spontaneity and the sincerity of America's commitment to Europe,
infusing into their perception of America's desire to sustain the
Euro-Atlantic alliance a European penchant for Machiavellian
duplicity.

It should be noted, however, that the operative words in the
preceding paragraph regarding the significance of a truly united
Europe are "would be." A European Union with genuine political weight
and unity is not foreordained. The emergence of such a Europe depends
on the depth of its political integration, on the scope of Europe's
external expansion, and on the degree to which Europe develops its
own military as well as political identity. The decisive steps in
these regards have yet to be taken.

Currently, Europe--despite its economic strength, significant
economic and financial integration, and the enduring authenticity of
the transatlantic friendship--is a de facto military protectorate of
the United States. This situation necessarily generates tensions and
resentments, especially since the direct threat to Europe that made
such dependence somewhat palatable has obviously waned. Nonetheless,
it is not only a fact that the alliance between America and Europe is
unequal, but it is also true that the existing asymmetry in power
between the two is likely to widen even further in America's favor.

This asymmetry is due both to the unprecedented strength of America's
economic expansion and to the technological innovation that America
pioneers in such complex and diverse fields as biotechnology and
information technology. What is more, the American-led technological
revolution in military affairs enhances not only the scope of the
military reach of the United States, but also transforms the very
nature and uses of military power itself. Regardless of any
collective action on the part of the European states, it is highly
unlikely that Europe will be able to close the military gap with
America at any point in the near future.

As a result, the United States is likely to remain the only truly
global power for at least another generation. And that in turn means
that America in all likelihood will also remain the dominant partner
in the transatlantic alliance for the first quarter of the
twenty-first century. It follows, therefore, that transatlantic
debate will not be about fundamental alterations in the nature of the
relationship, but rather about the implications of anticipated trends
and the corresponding yet somewhat more marginal adjustments. That
said, it hardly needs to be added that even incremental adaptations
can breed conflicts which should be avoided if the U.S.-European
relationship is to remain constructive and truly cooperative.

A basic historical mystification both inspires and complicates the
ongoing dialogue between America and Europe. Both sides instinctively
think of America when they dream of a united Europe. The Europeans
crave America's continental scale and global standing, and, in their
more effervescent moments, they even envisage a future Europe as a
global superpower co-equal to America. The Americans, when
welcoming--occasionally somewhat skeptically--Europe's future unity,
instinctively draw on their own historical experience. That vision
renders some U.S. foreign policymakers uneasy, for the inescapable
presumption is that Europe--when it "unites"--will become America's
peer, and potentially its rival.

The American experience is often invoked by European statesmen in
Europe's march to unity (one such figure recently declared to me that
the European Union today is somewhere between 1776 and 1789). Yet
most European political leaders realize that the European Union lacks
both the ideological passion and the civic loyalty that inspired not
only the framers of America's Constitution but--and this is the
crucial test of political commitment--those prepared to make the
ultimate sacrifice for the independence of the American colonies. As
of now, and for the foreseeable future, it is simply the case that no
"European" is willing to die for "Europe."

It follows that Europe, as it integrates, will be something
altogether novel in the history of political entities, both in form
and in substance. It will doubtless be a polity, in addition to being
globally a most significant single economy. As a polity, however, it
will lack the emotional and idealistic commitment that the United
States evoked when it took shape. That commitment was expressed in a
transcendental concept of political liberty, proclaimed to enjoy
universal validity, that provided both the philosophical foundation
and a politically attractive beacon for a new nation-state. The
commitment of those who founded that state, and of those who later
flocked to it and became assimilated by it, was almost religious. In
short, the American revolution created a new kind of nationalism, one
that was open to all, a nationalism with a universal face.

The Preamble to the U.S. Constitution conveys the singular character
of that American commitment to national unity and liberty:

"We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect
Union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for
the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the
blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and
establish . . . "

Nothing quite like it characterizes the drumbeat of the European
nations' march toward a common Europe. It is striking that the Treaty
of Rome, the historic 1957 pledge of six European nations "to lay the
foundations of an ever closer union", places emphasis in its very
opening on ensuring "economic and social progress", on "constant
improvements of the living and working conditions", on "the removal
of existing obstacles" to "balanced trade and competition", on "the
progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade", and so
on. It is an admirably pragmatic, but also pedestrian, document.

