Judging from recent headlines, things are going pretty well in the
war on terrorism. In his State of the Union address, President Bush
declared, "We have the terrorists on the run. We're keeping them on
the run. One by one, the terrorists are learning the meaning of
American justice." Several months later, Attorney General John
Ashcroft unabashedly claimed, "We are winning the war on terrorism."
Praise is also flowing from outside the government. Writing in the
Washington Post, David Ignatius portrays an Al-Qaeda that is
intimidated, divided, demoralized and reduced in both capacity and
morale. Apparently, even the long-term looks bright. Max Boot
contends that "the prospect of spending the rest of their lives in
Guantanamo Bay may even dissuade some of the more faint-hearted
Islamists from taking up arms." Highlighting this progress was the
March arrest of Khalid Sheikh Mohamed--the latest, and perhaps most
devastating, of a series of deaths, detentions and disruptions that
Al-Qaeda has suffered.

A closer look, however, leaves room for skepticism, or at least
caution. The United States has made considerable--even
surprising--progress in defeating a skilled and vast enemy.
Nevertheless, the job is far from complete. The May 2003 terrorist
attacks in Saudi Arabia and Morocco provide painful proof that
Al-Qaeda remains a lethal threat. More importantly, Al-Qaeda and the
ideology it promulgates remain strong, and the Middle East in
particular will remain fertile ground for anti-U.S. radicalism for
many years to come. As a result, for years and perhaps decades
Americans must live with the risk of large-scale terrorist violence.

The Perils of Measuring Success

Successful counter-terrorism is notoriously difficult to measure.
Unlike a conventional military campaign, there is no enemy capital to
capture or industrial base to destroy. Even a divided and demoralized
terrorist organization still has the capability to lash out and kill
many innocents.

To gauge success, it is tempting to rely on a "body count" approach.
In their public statements to Congress on February 11, 2003, FBI
Director Robert Mueller III, CIA Director George Tenet and other
senior officials emphasized the number of arrests and disruptions.
Mueller testified that "We have charged over 200 suspected terrorists
with crimes", while Tenet noted that "more than one-third of the top
Al-Qaeda leadership identified before the war has been captured or
killed." President Bush himself reportedly keeps a "scorecard" that
notes which Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders are dead or in custody.

A body count approach is appealing because it provides a concrete
measure of success and failure. Yet this approach is deeply
flawed--and it is not, by the way, something new in the annals of
American thinking. A body count can be misleading because the size of
the terrorist cadre is often unknown, and many of those killed or
captured are low-level recruits who can easily be replaced. More
importantly, it fails to reflect the impact on the adversary's
morale, recruitment, fundraising, and residual ability to conduct
sophisticated attacks.

Serious data problems, however, put a more comprehensive and
sophisticated approach to measuring success nearly beyond reach. It
is difficult to gauge precisely the morale or skill of Western
military forces, let alone those of shadowy terrorist organizations.
Most of Al-Qaeda's money comes from private sources--and some of the
donors do not know that they are supporting terrorism, believing that
their contributions are for charity. Even recruitment is difficult to
measure. There is no easy way to determine the size of Al-Qaeda, the
number and scale of its affiliates and proxies; or who its donors,
active supporters and potential sympathizers are. Local governments
often do not know, deliberately conceal, or may at times exaggerate
the Al-Qaeda presence in their countries.

Despite these limits, it is still better to struggle with less
precise categories and poor data than to rely exclusively on a body
count approach to the problem. Five genuinemeasures of success stand
out.

One concerns the freedom terrorists have to operate. If terrorists
have secure areas in which they can organize and plan with little
fear, they can wait to strike at their pleasure. Counter-terrorism
officials can at best stop an individual operation, but they will not
be able to shut down the network as a whole. Curtailing terrorists'
freedom of operation requires both ending obvious havens and working
with allies to prevent terrorist activity in their countries (as
well, of course, as in our own).

