Why should the United States maintain troops in the Republic ofKorea (ROK)? What American interests are being served by thealliance? Officials in both capitals maintain that the allianceremains as relevant as ever. The two governments insist that the"fundamental goal is to enhance deterrence and security on theKorean Peninsula."

But Washington's Cold War security concern for the ROK hasdisappeared. Even if the security of South Korea remained vital tothe United States--and it does not--America's treaty and troopsaren't necessary to achieve that end. The South has dramaticallyoutstripped North Korea on virtually every measure of nationalpower and can stand on its own.

South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun told graduates of the KoreanAir Force Academy in March: "We have sufficient power to defendourselves. We have nurtured mighty national armed forces thatabsolutely no one can challenge." Within a decade, he added, "weshould be able to develop our military into one with full commandof operations." The ROK spent $16.4 billion last year ondefense--roughly nine times North Korea's outlay--and rankseleventh in the world in total defense expenditures. His governmentis increasing military spending, up about 8.6 percent this yearover 2003, to create a "self-reliant defense that could help bringpeace and unification to the Korean peninsula."

The Bush Administration also seems to think that South Korea isbetter prepared to stand on its own. Moving U.S. forcessouth--essentially dismantling the fabled tripwire of fiftyyears--and cutting the American garrison by one-third suggest thatWashington no longer believes its military presence to be centralto the ROK's security. As Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeldexplained after meeting with South Korean Defense Minister YoonKwang-ung, "the South Koreans are appropriately increasingly takingthe lead in their own defense" and will be "assuming some missionsand some responsibilities as we adjust our relationship goingforward." Dealing with a nuclear North Korea would be morecomplicated but would not be aided by conventional troopdeployments. To the contrary, America's force presence exacerbatesthe problem by creating thousands of American nuclear hostageswithin range of Pyongyang's weapons. Whether Washington ended upholding a nuclear umbrella over the ROK or encouraging South Koreato create its own nuclear deterrent, the United States would gainnothing by maintaining an Army division and other units in theSouth.

The newly inaugurated Security Policy Initiative (SPI) talks,expected to run bimonthly over the coming year, will study, as theofficial statement after the first meeting explained, "how theKorea-U.S. alliance should be transformed to prepare for a futurein which security conditions on the Korean peninsula, such asimproved inter-Korean ties, occur." Mitchell Reiss, director ofpolicy planning for the State Department, acknowledges that "someof the assumptions that underpinned the alliance in 1953 are beingre-examined." But many Koreans worry that what Washington has inmind is the evolution of the alliance from a defense pact to aKorean blank check that will support any U.S. military action inthe region. Last fall Hankyoreh, a liberal daily newspaper,editorialized: "We must not let down our guard to the possibility[that] changes in the role of U.S. troops in Korea or a changedU.S.-Korea alliance could get Korea unwillingly dragged into aregional conflict."

An Alliance in Search of a Purpose

It would be a miraculous coincidence if a commitment forged inthe Cold War to deter a ground invasion from a contiguous neighborfunctioned equally well without adjustment to meet completelydifferent future contingencies. One cannot help but suspect thatthe means has become the end for most alliance advocates, to bepreserved irrespective of changes in the regional and globalsecurity environments.

Some alliance advocates, however, are vigorously re-imaginingthe rationale for retaining U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula.Advocates of a permanent U.S. occupation talk grandly of preservingregional stability and preparing for regional contingencies. SomeSouth Koreans do so as well: Kim Sung-ban of the Institute onForeign Affairs and National Security argues that "Even in theabsence of a military threat from North Korea", the alliance shouldbe revamped "to focus on promoting stability in Northeast Asia."Yet it is difficult to spin a scenario involving real war betweenreal countries. No general East Asian conflict, other than apossible China-Taiwan confrontation, seems to be threatening tobreak out. The region is no longer the focus of global hegemoniccompetition. All of the major regional powers benefit from peace;none has significant and growing differences with other majorpowers. Nor is it clear how unexplained "instability", as opposedto widespread conflict, would harm the global economy and thus U.S.interests. Only if nations throughout East Asia essentiallycollapsed--an unlikely event in the extreme--would there besubstantial harm to America and other countries.