To emphasize this essential difference between America and Europe is
not to denigrate the historical significance of Europe's undertaking.
Nor is it to question the good faith of those Europeans engaged in
creating a new architecture. It is to note that the defining
motivation of the European enterprise has, over time, become one of
convenience and practicality. The initial impulse for European unity
was more idealistic. Europe's "founding fathers" of the late 1940s
and early 1950s were inspired by a transnational political conviction
and very much motivated by the determination to end, once and for
all, the nationalistic conflicts that twice in this century came
close to destroying European civilization. They were also fearful
that America, disenchanted by European feuds, might simply abandon
the European nations to the other great historical option--also
"unifying" in its own ugly way--the one east of the Cold War's new
dividing line "from Stettin to Trieste."

Today's Europeans are serious about Europe in a more pragmatic way,
though some--as noted earlier--do dream of an entity that will match
America. French statesmen, at times unable to conceal their
hyper-envy of America's global standing, see in Europe the recovery
of France's past grandeur. The Germans have sought in Europe their
own redemption. The British, more skeptical, have finally concluded
that there will be a Europe of sorts and that they must be in it if
they are to infuse some genuine significance into their own special
relationship with America. Other peoples on the Continent--including
the recently liberated peoples of Central Europe--also wish to be
European, because they share the view that to be part of Europe is to
be more secure, more prosperous and free. None of these motivations
are base, all are historically justified, and they deserve America's
respect.

Nonetheless, pragmatism differs in substance as well as in its
effects from patriotism. A polity construed on convenience is bound
to be different from a polity derived from conviction. The former can
still generate loyalty. It can create a shared community. But it is
also likely to be less ambitious, politically less assertive and,
above all, less inclined toward idealism and personal sacrifice.
Despite some similarities in scale, the "Europe" that is actually
emerging is thus likely to be politically quite different from
America: a hybrid of a huge transnational corporation, to which it is
prudent and convenient and even gratifying to belong, and of a
confederated state that over time may also gain the genuine loyalty
of its hitherto distinctive communities. In short, the European
polity of convenience will be less than a United States of Europe,
though more than just a European Union Incorporated.

Indeed, it is no aspersion on anyone or any state to suggest that on
the global scene the emerging Europe is likely to be more similar to
a Switzerland writ large than to the United States. The Swiss
constitution--which ended inter-communal strife--stresses that the
ethnically differentiated Swiss Cantons resolved "to renew [their]
alliance", that they were "determined to live [their] diversity in
unity respecting one another", and went on to identify the practical
purposes of the Confederation. Abroad, the main emphasis of
Switzerland's international engagement has been in the important
areas of international finance and trade, while avoiding engagement
in this century's global political-philosophical conflicts.

Integration, Not Unification

In any case, it seems reasonable to conclude that "Europe", in the
foreseeable future, will not be--indeed, cannot be--"America." Once
the implications of that reality are digested on both sides of the
Atlantic, the U.S.-European dialogue should become more relaxed, even
as the Europeans address the dilemmas connected with their
simultaneous quest for integration, expansion and some
militarization; and even as the Americans adjust to the inevitable
emergence of a novel European polity.

Unification of several peoples normally occurs as a result of
external necessity, shared ideological commitment, domination by the
most powerful, or some combination thereof. In the initial phase of
the European quest for unity all three factors were at play, though
in varying degrees: the Soviet Union was a real threat; European
idealism was nurtured by the still fresh memories of World War II;
and France, exploiting West Germany's sense of moral vulnerability,
was able to harness Germany's rising economic potential in support of
its own political ambitions. By the end of the century, these
impulses have perceptibly waned. As a result, European
"integration"--largely a process of regulatory standardization--has
become the alternative definition of unification. Yet while
integration is a perfectly sensible way of achieving an operationally
effective merger, a merger still falls quite short of an emotionally
meaningful marriage.

The plain fact is that bureaucratically spearheaded integration
simply cannot generate the political will needed for genuine unity.
It can neither stir the imagination (despite the occasional rhetoric
about Europe becoming America's peer) nor develop the mortal passion
that can sustain a nation-state in a time of adversity. The 80,000
page-long acquis communautaire (organized into 31 policy
sectors)--which a new member of the European Union must ratify--is
not likely to provide the average European with the needed
nourishment for politically energizing loyalty. However, it should be
reiterated that by now, given the absence of the other three more
traditional ways of seeking unity, integration is not only necessary
but is the only way that Europe can move forward toward "unity."

