A textbook on current political affairs can be a publisher's nightmare. However, coming out in its second edition, Putin's Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain (edited by Dale R. Herspring -- 2nd ed., Rowman & Littlefield Publishers) has stood the test of quickly changing events. Whether this volume is commenting on the latest breaking news or on the origins of nagging unsolved problems, it has the analytical scope and intellectual rigor needed for those asking the questions: "who is Putin?" and "where is Russia going?"

For most observers of contemporary Russia, Vladimir Putin remains an unexplained political figure. There appear to be two overriding issues about Putin found throughout this volume: the necessity of Putin's reform project for Russia (and the hope that he will succeed) and the growing concern that his reform project may be slowly, but very surely, drifting away from core Western values concerning the importance of democratic principles, an open and free civil society, an independent media and a competitive market economy.

The scholars contributing chapters address both these issues. All of them, to one degree or another, possess an understanding of the motives behind Putin's decision-making mindset. However, there is little consensus on the thorny question of whether Putin's vision for Russia is good for the country's future and that of the rest of the world.

Timothy J. Colton and Michael McFaul grapple with one of the most pressing issues concerning Western publics, politicians and analysts in this area: to what degree is Russia a democracy? In "Putin and Democratization," Colton and McFaul have no clear answer, but are clearly of the opinion that Russia is moving away from earlier trends that are believed to have been signs of democratic development during the 1990s.

Thomas F. Remington's "Putin, the Duma, and Political Parties" asks the same question in terms of the institutionalization of democracy found or not found in the Russia's Parliament, the Duma, and comes to, more or less, to the same conclusion.

Nikolai Petrov and Darrell Slider, in "Putin and the Regions," are even more alarmist in their concerns surrounding Kremlin ploys to crush regional autonomy.

In what is otherwise superb analysis, Colton, McFaul, Remington, Petrov and Slider tend - as Western scholars often do - to over ideologize what should be expected of Russia's democracy during a time when the direction of the country's economic development remains far from clear. Putin's Russia is not a country to be merely measured by textbook edicts or homespun hopes that its form of democracy should eventually resemble that of the United States and/or other Western countries.

Putin is clearly not anti-democratic. However, he has shown himself to be indifferent toward democratic institutions or a democratic ethos to the extent that he believes that they will hinder his implementation of his vision of a more dynamic and modern Russian economy.

Putin is often severely criticized for his interventionist approach toward Russia's mass media, particularly the electronic media. McFaul and journalist Masha Lipman, in "Putin and the Media," present a detailed review of the history of the relations between Putin and the media -- the latter once controlled by the oligarchs. They also inject a dose of skepticism as to whether Putin respects anything resembling a Western understanding of free expression in his country.

However, both get carried away a bit. They make a very counterfactual, intriguing claim, which is never followed up: "Putin could have disciplined or brought to justice Russia's oligarchs without destroying their media empires." Additionally, virtually all critics of Putin's media approach fail to ask a fundamental question when it comes to the media's role in any society: are citizens provided enough information about the condition of society to make informed decisions? In fact, they are. If Lipman and McFaul approached Russia media from this perspective, their assessment would not sound as catastrophic as it seems they would have readers believe.

James R. Millar, in "Putin and the Economy," and Peter Rutland, in "Putin and the Oligarchs," discuss the essence of Putin's economic strategy. Millar makes the claim that Putin is explicitly aware of the reasons for economic failure under the different leaderships of Nikita Khrushchev, Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin and is consciously seeking an alternative policy. (Most probably, Putin is using the economic chaos of the 1990s as a negative model when making economic decisions.)

The strength of this chapter lies in Millar's understanding of the "Yukos affair" as it started to unfold. He draws attention to what is probably the most vexing issue concerning Yukos and its core shareholder: "After the fact, and especially five to 10 years after the fact, de-privatization poses a true dilemma for the leadership: Legitimacy of private ownership and protections of property rights in general versus popular demand for an equitable distribution of property that was, under the Soviet state, public property."