North Korean acquisition of nuclear weapons would obviouslygenerate instability beyond the Korean Peninsula, but a continuingU.S. conventional presence in the ROK would do nothing to moderatesuch geopolitical shock waves. In contrast, allied cooperation todevelop a theater missile defense would help limit the threat. Sucha program would not, however, depend on maintaining today'sbilateral defense guarantee to Seoul.

Some alliance advocates argue that America's military presenceaddresses other potential enemies besides North Korea. That is, thealliance serves what Avery Goldstein called "dual-use" purposes.For instance, some analysts and politicians have suggested thathaving troops in Korea could help contain a resurgent Tokyo.Advocates of this fanciful scenario are stuck in 1945. Those whoplanned and initiated Tokyo's aggression in the 1930s and 1940s arelong dead; Japan has achieved all of the economic benefits of theGreater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere peacefully, and pacifistsentiments remain strong in what remains an overwhelminglycommercial nation. It is to the benefit of states throughoutnortheast Asia that North Korea's repeated threats and China'scontinuing hostility have moved Japan to begin doing more topromote regional security.

In response, some supporters of America's position in SouthKorea suggest using forces stationed there to intervene in localconflicts and civil wars. However, a commitment to defend"stability" in East Asia implies a willingness to intervene in ascore of local conflicts revolving around border disputes, ethnicdivisions and other parochial squabbles. Of course, Washingtonrefused to use force against Indonesia over East Timor; it is notlikely to intervene in inter-communal strife in the Moluccas orindependence demands in Aceh or Irian Jaya. The greatest threats toregional stability come from within weak if not outright failedstates: insurgency and corruption in the Philippines, democraticprotests and ethnic conflict in Burma, economic, ethnic,nationalistic and religious division in Indonesia. Most of theseproblems are not susceptible to solution via U.S. militaryintervention--nor is it clear why the Mutual Defense Pact betweenSeoul and Washington is required.

Advocates also fall back on a familiar litany of transnationalthreats such as terrorism, piracy, drug trafficking and infectiousdiseases to justify the continued existence of the alliance. Onewonders, however, how stationing troops in Korea helps to combatthe spread of aids, or whether the Air Force is preparing to bombopium fields in Burma. Piracy is a major problem, but not only isthere no reason that the regional powers--including South Korea,Singapore, Australia, Japan and Indonesia--cannot deploy more shipsand other assets to cope with this threat, U.S. ground forces basedin Korea cannot patrol the Malacca Strait. Terrorism, meanwhile, isbest combated by accurate intelligence and special forces, notthousands of conventional forces configured to repel a landassault.

Alliance advocates are searching for a new raison d'être for aCold War relic. As much as the United States might prefer tomaintain its current dominance of every continent on earth, itcannot realistically expect its influence to persist forever. Thereno longer is a global hegemonic struggle turning local disputesinto a cause for global war. So the United States should be able todevolve upon its populous and prosperous allies the responsibilityof developing adequate deterrent forces necessary to guaranteetheir own security.

The Chinese Conundrum

The one important case where the American presence more crediblycould retain relevance is the People's Republic of China. But it isnot obvious that the United States should implement a plan to"contain" Beijing, or that the ROK should join such a system.

China may soon marry the world's largest population with itsbiggest economy, assuming it continues to enjoy strong economicgrowth. It is a potential superpower, the most obvious peercompetitor to America in the not too distant future. Nothing iscertain, of course; China remains relatively poor, faces ethnic andseparatist issues, and suffers an uncertain political future.Nevertheless, its economic influence is already surpassing that ofAmerica in East Asia. In 2003, China overtook the United States asthe biggest trading partner of South Korea; in 2004, China becameJapan's biggest trading partner. By the close of 2005, China ispoised to become the dominant trader with the Association ofSoutheast Asian Nations.

China's rising "soft power" is having an impact on Koreanattitudes. A recent poll by the Program on International PolicyAttitudes found that 49 percent of South Koreans viewed Chinafavorably, compared to 47 percent negatively. Significantly, thosein their forties and younger chose friendship with China overAmerica.