That gap between "unification" and "integration", in turn, explains
why integration is bound to be slow; and why, were it somehow
accelerated too sharply, it could even divide Europe once again.
Indeed, any attempt to accelerate political unification would
probably intensify internal tensions between the leading states
within the Union, since each of them still insists on preserving its
sovereignty in the critical area of foreign policymaking. At this
stage, anti-Americanism as the impetus for unity--even when disguised
by talk of "multipolarity"--cannot be a unifying force as
anti-Sovietism once was, because most Europeans do not subscribe to
it. Moreover, with Germany reunited, no one in Europe, outside of
Paris, still regards France as the putative leader of the new
Europe--but also no one in Europe desires Germany to become Europe's
dominant leader.

Integration, however, is not only a slow process, but each successful
step increases the very complexity of the undertaking. Integration
inherently means an incremental and highly balanced progression
toward deepening interdependence among constituent units, but their
growing interdependence is not infused with the unifying political
passion required for the assertion of genuine global independence.
That may happen eventually, when Europeans come to view themselves
politically as Europeans while remaining, for example, German or
French as a matter of linguistic and cultural peculiarity.

Horizontal Expansion

In the meantime, because of Europe's slow progression, external
expansion is likely to become a partial compensation for the crawling
pace of internal integration. Europe will grow, but more horizontally
than vertically since, as a practical matter, the two cannot
significantly advance at the same time. This painful reality is a
sensitive point among Europe's true believers. When Jacques Delors
dared to declare flatly in early 2000 that "the pace [of enlargement]
is unquestionably being forced . . . we thus risk diluting the
blueprint" for European integration, with the result that "we will
inevitably move away from a political Europe as defined by Europe's
founding fathers", he was almost immediately and publicly taken to
task by a compatriot EU Commissioner, Michel Barnier.

The Commissioners in Brussels hope that bureaucratic streamlining and
institutional renewal will invigorate the process of integration.
Buoyed by the modest success of the euro--despite some apocalyptic
predictions from its largely American and British
detractors--Brussels has moved forward, in anticipation of
significant expansion, with the long-standing inter-governmental
conference on the renewal of the European institutions. Key
institutional decisions are to be made by the end of the year. But
even the most forceful proponents of expansion concede that, at best,
politically significant integration will have to be confined for a
while to the smaller inner core of the EU, thus perhaps creating a
so-called "multi-speed and variable geometry" Europe. Yet even if
that were to happen, it is doubtful that this formula would resolve
the basic tension between integration and expansion in so far as the
development of a common foreign policy is concerned. Such a Europe
would mean division into first and second-class members, with the
latter objecting to any major foreign policy decisions taken on their
behalf by a directorate of allegedly more truly European states.

In any case, enlargement, too, is bound to become an increasingly
absorbing and complicated task. With some two hundred EU teams about
to begin the tedious process of negotiating the modalities of
accession with the dozen or so new aspirant nations, expansion will
probably slow down, both because of its inherent complexity and
because of a lack of will on the part of EU member states. In fact,
the admission of any Central European state by 2004 is becoming
increasingly problematic. In the longer run, however, expansion
cannot be avoided. An amputated Europe cannot be a true Europe. A
geopolitical void between Europe and Russia would be dangerous.
Moreover, an aging Western Europe would begin to stagnate
economically and socially. No wonder, then, that some leading
European planners have begun to advocate a Europe of as many as
thirty-five to forty members by the year 2020--a Europe that would be
geographically and culturally whole, but almost certainly politically
diluted.

A Question of Muscle

Thus, neither integration nor expansion is likely to create the truly
European Europe that some Europeans crave and some Americans fear.
Indeed, an increasing number of Europeans do sense that the
combination of the euro and integration with slow expansion can only
create economic sovereignty. Political awareness that more is needed
prompted the three leading European states--France, Great Britain and
Germany--to join in 1999 in an effort to create a credible European
military capability, and to do so even before an integrated Europe
with a defining foreign policy of its own emerges. The projected
European military force is meant to put some muscle behind a common
foreign and security policy (CFSP), which is to be shaped by the
newly created post of Europe's High Representative for External
Relations and Common Security.

The proposed joint European rapid reaction force, which is to be
operational by 2003, will be the first tangible manifestation of a
political Europe. In contrast to the already existing, but largely
symbolic, "Eurocorps"--composed primarily of French, German, Spanish
and other draftees and possessing neither mobility nor real military
capability--the planned force would be assembled when needed from
pre-dedicated combat units, would number up to 60,000 men deployable
within 60 days, and would be sustainable in a theater of deployment
"in or around Europe" for at least a year. In effect, according to
various European estimates, such a force would be equivalent to a
full corps, supported by some 150 to 300 aircraft, 15 large combat
vessels, a strategic air transport capability, and the requisite C3I
(command, control, communications and intelligence). European
military experts are to conduct an accelerated audit of the inventory
of the available European assets so that the force can engage in
peacekeeping or even in some (otherwise unspecified) limited combat
operations. Its appearance would mark the emergence of a genuine
European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), capable of military
action outside of NATO.