Second, a high level of domestic support for counter-terrorism is
also vital. The fight against Al-Qaeda and similar radicals may last
a generation. The American people must sign on for the long haul to
pay for intelligence budgets and security assistance to allied
regimes. They must themselves also contribute to fighting terrorism.
In Israel, local police, bus drivers and other ordinary citizens are
often the first to notice suspicious activity, helping to prevent
numerous attacks or minimize their lethality. This fight is not
restricted to soldiers and government officials.

The third measure consists of taking stock of the status of an
adversary's leadership and command structure. Some terrorist groups
have quickly folded when their top command was compromised: the
Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey and the Sendero Luminoso in
Peru both essentially collapsed when their leaders were captured.
Groups such as Al-Qaeda, however, have a much deeper and more diffuse
leadership structure that reaches far beyond even a charismatic and
skilled leader like Osama bin Laden. Like Hizballah, which has lost
numerous leaders to Israeli attacks and infighting in Lebanon,
Al-Qaeda's bench is deep.

This is why, for a group like Al-Qaeda, disrupting recruitment is a
vital fourth measure of success. It is not enough to stop the current
group of terrorists if they will simply be replaced by another
generation of eager and skilled recruits. It is even plausible that
if Al-Qaeda itself is destroyed as an organization, similar groups
will rise in its place. Leftist groups in Europe collapsed not only
because of good police and intelligence work, but also because
Marxism in general became discredited, reducing the allure of that
particular sort of radical ideology. It is essential to win the
hearts and minds of would-be radicals to the point that they do not
support or join the cause. But if hearts and minds cannot be won,
deterrence is essential: both radicals and their would-be followers
must be convinced that the costs of warring against the United States
and its allies are too high.

The fifth measure of success--the one that matters most to U.S.
citizens--is whether a terrorist adversary is committing attacks.
Indeed, this measure not only reflects the overall threat the group
poses, but also the group's very viability. To continue to attract
recruits and raise money, terrorist organizations (like political
causes of all types) need to demonstrate that they are active and
relevant. If an organization goes too long without any action,
potential supporters will look to others to carry the banner--or will
go looking for something else to do with their lives. Yet all attacks
are not equal. A group capable of orchestrating simultaneous
hijackings is far more menacing than one that is only able to shoot a
tourist or a missionary. With these five measures in mind, let us
review how well we are really doing in the war on terror.

Less Freedom to Operate

With regard to the first measure of success--Al-Qaeda's freedom to
operate--the first six months after September 11 witnessed several
major U.S. victories. Most obviously, the United States and its
Afghan allies ended Al-Qaeda's sanctuary in Afghanistan. Although it
appears that Osama bin Laden sought to draw the United States into a
debilitating and bloody conflict there, the United States and its
Afghan allies quickly routed the Taliban with few losses and killed
or dispersed much of Al-Qaeda's cadres.

Some skeptics contend that such dispersal has little impact, since in
the information age Al-Qaeda can still use computers and cell phones
to plan and organize attacks from anywhere in the world. This misses
the point. Afghanistan was a haven for training and recruitment as
well as for planning. Al-Qaeda and its supporters sent thousands of
radicals to Afghanistan, allowing the group to choose the most
skilled and dedicated to help with operations. In addition, in
Afghanistan Al-Qaeda members enjoyed relative immunity from attack,
reducing the stress inherent in the life of a radical revolutionary.

In short, the United States and its allies now have the initiative.
Before the fall of the Taliban, a senior Al-Qaeda planner or
organizer could quickly flee to Afghanistan whenever the heat grew
unbearable. Eight senior Al-Qaeda members charged with plotting the
1998 embassy bombings in Africa (including bin Laden) were believed
to be in Afghanistan, outside the reach of justice. Similarly,
Egyptian Islamic Jihad leader 'Ayman Zawahiri went to Afghanistan to
avoid arrest and detention in Egypt. The Congressional September 11
Inquiry quoted one counter-terrorism official as stating that
Al-Qaeda's haven in Afghanistan gave it the initiative and prevented
the intelligence community from doing more than reacting to its
constant plots. In this official's eyes, the United States was
"trying to chop down a tree by picking the fruit." Now Al-Qaeda
members must be constantly on the run, unable to relax or to vet new
recruits with the same thoroughness.