In more ways than one, Rutland picks up where Millar ends. Probably the best scholar of Russian business, Rutland first presents a panoramic history of "economic oligarchy" in post-Soviet Russia and then assesses the relative utility of this phenomenon in terms of Putin's economic goals.

This chapter was written without the Yukos affair in mind, but ends on a note that gets as close to prophesy as possible in Russian studies: "It's not clear whether the slow pace of change is because Putin does not understand the need for further reform, or because he still lacks the political authority to carry it out." This piece certainly doesn't explain the Yukos affair, but it does explain the probable reason for it having unfolded in the first place.

If it had not been for some major changes in Russia's top military brass in July of this year, many would have read Dale R. Herspring's timely chapter "Putin and Military Reform" with some bewilderment. Reforming Russia's still very Soviet military establishment and mindset has always been an important policy agenda of Putin's presidency. In reading this chapter, readers are presented with a comprehensive "story behind the story" of the recent shake-up of the Russian military, which is still in a state of enormous flux and wracked by indecision.

Very much in the same vein, Jacob W. Kipp reviews the most tragic -- and seemingly never-ending -- feature of Russia's recent history in "Putin and Russia's Wars in Chechnya." Kipp breaks no new ground in this chapter, nor does he suggest an alternative policy agenda the Kremlin should pursue to put an end to Chechnya's nightmare. However, the narrative is rich in details and puts the Chechen Wars into international perspective. However, there is one glaring omission -- the Kremlin's experiment with "Chechenization" under recently assassinated strongman Akhmad Kadyrov.

"Putin and Russian Foreign Policy" by Herspring and Rutland remind us how masterfully Putin has played the weak hand Russia inherited from the Soviet collapse. The Herspring-Rutland duo also looks at how Putin has selectively (and most often successfully) engaged the West without losing sight of Russia's desire to reassert itself in a quickly evolving international system. Putin -- mirroring his domestic policy -- appreciates the room to maneuver that uncertainty and change in international politics can bring Russia with very little commitment and cost.

Three important areas are covered in this volume that are rarely given much hearing beyond specialty journals publications - culture, agriculture and demographics.

Boris Lanin's "Putin and Culture" is heavy on description and a bit light on analysis concerning what many in Russia and the West have come to identify as Putin's "cult of personality." There is no doubt the Kremlin, most likely Putin himself, demands a positive image of the president in the electronic media. However, we are never really told what is wrong with this or why Putin's "cult" is really novel, given Russia's tradition of lavishing praise on its leaders.

One of the most tightly written and focused pieces in this volume is Stephen L. Wegren's "Putin and Agriculture." For those interested in Russian agriculture, Wegren's article is a sure delight. However, for the rest of us, the value of this piece lies in its approach, tackling as it does first the problem, then the reform strategies and finally the results. Unlike the rest of this book, Wegren presents a Putin reform package that has been an overlooked success -- a Russia that is again agriculturally self-sufficient and a net exporter.

Most observers would agree that, under Putin's rule, Russia has started to convincingly recover from the chaos of the post-Soviet collapse. However, David Powell, in his "Putin, Demography, Health and the Environment," reminds us that Russia is far from being out of the woods. This chapter does not directly deal with what Powell's title suggests. Rather, the author provides the biggest of all possible pictures of Russia's continued demographic collapse -- with no end in sight. Read carefully, this chapter makes other concerns about Russia's future basically superfluous.

As a form of conclusion, the forward by former ambassador to Russia, James F. Collins, "Putin's Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain," provides a personal touch on Putin's Russia few can match. Collins reminds us in his own subtle way that Vladimir Putin is just as much about change and continuity as his reform agenda for Russia.

From my perspective, all writers have made an important contribution, but I tend to favor the view of Putin presented by Rutland, Herspring and Collins. Putin is neither ideologically driven, nor a mere opportunist, nor a Soviet throwback. He has shown himself to be remarkably pragmatic.

Peter Lavelle is an independent Moscow-based analyst and the author of the electronic newsletter on Russia "Untimely Thoughts" (untimely-thoughts.com). He would like to thank Chris Doss, the great wordsmith, for his gracious review of this text.)