However, the European defense initiative--driven by the genuinely
felt sense of Europe's military inadequacy revealed by the Kosovo
war, fueled by French ambitions, but tempered by British and German
inclinations to reassure the Americans--has yet to pass three basic
tests: will the force be rapidly deployable, will it be militarily
capable, and will it be logistically sustainable? Europe has the
means to create such a force; the question is whether it has the will.

At this stage, skepticism is very much in order. European defense
leaders have stated that the force can be assembled without
additional expenditures through a very deliberate reallocation of
existing defense budget items, a proposition that defies common
sense. It is evident to serious European commentators that the
planned force will require improvements in central logistics control,
joint military depots, and presumably some joint exercises. That
would entail additional costs, not to mention the more basic need for
adequate reconnaissance and intelligence as well as for a more
competitive and more consolidated European defense industry. Yet in
recent years the overall percentage of the European budgets allocated
to defense as well as to defense-related R&D has actually been
declining, with European defense expenditures having fallen in real
terms by about 22 percent since 1992.

The critical fact is that political parsimony undermines the military
seriousness of the venture. As Daniel Vernet wrote in Le Monde in
September 1999, for the European force to come into being, the
Europeans "must know exactly what they want, define defense
restructuring programs (politically sensitive and financially
costly), and, finally, allocate the budgetary resources to match
their ambitions." In addition, to sustain a force of 60,000 men in
the field for more than a year, a rotational pool of about 180,000
combat-ready European soldiers must be available. It is not.

A further complication, casting additional doubt on the credibility
of the proposed enterprise, is that some European states are members
of the EU but not of NATO (the "neutrals"), and others of NATO but
not of the EU (America's "Trojan horses", according to some
Europeanists). Their prospective relationship to ESDI is thus unclear
and, in any case, it inevitably complicates the picture. Finally, but
perhaps most important of all, the meshing of the proposed force with
existing NATO arrangements could become disruptive operationally and
divisive politically.

Ultimately, the most probable outcome for ESDI is that the proposed
force will produce neither a rival to NATO nor the long-missing
second European "pillar" for a more equal alliance. Although the
Europeans will probably somewhat enhance their own military planning
and joint command structures, especially after the expected
absorption of the Western European Union by the EU itself, more
likely is the piecemeal emergence over the next five or so years of a
somewhat improved European capability to provide for non-NATO
peacekeeping in some not overly violent European trouble spot (most
likely in the Balkans). In effect, the so-called European pillar will
be made less out of steel and concrete and more out of papier-mâché.
As a result, Europe will fall short of becoming a comprehensive
global power. Painful as it may be for those who would like to see a
politically vital Europe, most Europeans still remain unwilling not
only to die but even to pay for Europe's security.

U.S. policymakers should keep in mind a simple injunction when
shaping American policy toward Europe: do not make the ideal the
enemy of the good. The ideal from Washington's point of view would be
a politically united Europe that is a dedicated member of NATO--one
spending as much on defense as the United States but committing the
funds almost entirely to the upgrading of NATO's capabilities;
willing to have NATO act "out of area" in order to reduce America's
global burdens; and remaining compliant to American geopolitical
preferences regarding adjacent regions, especially Russia and the
Middle East, and accommodating on such matters as international trade
and finance. The good is a Europe that is more of a rival
economically, that steadily enlarges the scope of European
interdependence while lagging in real political-military
independence, that recognizes its self-interest in keeping America
deployed on the European periphery of Eurasia, even while it chafes
at its relative dependence and half-heartedly seeks gradual
emancipation.

U.S. policymakers should recognize that "the good" actually serves
vital American interests. They should consider that initiatives such
as ESDI reflect the European quest for self-respect, and that carping
injunctions--a series of "do nots" emanating both from the State and
Defense Departments--merely intensify European resentments and have
the potential to drive the Germans and the British into the arms of
the French. Moreover, American opposition to the effort can only
serve to convince some Europeans--wrongly--that NATO is more
important to U.S. security than it is to Europe's. Last but not
least, given the realities of the European scene, what ESDI poses for
NATO are problems of process not ones of principle, and problems of
process are not likely to be constructively managed by elevating them
into issues of principle.