A second, less noticeable, advance is the worldwide police and
intelligence campaign against Al-Qaeda. Before the attacks,
counter-terrorism was often low on the list of U.S. priorities in
talks with European and Asian allies. Even when senior U.S. officials
did raise the issue, many foreign governments did not see the same
degree of danger as did the United States. This produced tremendous
benefits for Al-Qaeda. As Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz
testified, "even worse than the training camps [in Afghanistan], was
the training that took place here in the United States and the
planning that took place in Germany." In essence, many governments
around the world, including ours, provided Al-Qaeda a permissive
environment in which to operate. Although these governments in no way
supported Islamic radicalism, their own indifference or legal
restrictions allowed Al-Qaeda operatives to recruit, train and plan
with relative impunity.

No more. Although allied governments' police and intelligence
services have different degrees of skill and face different political
pressures, they have unquestionably made Al-Qaeda a priority. In
Europe and in Asia, security services are far more willing to monitor
and act against suspected radicals. In addition, several countries
have scrutinized their legal codes to ensure that terrorists do not
exploit various loopholes. Tenet testified on February 11, 2003 that
more than a hundred countries have been involved in the capture and
arrest of Al-Qaeda members.

An Incomplete Body Count

The United States has also killed or arrested numerous Al-Qaeda
leaders. Although the total number of those arrested comes to more
than 3,000, according to Tenet, these arrests often receive little
notice, appearing in media coverage as just another unknown person
sent to an undisclosed facility where it is unclear what may be
revealed. Yet such measures are the indispensible ingredients of
counter-terrorism success. These arrests do more than take dangerous
individuals off the street and bring them to justice. Each individual
arrested brings with him the potential to reveal more of the broader
network, helping U.S. and allied intelligence focus more effectively
on stopping the next attack and making it harder for Al-Qaeda to
train and vet troops.

In March, the United States and its allies scored perhaps their
biggest success yet: the capture in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, of Khalid
Sheikh Mohamed, the mastermind of 9/11 and a key Al-Qaeda planner and
facilitator. His capture is only the latest in an impressive series
of victories. As the war in Afghanistan commenced, U.S. bombing
killed Al-Qaeda's military chief, Mohamed Atef. Numerous other
Al-Qaeda members were killed in Afghanistan, along with members of
affiliated groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the
Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Abu Zubayda, Al-Qaeda's chief recruiter and
thus an individual who could detail the full extent of the
organization, was taken prisoner in Pakistan. Ramzi bin al-Shibh,
another 9/11 planner, was also captured. Numerous regional and local
leaders, such as Abdel-Rahim al-Nashiri, the Al-Qaeda chief of
operations for the Persian Gulf, have also been captured or killed.
So, too, have financiers, logisticians and leading trainers.

This considerable progress should not obscure remaining tasks,
however. Much of Al-Qaeda's senior leadership apparently remains
alive, including of course bin Laden himself and his deputy,
Zawahiri. So too is Saif al-Adel, Al-Qaeda's long-time security
chief, and Abu Hafs, nicknamed "The Mauritanian", who led religious
education efforts and was involved in many operations. Not only can
these leaders continue to organize and plan, as the mid-May
atrocities in Riyadh and Casablanca clearly show, but the failure to
kill or capture them bolsters their cause. As terrorism expert Bruce
Hoffman explains, "for bin Laden--like guerrillas and terrorists
everywhere--not losing is winning." As long as these leaders remain
alive in the face of a massive worldwide manhunt, they build stature
for their movement simply by their successful defiance. (In the
Middle East, in particular, leaders have often "won" politically by
losing militarily. No one expected Egyptian President Nasser to
defeat Britain in 1956, his successor Anwar Sadat to defeat Israel in
1973, or Saddam Hussein to defeat the United States in 1991. Rather,
all three leaders gained admiration for successful defiance against
an acknowledged superior foe, not outright victory.)