The future course of Chinese-U.S. relations is uncertain, asdisputes over human rights, non-proliferation and Taiwan remain farfrom resolution. It is by no means inevitable that Beijing willemerge as an antagonist--and we should be very careful to avoidcreating a self-fulfilling prophecy. Nonetheless, Taiwan poses themost worrisome flashpoint. Despite the assumptions of some analyststhat a pragmatic leadership in Beijing would not risk its economicgains by taking military action against Taipei, nationalistsentiments are powerful throughout the Chinese population and eventhe Chinese diaspora. It would be foolish to underestimate China'sdetermination to reclaim its "breakaway province", evidenced by thevery public initiation of anti-secession legislation aimed atTaiwan.

Given that, as CIA Director Porter Goss recently testified,"Beijing's military modernization and military buildup could tiltthe balance of power in the Taiwan Strait", the United States isinterested in credible deterrence. Secretary of State CondoleezzaRice suggested what amounted to a strategy of containment beforesetting out on her March trip to Asia. She observed: "There areseveral ways to deal with [China's build-up]. Perhaps the mostimportant is to recognize the United States has very strongalliances in the region that bring stability to the region at atime when the Chinese role is changing."

For this contingency, a reformed U.S.-Korean alliance mightbenefit Washington. And the Bush Administration almost certainly isgoing to raise the issue. After all, Washington has been pressingAmerica's other friends to carefully consider what they would do ifwar comes to the Taiwan Strait. But the response has beenmixed.

Singapore Prime Minster Lee Hsein Loong returned from a visit toTaiwan in August 2004 warning Taiwan against any move towardindependence and raising serious doubts that his nation wouldactively back Washington in a confrontation with China. Australia,along with Great Britain America's strongest backer in Iraq, alsohas stepped back from U.S. support for Taiwan. Last fall, ForeignMinister Alexander Downer warned Washington not to take Australiansupport for granted. And Canberra was no more willing to backAmerica in the aftermath of Beijing's approval of itsanti-secession law. China pointedly suggested that Australia ensurethat its military relationship with the United States not encompassthe Taiwan question. Downer responded that while Canberra wouldhave to consult with America in the event of a conflict, "that is avery different thing from saying that we would make a decision togo to war."

Only Japan, in the midst of worsening relations with China andan obvious rethink of its relatively pacifist military stance inthe face of North Korean saber-rattling, seems inclined to back theUnited States in the event of a crisis in the Taiwan Strait. Inrecent security guidelines, Tokyo took the unprecedented step ofcalling Taiwan a mutual security concern. Tokyo might well flinchif war approached, but so far the Koizumi government has proved tobe increasingly tough with both China and North Korea.

Japan's stance has raised expectations regarding South Korea.What would the ROK do? No official decision has been taken, butnews reports suggest substantial opposition within the governmentto expanding the alliance's reach, especially involving a conflictbetween China and Taiwan. The Korea Herald editorialized on March11 that unlike Japan, "Korea will certainly wish to avoid beingdrawn into" a Sino-American conflict over Taiwan.

To join the United States against China would turn Seoul into animplacable enemy of its permanent neighbor, one that possesses along memory and almost certainly will eventually become theregion's dominant power, irrespective of Washington's policies.This is why Korean analysts Woosang Kim and Taeho Kim have argued,"China's growing influence over and interdependence with SouthKorea amid the continuing rivalry between the U.S. and China couldwell make untenable the proposition that both countries can jointlycooperate to resolve a plateful of concrete policy issues andlonger-term questions on the peninsula."

Thus, Seoul faces a difficult decision. Several years ago,participants in a conference on U.S.-South Korean relationsobserved that "South Korea's balancing act between its alliancewith the United States and its cooperation with China could wellturn out to be the most prominent security challenge in the 21stcentury." More recently, some analysts suggest that the ROK'schoice is a more fundamental one, essentially between China and theUnited States. Reporting on a recent conference in Honolulu,Hawaii, Richard Halloran of the Washington Times wrote: "SouthKorea is fast approaching a critical decision whether to try torevive its troubled alliance with the United States or dissolvetheir joint security treaty, expel American forces from thepeninsula and seek an alliance with China."

This may be an overstatement, but Seoul need not expel Americantroops to have them leave. In early March, President Roh declared,"I clearly state that the U.S. forces in Korea should not beinvolved in disputes in Northeast Asia without our consent." Headded, "Our people will not get entangled in regional disputesagainst our will in the future." However reasonable that might befor South Korea, if America's troops in the South are not needed todefend the ROK and Seoul is unwilling to allow America to use thoseforces for any other security purposes, why should the UnitedStates keep any military units there?