Hence, dramatic warnings of "decoupling" are counterproductive. They
have a theological ring to them, and as such they threaten to
transform differences that can be accommodated into ones involving
doctrinal debates. They are reminiscent of earlier NATO collisions
that accomplished nothing good--whether over the abortive
Multilateral Nuclear Force initiative of the early 1960s, which
accelerated the French nuclear program; or, more recently, the brief
spasm in 1999 of American-pushed efforts to revamp NATO into some
sort of a global ("out of area") alliance, which quickly came down to
earth with the outbreak of the Kosovo war. Such disputes detract and
distract from a fundamental reality: NATO, a truly remarkable
success, may be far from perfect but it does not require a dramatic
overhaul.

One should pause here and ask: Even assuming that the new European
force were to come into being by 2003, where and how could it act on
its own? What credible scenario can one envisage in which it could
act decisively, without advance guarantees of NATO support and
without some actual dependence on NATO assets? Let us assume a
conflict in Estonia, with the Kremlin stirring up the Russian
minority and then threatening to intervene; Europe would not lift a
finger without direct NATO involvement. Suppose Montenegro secedes
and Serbia invades; without U.S. participation, the planned European
force would probably be defeated. While social unrest in some
European province--say, Transylvania, or even Corsica!--might prove
more susceptible to a deployment of European peacekeepers (much as
has been the case in Bosnia), such an intervention is hardly an
example of Europe becoming "an independent actor on the international
stage", to quote French Defense Minister Alain Richard.

In a genuinely serious mission, the planned European force still
would have to rely heavily on NATO assets in the key areas of
reconnaissance, intelligence and airlift. These assets are primarily
American, though dedicated to NATO. Thus, NATO would be de facto
involved, even if initially it had exercised its option of first
refusal. In brief, if the crisis is serious, the European reaction
will not be independent; if the reaction is independent, the crisis
will not be serious.

To be sure, adjustments within NATO will be unavoidable as Europe
slowly evolves into a more defined polity. ESDI will make NATO's
decision-making processes somewhat more cumbersome, and European
contributions to NATO's own military enhancement may even marginally
suffer as the EU seeks some sort of force of its own. ESDI,
especially after the Europeans organize within the EU some sort of a
European defense organism, will also have the effect of stimulating a
shared European strategic perspective, which America will have to
take into account. But a shared European security posture is more
likely to emerge through the gradual consolidation of the European
defense industry and intensified European military planning than
through any precipitous leap--especially by 2003--into an autonomous
European combat capability.

Indeed, of greater consequence to NATO's future than the European
under-performance revealed during the Kosovo war is Europe's
nonperformance after the Kosovo war. The staggering fact is that
"Europe" not only cannot protect itself but cannot even police
itself. The inability of the European states to engage entirely on
their own in effective peacekeeping in a small and weak region--and
their reluctance to provide the needed financing for its economic
recovery--poses a more serious long-term challenge to NATO's cohesion
than does ESDI. It is likely to breed growing American uneasiness
regarding the proper role for U.S. forces committed to Europe's
defense.

In the nearer term, an even more divisive issue--one of greater
strategic import--may be generated by U.S. plans to deploy a missile
defense system. The ongoing debate in the United States over missile
defense has been driven primarily by domestic political
considerations, and a unilateral American decision, made in the heat
of a U.S. presidential race, would doubtless be badly received in
Europe. Indeed, American unilateralism on this matter could have far
graver consequences than even the most intense U.S. concerns
regarding ESDI's alleged "decoupling" effect on American and European
security. If transatlantic security ties are to be sustained as
America's central strategic priority, it is clearly better at this
stage to engage in comprehensive discussions with America's allies
regarding the feasibility, the costs, the defense trade-offs, and the
political as well as strategic effects of a missile defense
deployment. In any case, it is too early to make a prudent judgment
as to how urgently needed and how practicable such a defensive shield
may be. That is a decision for the next U.S. president to make.

N THE MEANTIME, a basic strategic priority of the United States should be the continued expansion of NATO. NATO enlargement offers the best possible guarantee of continued transatlantic security ties. It serves to create a more secure Europe, with fewer areas of geopolitical ambiguity, while increasing the European stake in a vital and credible alliance. Indeed, the case can be made that the 1999 NATO decision to return to the issue of enlargement no earlier than 2002 should be revised, and that a serious effort to decide on new members should be made in 2001, once a new U.S. president is in office. Several countries appear to be ready for inclusion, meeting not only the standards set recently for Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, but even previously for Spain. An earlier resumption of the process of enlargement would provide a clear signal that not only does the transatlantic security link remain vital, but that America and Europe are both serious about shaping a secure Europe that is truly European in scope.

American support for the resumption of NATO enlargement is consistent with the American stake in expansion of the EU. The larger Europe becomes, the less likely it is that either external or internal threats will pose a serious challenge to international peace. Moreover, in the longer run the more overlap there is in membership between NATO and the EU, the greater will be the cohesion of the transatlantic community and the more compelling the complementarity of the Atlanticist and Europeanist visions. It is a felicitous fact that some of the candidates currently qualified for either NATO or EU membership happen to be the same countries. The United States can argue persuasively that Slovenia, Slovakia and Lithuania already meet, or are close to meeting, the criteria for NATO membership. According to a comparative study prepared by PricewaterhouseCoopers, several Central European states (including Slovenia and Estonia) are more qualified--in terms of macroeconomic stability, GNP, economic interaction with the EU, and economic infrastructure--for EU membership than was Greece. Poland and the Czech Republic--both already NATO members--were recently listed in The Economist as being more qualified than Italy! Which makes it all the more egregious that "the present accession requirements are more numerous and stringent than those that were faced by the South European countries that joined the EU earlier."

That some countries merit entry into the EU and NATO should facilitate and encourage stronger U.S. support for the enlargement of both. High-level NATO-EU consultations regarding a staged, progressive and continuing expansion therefore would be very much in order. But it is premature at this stage even to speculate as to what might be the eventual outer boundaries of the two, hopefully overlapping, entities. Much will depend on the evolution of Russia, for whom the doors to an Atlanticist Europe should be kept open. An expanded EU overlapping with NATO can encourage Russia's positive evolution by dampening old imperial temptations. Russia may then recognize its own interest in accommodating and becoming associated with NATO. If it does not, then a larger NATO will provide the needed security for a larger Europe. But in any case, the a priori exclusion of any qualified European state either from NATO or the EU would be unwise.

Moreover, from a geopolitical as well as economic point of view, it is not too early to note that once both NATO and the EU have expanded to include the Baltic and some southeastern European states, the subsequent inclusion not only of Turkey but of Cyprus (following a Turkish-Greek accommodation) and of Israel (following a comprehensive peace with all its neighbors) may also become desirable. In addition, as Europe expands, the transatlantic community at some point will have to respond to signals from countries such as Ukraine, Georgia and even Azerbaijan, that their long-term objective is to qualify for participation in the great historical undertaking occurring within the EU and under NATO's security umbrella.

In promoting this great project, the United States should remain supportive of the EU's quest for deeper integration, even though that support will be mainly rhetorical. The United States has wisely avoided identifying itself with the conservative British opposition to Europe's political as well as monetary unity, and it should likewise avoid the occasional temptation to display Schadenfreude when Europe stumbles. Precisely because European integration will be slow and because the European polity will not be like America, America need not fear the emergence of a rival. The transatlantic relationship is more like a marriage that blends together mutually respected differences--including some division of labor--as well as commonalties, and both in fact serve to consolidate the partnership. That has been the case over the last half century, and it will remain so for some time to come.

In fact, the evolving character of the international system should reinforce the transatlantic bond. Europe and the United States account jointly for less than 15 percent of the world's population and are highly visible as islands of prosperity and privilege in a seething and restless global environment. In this age of instant communications, an awareness of inequality can be rapidly translated into political hostility targeted at those who are envied. Hence, both self-interest and a sense of potential vulnerability should continue to provide the underpinning for a durable U.S.-European alliance.

The European polity, situated on the western edge of Eurasia and in the immediate proximity of Africa, is more exposed to the risks inherent in rising global tumult than the politically more cohesive, militarily more powerful and geographically more isolated America. The Europeans will be more immediately at risk if a chauvinistic imperialism should again motivate Russian foreign policy, or if Africa and/or south-central Asia suffer worsening social failures. The proliferation of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction also will endanger Europe more, given Europe's limited military capabilities and the proximity of potentially threatening states. For as far as one can see, Europe will continue to need America to be truly secure.

At the same time, a close relationship with Europe philosophically legitimates and gives focus to America's global role. It creates a community of democratic states without which the United States would be lonely in the world. Preserving, enhancing and especially enlarging that community--in order to "secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity"--must therefore remain America's historically vital task.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national security adviser to the president, is author of The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (Basic Books, 1997). This is the second of three articles on U.S. foreign policy by the author. The third will appear in the Fall issue, and will address the topic of Russia in the context of U.S. policy, the EU and NATO.

Comments on Brzezinski

Daniel Vernet:

ZBIGNIEW Brzezinski knows exactly where a European defense force could be deployed: in Corsica! Thank you, Doctor. We already have the French gendarmerie, a kind of national guard that is in great demand in Bosnia and Kosovo, for that.

More seriously, Brzezinski represents the benevolent side of the American attitude toward the European integration process, including the attempt to build European projection forces allegedly capable of acting independently of NATO. He does not criticize this decision. He does not recommend that Washington should undermine it. He does not transform it into a problem of principle, which could divide the two sides of the Atlantic. Being more than skeptical about the ability of the Europeans to accomplish what they have embarked upon, he gives the American administration a piece of sound advice: do not fear the emergence of a rival. Brzezinski has a good case, underpinned by arguments that are hardly dismissible. Let me stress a few of them:

1) Integration has replaced unification as the ultimate goal of the European process. It will be a slow process, as a too speedy one could divide Europe rather than unite it.

2) Europe will grow horizontally rather than vertically, and widening is not compatible with deepening.

3) ESDI--the European Security and Defense Identity--does not represent a threat to NATO because, even in the most optimistic hypothesis, it will be effective only in unserious crises.

4) NATO and the EU should extend at the same pace, excluding no country a priori and including close association with Russia. Russia should recognize that this combined NATO-EU enlargement does not contradict its own interests. If it does not do so, NATO and EU enlargements will be needed to provide security to an expanded Europe.

Brzezinski seems to accept the Attali vision of a Europe from the Atlantic to Vladivostok, which is inconsistent with the dream of the founding fathers of the Common Market and the European Community. That dream envisaged the new Europe not only as a free-trade zone but as an international actor, a political partner for America--maybe not a global power for this generation or the next one, but a regional power, not only overcoming the historical conflicts between its member states but exporting security and possibly prosperity to its "near abroad."

Brzezinski is right: there is a contradiction between this vision--traditionally supported by every French government but not necessarily shared by all its partners in the EU--and the present shape of Europe. He is also right to point out that this situation will probably not change in the next few years. In some matters (the institutions, for example) Europe is more likely to accommodate the existing framework than to make the profound changes needed by a grand bond en avant. In other matters (such as defense), it lacks either the will or the means, or both, to have a common policy; in particular, it lacks the political will to allocate more resources to defense budgets, without which it will be impossible for Europe to have a common foreign and security policy.

All these points are indisputable. However, the future of the European Union does not look quite as bleak as described by Brzezinski. Up to now, Europe has not reached a point of no return, which could make the original vision impossible. Furthermore, every measure taken in the last decade--single market, euro, free circulation of people inside Europe (the so-called "Schengenland"), nomination of a High Representative for External Relations and Common Security, a modest but realistic step toward a European defense--leaves open the possibility of future improvements, even if they would not be spectacular ones. All options are still on the table.

Take the projection forces. Brzezinski rightly notes that the European reaction will not be independent if the crisis is serious. For the time being, that is certainly so. But an independent reaction in a less than vital conflict would be a major step forward compared with the inability and unwillingness of the Europeans to act in some low-intensity crises of recent years. Let us take the first step before the second.

Europe will not be a military power, but it will not set limits to its ambition and be a soft power, the kind of larger Switzerland Brzezinski refers to.

Since the end of World War II the American attitude regarding European integration has always been ambiguous: unify but not too much. The end of the Cold War has not altered this ambivalence: poor Europe that is incapable of going beyond a limited integration; happy America that has such an ally.

Daniel Vernet is director for international relations at Le Monde.

Christoph Bertram:

FOR all its many good points, Brzezinski's prescription for the future U.S.-European relationship is, in the final analysis, a complacent and hence a flawed one. It can be summed up in one sentence: Europe, far from turning into a rival for the United States, will remain a dependent variable, a useful tool for U.S. strategy to spread stability to as many countries outside Russia as possible by incorporating them; it should be humored but not regarded as an equal partner by the United States.

On one issue Brzezinski is right: there is no need for Americans to panic as the EU tries to speed up defense integration. The angry fluster in some Washington corridors caused by plans for modest if urgent improvements in European capabilities for "out of area" military intervention has no justification: whatever comes of the plan, in the event European forces will have to draw on U.S. assets and hence to gain prior U.S. agreement.