Focusing on a body count of the pre-September 11 Al-Qaeda leadership
also misses several of its most frightening characteristics,
including its tremendous ability to regenerate, rather like demonic
plenaria. An anonymous intelligence officer, in the superb book
Through Our Enemies' Eyes, notes that in the years before September
11 police and security forces worldwide disrupted Al-Qaeda cells and
arrested many members. In mid-1996, Al-Qaeda's senior military
commander, Abu Ubaydah al-Banshiri, drowned in Lake Victoria.
Al-Qaeda also lost Ali Muhammad, its leading trainer, when he was
arrested in September 1998. Another huge blow came the next month
when German authorities arrested Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, a key
logistician. Sidi al-Madani al-Tayyib, Al-Qaeda's chief financial
officer, was captured by or surrendered to the Saudi government in
1997, and the Saudi regime also arrested 300 bin Laden supporters in
early 1999. As with the arrests and disruptions today, these efforts
probably saved hundreds if not thousands of lives--but they did not
stop the growth of the movement. As the anonymous officer argues,
Al-Qaeda's ability to recover from detentions, deaths and other
disruptions make claims of its demise by officials "sound like
nothing so much as an arrogant ninny whistling past the graveyard."

Al-Qaeda also regenerates entire lost cells. For example, in August
1997 the home of an Al-Qaeda lieutenant, Wadih el-Hage, was raided in
Sudan, and he fled the country (disturbingly, to a "haven" in the
United States). Although this would be a permanent setback for many
organizations, a year later Al-Qaeda successfully destroyed the U.S.
Embassy in neighboring Kenya. Again, even after several of the
bombers were arrested and the FBI combed through Kenya looking for
suspects, Al-Qaeda launched another attack in Kenya in November 2002
on a hotel frequented by Israelis. The Kenya experience suggests that
cells wrapped up today may reappear tomorrow. So do the May 2003
attacks, and the evidence that Saif al-Adel has taken the place of
Mohamed Atef as military commander.

In addition to its regenerative powers, the body count approach fails
to capture the plain fact that Al-Qaeda is not just a distinct
terrorist organization: it is a movement that seeks to inspire and
coordinate other groups and individuals. Even if Al-Qaeda is taking
losses beyond its ability to recuperate, there is still a much
broader Islamist movement that is hostile to the United States, seeks
to overthrow U.S. allies and is committed to mass-casualty terrorist
violence. A proper listing of the Al-Qaeda roster should also
include, at the very least, senior officials of the Egyptian Islamic
Jihad, Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia, the Salafist Group for
Preaching and Combat in Algeria, and al-Ittihad al-Islamiyah in
Somalia. A more comprehensive list would add Kashmiri groups, the
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Armed Islamic Group, the Al-Jama
Al-Islamiyya and other organizations with strong institutional and
personal ties to Al-Qaeda. It probably should include, at least
potentially, the Hizb ut-Tahrir organization worldwide, which,
despite its claims to be against terrorism, is an extremely radical
group.

The conceptual key is this: Al-Qaeda is not a single terrorist group
but a global insurgency. Unlike the November 17 organization in
Greece, Al-Qaeda cannot be crushed with a few key arrests. It
requires instead a painstaking and lengthy struggle to dismantle not
only the current leadership, but also the broader organizational
structure. In addition, the recruiting environment also must be
addressed, or today's victories will be short-lived.

Declining Domestic Engagement?

Another advance--one that is in jeopardy--is an increased U.S. public
concern about foreign affairs. President Bush's successful
mobilization of domestic opinion to confront Iraq, for example, would
have been impossible had the American public not been sensitized to
the risks of neglecting problems until they become truly dangerous.
The administration has faced little criticism for its various
counter-terrorism initiatives despite recent killings of Americans in
Kuwait, Pakistan, Yemen and elsewhere--all because the public now
understands the continued danger of terrorism and the need for the
United States to be active abroad in fighting it.

In addition, the American public is more vigilant at home. Too easily
this vigilance can slip over into racism or undue suspicion. Vague
electronic messages on our highways to "report suspicious activities"
certainly fall into this latter category. But in general, police and
the FBI have acted circumspectly, and predictions that America would
become a xenophobic police state have not materialized. Instead,
Americans again trust their police and government to protect them,
and most are willing to assist rather than to merely watch from the
sidelines.