Wrapping Up the Alliance

It should come as no surprise that the majority of SouthKoreans, who most obviously benefit from their defense free-ride,oppose proposals for America to withdraw its troops and end itssecurity guarantee. However, there are good reasons for SouthKoreans to be dissatisfied with the current relationship. The priceof the American guarantee is turning decisions about South Korea'sdefense over to Washington. For many decades, this was not a graveconcern for South Koreans, especially when it appeared that warwith the North was inevitable if the United States left thepeninsula. Today, however, peace on the Korean Peninsula ispossible apart from the Mutual Defense Treaty. Far more important,South Koreans are finding that they are much more risk averse thanthe United States--as represented by both the Clinton and George W.Bush Administrations--in terms of engaging in military adventuresin the region.

Moreover, objections from South Korea might not sway the UnitedStates from its chosen course. Attitudes toward the North nowdiverge widely. The reasons are complex, but many South Koreans, inparticular younger people, view North Koreans more as long-lostbrothers than long-time enemies. Hostility toward America also hasrisen, as the older generation, which remembers the United Statesfondly for having intervened to prevent North Korean conquest in1950, passes on. In contrast, young people are more likely to thinkof Washington's support for assorted military dictators. Finally,with Seoul barely 25 miles from the North Korean border, ROKleaders and citizens alike are acutely aware of their vulnerabilityin any conflict, even though the allies would ultimately prevail.South Koreans could not have been reassured when, in early 2004,Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Senator Richard G.Lugar (r-in) contended that the United States should "not rule outany options, including--as a last resort--the use of force" to dealwith North Korea or other regional threats. Even blunter wasSenator John McCain's (R-AZ) statement: "While they may risk theirpopulations, the United States will do whatever it must toguarantee the security of the American people. And spare us theusual lectures about American unilateralism. We would prefer thecompany of North Korea's neighbors, but we will make do without itif we must." So long as American forces are based in the South,Washington will seek to dominate and control the alliance. Realequality is simply impossible.

Seoul cannot escape being tied to U.S. policy, even if it triesto disassociate itself from Washington. Imagine the imposition ofsanctions, enforcement of a blockade or military strikes on theNorth--conducted by American forces located beyond South Korea'sborders and acting outside of South Korea's borders over theobjections of the ROK. North Korea is unlikely to distinguish thepositions of the two members of the Mutual Defense Pact and islikely to view the South as an appropriate target ofretaliation.

Other dangers also await the South if it continues to tie itselfto American defense policy. The most important future internationalrelationship may well be that between the United States and China.Can Beijing peacefully assert itself on the East Asian and globalstage, and can the United States accommodate itself to a moreinfluential China? Is the ROK willing to risk its survival as aprosperous and independent nation by getting in between those twopowers? This is why the relationship between the United States andSouth Korea must change.

There is much the United States and ROK can do in the comingyears to cooperate to encourage South Korean and regional security.The SPI talks should focus on refashioning the relationship to fittoday's dramatically new security environment. Most important, theyshould begin with the presumption that Seoul will begin taking overresponsibility for its own defense. Rather than maintaining aformal commitment to defend the South from North Korea (or China,for that matter), Washington should pursue more limited forms ofdefense cooperation advantageous to both sides. Cooperation onmissile defense would be one such step. Another would be jointnaval training and maneuvers to prepare for future contingencies,such as seizure of illicit North Korean weapons shipments.Arrangements also should be made for emergency base access, shouldAmerican support be needed to thwart a serious hegemonic threatbeyond the capacity of friendly regional states to contain.

In 1971, Prime Minister Kim Jong-pil responded to the NixonAdministration's partial withdrawal by stating: "Now is no time tosurvive by depending on others--U.S. troops in our country will gohome sooner or later, which means that we must defend our countrythrough our own strength." Surely that time is now, thereby freeingthe American people from a commitment that costs far more than itis worth, absorbs valuable military resources, and keeps the Koreanpeople in a dependent relationship that insults their nationhoodand puts their destiny in another country's hands. Only then canSouth Korea and the United States decide on the contours of futuremilitary cooperation that will serve both nations.