But to make military power the litmus test of European integration is to repeat Stalin's mistake of judging the Catholic Church by the number of its divisions. Even Brzezinski, that most European of American realpolitikers, does not understand what this emerging Europe is really about. For him, it is "a polity construed on convenience", not "conviction", a pragmatic device for shared prosperity and stability. But pragmatism fails to explain the extent to which proud states, steeped in their respective histories, have sacrificed national autonomy for European interdependence. What drove them to submit to the authority of common laws and a common supreme court, to create a common currency, to unite the western part of the Continent, to invite the new democracies of the rest of Europe into their midst, and now to try and develop the means for autonomous military action was never merely convenience. It was, and is, a certain idea of what Europe should be.

The power of this idea should not be underrated. Americans used to recognize this, patiently but persistently encouraging efforts at European integration during all the decades of the Cold War. Now, perhaps out of irritation over Europe's newfound confidence, coupled with a one-track fascination with their own military and technological prowess and the dizziness of grandeur that has descended upon the world's only and probably last superpower, Americans seem to have lost both the patience and the vision. Sadly, Brzezinski here provides a strategic rationale for this loss.

It is shortsighted nevertheless, and for the very reasons the author himself states so eloquently at the beginning of his article: "America and Europe together serve as the axis of global stability." There is no other similar partner for an America that cares about international order, prosperity and democratic progress. And Europe, whatever its shortcomings, is a much stronger partner today than during the Cold War. It will be stronger still in the future.

Therefore it should be America's prime interest to lay the foundations today for a partnership with the Europe of tomorrow. U.S. supremacy may last for a generation but it will not last forever. What better use to make of this temporary advantage than to establish now the institutional framework for a partnership in which a Europe that will be stronger than it is today and an America that will be weaker can work together for order, prosperity and democracy in tomorrow's world? That, Dr. Brzezinski, would be imaginative realpolitik!

Christoph Bertram is a contributing editor of Foreign Policy. He is head of the Foundation for Science and Policy, a research center on international affairs that advises the German government and parliament.

Timothy Garton Ash:

AS I would always expect from Zbigniew Brzezinski, this essay is lucid, incisive, far-reaching and stimulating. I have the problem of agreeing with most of its analysis and policy recommendations, especially those on NATO and EU enlargement. Let me nonetheless, as an English European, tease out five points, partly in disagreement, partly in necessary elaboration.

First, I am always in favor of saying things that are true, even if they are politically unhelpful. The statement that Europe is a "de facto military protectoratexof the United States" seems to me neither true nor helpful. If I say "Xanadu is a French protectorate", this is generally understood to mean that the French run Xanadu. The Americans do not run Europe. Even in the weaker sense of "being dependent for military protection" this statement is scarcely true since, chaotic though Europe's defense arrangements are, there are no major current threats to our security against which the major European powers could not defend themselves and their EU partners.

Second, it is, however, true that even the strongest EU countries are still pathetically reliant on the United States in the case of any actual military action beyond the frontiers of the EU, even in a small patch of our own backyard such as Kosovo. I think one could usefully spell out that one major reason for this is that the leaders of Western Europe set the wrong priorities at the end of the Cold War, putting the creation of a common currency before that of a common army. With the present initiatives for improved foreign policy and defense coordination, the EU is doing in 2000 what it should have done in 1990. (I make the argument in more detail in my new book, History of the Present.)

Third, Brzezinski is absolutely right about the urgent need for the United States to be seen to be supporting, rather than carping at, these belated initiatives, especially in the defense field. The top-level political message from the new administration in Washington should be entirely and emphatically positive: "We want Europe to have a stronger defense identity and effective rapid reaction force." The supplementary stick might usefully be: "and we now expect you to look after Kosovo yourselves." Justified reservations about NATO compatibility can all be explored at lower, more technical levels.

Fourth, yes, Europe will never be a country. But (partly by means of introspection) I am not so pessimistic as Brzezinski is about the possibilities of positive emotional identification with Europe. Indeed, I think we have mutual friends in Central Europe who could well imagine "dying for Europe." Malgrétout, Europe has a soul. There is a struggle going on for this soul. Crudely stated, this is a new version of the old argument between the Atlanticist, liberal, global free-trading orientation, and the Gaullist, étatist, protectionist one. Historically, the balance of advantage has been moving from the latter to the former.

Fifth, by what it does and says, the United States will significantly affect this struggle, for better or for worse. Neither expecting a United States of Europe, nor accepting a Europe as Greater Switzerland, it should work toward two goals best defined by one George Bush (Sr.): "partners in leadership" and "Europe whole and free."

Timothy Garton Ash is author of History of the Present: Essays, Sketches and Dispatches from Europe in the 1990s (Random House, forthcoming). He wrote this comment while a visiting scholar at the Hoover Institution Stanford, CA.