The risk of complacency, however, is growing. As Americans return to
business as usual, the urgency that characterized the months after
September 11, 2001 has dissipated. In October 2002, a Council on
Foreign Relations Task Force led by former Senators Gary Hart and
Warren Rudman declared that "America remains dangerously unprepared
to prevent and respond to a catastrophic terrorist attack on U.S.
soil." Although the appointment of Governor Tom Ridge to head a
Homeland Security Department is an important step forward, the fact
that it took well over a year to do so--and that it will take at
least several years to streamline the chaotic grouping of agencies
dumped into the new Department--is dispiriting.

A Surprising Calm

Although incomplete, the impressive advances achieved by the United
States and its allies may explain perhaps the biggest surprise since
the September 11 attacks: the absence of another mass casualty attack
involving Americans. In 2002, Al-Qaeda and its allies killed 200
people, 19 of whom were American. But this low American body count
was a close-run thing. Richard Reid, the so-called "shoebomber", was
thwarted from killing hundreds only by an alert stewardess--and by
his own abundant incompetence.

Nevertheless, the predictions of many informed observers (including me)
that another major attack was imminent have proven false. Success may be
due to disruptions of Al-Qaeda's command structure, the
organization's temporary suspension of operations until police and
intelligence pressures let up, or just good fortune. Trumpeting this
success would be foolish, however; for all any of us knows, tomorrow
may witness massive bloodshed. But even a year and a half of only
limited violence--and violence confined to targets overseas--is
clearly a success.

Even the Bali attack of October 2002 and killings of Americans in
Pakistan, Kuwait and Yemen can even be portrayed as a sort of
progress, albeit grim, in the effort against Al-Qaeda. In the past,
Al-Qaeda focused its attacks on symbolic targets linked to the United
States, particularly diplomatic and military facilities. The 1998
attacks on U.S. embassies in Africa and the 2000 attack on U.S.S.
Cole both indicated an adversary that sought to confront American
power head on--and was admired for it. The September 11 attacks were
against notably symbolic targets, and the attackers' daring is
unquestionable. The Bali attack, in contrast, was not the sort of
gesture that draws admiration from potential sympathizers. To all but
the most zealous or deluded, young Australian tourists are a far
lesser foe than American soldiers, diplomats and financiers.
Similarly, the attacks on missionary doctors in Yemen--people who had
devoted their lives to helping poor Yemenis and had gained the
respect of the local community--discredit the militants' cause. The
same may be said of the May 2003 attacks in Riyadh and Casablanca:
low-tech and likely counterproductive overall.

An apt comparison can be made to the 1997 Al-Jama Al-Islamiyya attack
on the Temple of Hatshepsut in Luxor, Egypt where 58 tourists and
four Egyptians were murdered. The attack was roundly condemned, not
only by Western governments but by other radical Islamists who viewed
it as discrediting their cause. Support for Al-Jama Al-Islamiyya
plummeted in Egypt. Similarly, the Armed Islamic Group grew so brutal
in its campaign against the Algerian government that it disgusted
many Muslims who sympathized initially with its ideals. These groups
remain active, but their brutality has alienated the people they most
wanted to attract and, over time, has seriously hindered their
efforts.

In any event, the lack of a major attack against Americans so far
should not obscure the fact that Al-Qaeda and affiliated groups
probably remain capable of another major attack. Numerous senior U.S.
officials have publicly and repeatedly warned that the United States
is at risk of another attack from Al-Qaeda, and that this attack
could occur with little warning. They are right.

Losing Hearts, Losing Minds

Although in the short-term the war goes well, the long-term outlook
is more troubling. Al-Qaeda continues to draw numerous recruits
throughout the Middle East and the Islamic world more broadly. The
September 11 attacks built on Al-Qaeda's past successes, making it
clearly the leading anti-American movement in the world. Although it
is difficult to get more than an anecdotal sense of Al-Qaeda's
recruitment, bin Laden himself gloated about his successes in a
videotape shot before the overthrow of the Taliban. A UN report
released in December 2002 also noted that Al-Qaeda continued to
attract recruits and raise money successfully.

Al-Qaeda's worldwide stature as America's number one enemy may have
also allowed it to globalize what were in essence local conflicts.
Before September 11, Al-Qaeda constantly strove to turn local
movements into ones that shared its global anti-U.S. agenda. It had
mixed success. In the future, however, radicals fighting Egypt,
Israel, Russia, China, Algeria and other countries may focus more of
their attention on America. The jihadi movement in general appears
increasingly anti-American in its focus.

Indeed, American successes in shutting down terrorism in Afghanistan
and dispersing Al-Qaeda's fighters may help turn local groups against
the United States. Although organizations like Hamas and the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan have no love for the United States, they have
not as of yet actively focused on American targets. This may change.
Al-Qaeda-linked militants, most of whom will enjoy considerable
prestige because of their ties to the group's past glories, may
reshape the local groups they rejoin. In Algeria in the 1990s,
returning fighters from Afghanistan radicalized local groups, and a
similar effect could be felt in Kashmir, Chechnya and among
Palestinians. Given that these groups have recruiting and fundraising
networks in Europe and elsewhere, a shift in targeting by these
organizations could prove very deadly.

Even as Al-Qaeda remains attractive, the United States appears to be
failing to win support in the Muslim world. Polls taken before the
war with Iraq became imminent suggest that the United States is
positively regarded (though not uncritically supported) in all
regions of the world except for the Middle East. In Jordan, Pakistan
and Egypt--all of which have governments that are strongly supportive
of the war on terror--popular dislike of the United States is
particularly intense. In Egypt, the second largest recipient of
American aid, only 6 percent of the population has a favorable
opinion of the United States.

Much-touted U.S. efforts at public diplomacy have so far made little
progress. Indeed, the most egregious and ridiculous conspiracy
theories appear to gain more credence in the Muslim world than do
patient U.S. efforts to gain support for its policies or attempts to
demonstrate "even-handedness" in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In
the Arab world in particular, the poverty of alternatives to the
region's authoritarian governments further burnish the Islamists'
credentials to would-be recruits.

More generally, the legitimacy of U.S. power in the world is
suffering, including among the populations of many of our (formerly?)
closest allies. As Robert Satloff contends,

"For nations liberated by America in our parents' lifetime to tell
pollsters they believe . . . that Americans have somehow sacrificed
their moral compass while waging the war on terror bespeaks a
thundering failure to deliver the message of our policies abroad."

Ironically, too, U.S. efforts to fight terrorism have sometimes
fostered rather than diminished anti-U.S. perceptions. Washington's
embrace of sordid governments such as the Karimov regime in
Uzbekistan, its silence regarding Russian brutality in Chechnya and
other distasteful concessions offered to ensure these governments'
cooperation against Al-Qaeda are bolstering claims that the United
States supports the oppression of Muslims and props up brutal
governments.

The U.S.-Iraq conflict, too, is likely to increase hostility among
even moderate Islamists, particularly in the near-term. Richard
Clarke, the senior counter-terrorism official in both the Clinton and
(until recently) the George W. Bush administrations, contends:

"The war as seen on television in Islamic countries has dangerously
increased the level of frustration, anger, and hatred directed at the
United States. It has given radical Islamic terrorists another
target, U.S. personnel in Iraq. The seeds of future terrorism have
been sown."

There is plenty of evidence for this statement. Two moderate
Indonesian clerics (one of whom holds a degree from the University of
Chicago), for example, criticized U.S. policy toward Iraq and
immigration restrictions on Indonesians going to the United States
and refused to attend meetings in Washington. Scholars at Egypt's
Al-Azhar University, the leading institution of Islamic learning in
the Arab world, declared a U.S. attack on Iraq to be a "crusade" and
called for jihad in response. These are not voices in the wilderness,
but rather the core of the Sunni Muslim religious establishment.

Such problems are perhaps inevitable. Although public diplomacy
efforts should be both reviewed and renewed, making progress in a
region where most hearts and minds appear firmly set against America
is exceptionally difficult. At best, perhaps, we can strive for neutrality
or distaste rather than set our sights on a warm embrace. Similarly, when
possible the United States should distance itself from brutal
Middle Eastern regimes--but this is seldom possible and never
uncomplicated. This is because Al-Qaeda cannot be allowed another
sanctuary, or even another permissive environment, which is precisely
what such distancing could produce. Washington should try to make its
allies' own campaigns against their local militants less brutal, and
try to encourage efforts that will gain the goodwill of the
population in general. But the imperative of stopping another attack
will force the United States to embrace some dictators, even knowing
that this may contribute to problems in the long run.

Little Progress on Deterrence

Deterring terrorists is exceptionally difficult even under the best
of circumstances. In general, many terrorists are highly committed
and willing to take considerable personal risks. Potential followers
are easier to dissuade, but even they may be highly motivated.

So far, U.S. successes probably have had little deterrent effect. Bin
Laden and Zawahiri remain alive, defying a worldwide manhunt.
Operations against the West continue, even if they are less dramatic
than those of September 11. The U.S. failure to trap much of the
Al-Qaeda cadre at Tora Bora, and the reluctance to commit American
ground troops in large numbers, have validated for many bin Laden's
rhetoric that Americans are afraid to get their hands dirty in a
fight and will thus collapse if hit hard. The video bin Laden
released on February 11, on the occasion of the Id al-Adha, urging
Iraqis to take up arms against American invaders, also contained
taunts that Americans were cowards in Afghanistan, as they were not
willing to fight hard on the ground. Taken together, these weaknesses
may convince potential recruits and supporters that Al-Qaeda remains
a horse worth wagering on.

As to new sanctuaries, there may arise new Afghanistans where would-be radicals can congregate and form lasting ties. Numerous jihads continue without letup. Chechnya remains a bloody standoff, attracting militant Islamists as well as homegrown radicals. Kashmir has died down but may soon re-ignite. Xinjiang remains turbulent, and Indonesia may flare up as well despite, or maybe because of the government's late-April crackdown on Jemaah Islamiyah and its military approach in Aceh.

An even more troubling phenomenon is the discovery of possible cells in the United States itself. In essence, the September 11 hijackers were infiltrators in the United States, taking advantage of permeable U.S. borders to plot their attacks. The arrests of alleged militants in Lackawanna, Seattle, Detroit, Chicago, Florida and Portland also indicate that Islamic radicalism is appealing to individuals rooted in American communities. The FBI estimates that several hundred militants linked to Al-Qaeda are in the United States. This challenge is distinct from protecting borders and ensuring proper visa issuance. But it is certainly no less daunting.

But Today the Struggle

THERE ARE few easy choices in the war against terrorism, and no silver bullets. Anti-U.S. sentiment will remain strong, and it may even grow as the United States aggressively disrupts existing militant networks. Conflicts in Chechnya, Kashmir and elsewhere will rise or decline largely on their own accord, with the United States having at best marginal influence. As a result, radicals will continue to enjoy success in recruiting and fundraising. Even if Al-Qaeda's current leadership cadre is killed or arrested, its ideals and legend will remain strong, inspiring the next generation of radicals--who may well manage to get hold of truly dangerous biological or radiological substances.

As a result, current operations against existing cadres remain necessary At times, killing the right leader may dishearten a movement or a cell, and his arrest may produce valuable information that can wrap up a much broader network. Such benefits, even if ephemeral, are worth the effort, and even if they may create problems over the long-term. This is because failure to act would not only allow current operations to succeed, but would also enable existing terrorist networks to deepen and expand, making attacks deadlier and more frequent.

There is no easy long-term strategy that guarantees success. Instead, the United States and its allies must accept the inevitability of a large, global movement bent on murder as a form of political expression. With skill and energy; we can beat it back. Outright defeat will be far harder. That may depend ultimately on the proverbial draining of the political swamp. But by any measure it is a very large swamp.

Daniel Byman is assistant professor in the Security Studies Program of Georgetown University and a non-resident senior fellow at thc Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution