The political personality of Russian power today is the product both of ideology and circumstances. George Kennan's observations, made nearly sixty years ago, are just as valid today when considering Vladimir Putin's Russia.

Too often, outside observers have first created their image of Russia, and then located the appropriate facts and personalities to support their construction. To get Russia right, we must seek to understand it as it understands itself, not as we might wish it to be.

During the 1990s, we underestimated Russia's vices in order to maintain the fiction that a post-Soviet Russia under Boris Yeltsin was firmly on the path to Western-style liberal democracy and free-market economics. As Russia moved further away from its Soviet past, the assumption ran, so its interests would converge with those of the United States. The desire to anoint Russia as a liberal ally of the West covered over a multitude of sins, most notably the rampant corruption that continues to devastate the Russian economy.

Today, we underestimate Russia's virtues to depict the country as a neo-Stalinist, authoritarian dictatorship bent on subverting freedoms at home and recreating its empire abroad. Russia is no longer seen as a partner to be engaged, but an emerging threat that needs to be contained. Jackson Diehl of the Washington Post concludes that we are witnessing "the consolidation of KGB-style authoritarianism" in Russia, while Senator John McCain accuses President Putin of mounting a "creeping coup against the forces of democracy and market capitalism." Yet renewing the Cold War image of Russia as an evil empire precludes the development of a genuine partnership based on shared vital interests.

Both of these positions miss the numerous complexities of post-Soviet Russia. Contemporary Russia is a state that "completely mixes, functionally and territorially, important democratic and authoritarian characteristics."1 It can desire close and meaningful relations with the West, particularly the United States, yet strive to maintain its influence, especially in its immediate Eurasian neighborhood. So, a realistic evaluation of what Putin and his regime stand for is needed--as is an explanation of why the course that is being set for Russia enjoys such overwhelming domestic support.

Stolypin, Not Stalin

It is difficult to summarize the set of ideological concepts that guide Putin and his team--"Putinism" remains a work in progress. Nevertheless, from the inception of his administration, he and his team have sought

"to replace the disorder of the Yeltsin period with order and stability. A primary component of Putin's policy of strengthening vertical power in Russia is the reeling in of the power of the oligarchs and local bosses."2

This platform has won Putin a great deal of support, especially among the emerging small business community, which looks to a strong central government for security against both the oligarchs and power-hungry local politicians.

And it is clear that Putin has no desire to create a democracy for democracy's sake, especially if the result is an economically weak, politically impotent entity. Russians have no interest in becoming another "El Salvador and Jamaica . . . two excellent examples of relatively poor but inclusive societies with above-average social welfare"3 but scant influence in the world.

Yet the rejuvenated Russian state the Putin team has in mind has more in common with the late-tsarist era conservative reformer Peter Stolypin (prime minister, 1906â€"11) than with Joseph Stalin. After the chaos unleashed by the 1905 Revolution, Stolypin emphasized political stability with an eye to promoting rapid economic growth. A dynamic market economy and modernized, efficient institutions would enable the Russian state to exercise power in the world, he argued, especially after the defeat of the Russo-Japanese war.

Stolypin, who as a regional governor freely employed harsh tactics to crush revolutionary unrest, nonetheless recognized that the command methods of the autocracy were not capable of generating the economic and social development Russia needed to advance. Some degree of political and economic pluralism was necessary and needed to be accommodated. Stolypin's most famous reform plan was to break up the traditional Russian peasant commune in favor of individually-owned farms, in an attempt to create a new middle class supportive of his policies. His manipulation of electoral laws kept many radical democratic elements out of the Third and Fourth Dumas but also transformed the fledgling legislature from a pulpit for revolutionary orators into a working parliament. Many Russians today believe that if Stolypin's reforms had not been interrupted by his assassination and the onset of World War I, he would have transformed the Russian Empire into a modern state with social and political institutions comparable to those found in Western societies.

It is not accidental that Stolypin's motto, "You want great upheavals, but we want a Great Russia", has been resurrected as a slogan of the United Russia party. I suspect that another Stolypin truism, "First establish order, then start the reforms" would resonate very strongly with the current Kremlin.

Managed Pluralism

Like Stolypin, Putin wants a regime that, while ensuring political stability, will promote economic growth. Yet the Putin team grapples with a paradox: while recognizing the immense value created by a pluralistic, competitive society, it fears that unrestrained pluralism--especially in the absence of strong, mediating institutions--will be destructive for Russia. In December 1999, Putin declared that "Russia has had more than its fair share of political and socioeconomic convulsions."

His administration believes that Russia can best avoid further destructive convulsions by a system "where state and public principles are not antagonists."4 Franz Klintsevich, deputy chair of United Russia's fraction in the Duma, concluded recently: "We seek a broad alliance between the authorities and society to achieve a goal that everyone understands, which is to ensure decent living standards in Russia and make people again be proud about their Motherland."5

Putinism or neo-Stolypinism does not subscribe to the notion that Kennan identified as an institutional and psychological foundation of the Stalinist system, that "no opposition . . . can be officially recognized as having any merit or justification whatsoever." And the Russian government does not have absolute freedom to set the agenda. The Putin Administration must contend with "domestic interest groups and constituencies" in crafting policies.6

What emerges is what I have termed "managed pluralism." In such a system, there is some room for competition and choice but the central authority consciously regulates the available social, political and economic options by design, with an eye to preserving stability or consensus.7 In Russia, most of the organizations of civil society--from media outlets to religious organizations--rely on either the state directly for funding or private corporations that are sensitive to the regime's concerns. (This prompted the noted Russian journalist Vladimir Pozner in January 2002 to observe, "Do not think about your independence if you are not economically solvent.")

In the political realm, there are elections, political alternatives and the opportunity to replace leaders. However, the state plays a role in controlling the number of groups allowed access to the public square, as well as delineating the limits of debate and deviation from the social norm. The system, therefore, is democratic--but only to a point. The Kremlin has not been shy to use "administrative resources" to "place impediments in the path of opposition candidates"8--as the December 2003 parliamentary and the March 2004 presidential elections made clear. Yet, when evaluating the parliamentary poll, it is important to recall that more than half of the members of the Duma were replaced. Opinion polls confirm that the election results, however unwelcome in the West, reflect popular preferences.9

In economic terms, managed pluralism favors state-directed capitalism, similar to public-private partnerships found in contemporary Japan, South Korea or Singapore. The Putin Administration has on many occasions made it clear that there will be "no revision of privatization", no re-nationalization of assets.10 They recognize that when private owners (including foreign investors) exercise managerial control over assets and are able to reap the profits, the economy prospers. But Putin's associates advance the argument that the government should have a consultative role in the development of the Russian economy. In their mind, the right to own property--economic assets, natural resources and so on--is balanced by the duty of the business community to work with the state to promote the common good. "Take care of the welfare of other people, the nation and the country when seeking personal welfare", sums up their attitude.11

Under managed pluralism, actors have the ability to pursue their interests in Putin's Russia--within the limits that have been delineated by the Kremlin. And the regime has formidable tools at its disposal to try and ensure that social actors remain within bounds. Steps taken by the Kremlin over the last few years--reining in oligarch-controlled media outlets, creating no-go zones between business and politics,12 tinkering with electoral procedures--do not represent regression from an idyllic liberal democracy, but consolidation of the managed pluralist system--especially if we recognize that the goal of the Putin Administration is not to establish liberal democracy at all costs but rather to continue with orderly reform.

The Collapsed Superpower

The desire to promote stable reform is an outgrowth of the Putin team's recognition that Russia is a collapsed superpower and a declining great power. Unlike Boris Yeltsin, who still clung to the illusion that post-Soviet Russia was a near equal to the United States on the world stage, the current regime recognizes that Russia can neither compete with the United States nor serve as co-guarantor of any new world order. Its greatest fear is that a de-industrializing and de-populating Russia will be transformed into a resource-and-raw-materials appendage to the more developed world, leading to the complete erosion of any Russian influence in the world, even in their immediate Eurasian neighborhood, and possibly even loss of control over parts of Russia itself. They reluctantly agree with Kennan's analysis that "Russia, as opposed to the Western world in general, is still by far the weaker party . . . and that [Russian] society may well contain deficiencies which will eventually weaken its own total potential."

Contemporary Russia has a weak hand to play in international affairs. Following a classic strategy in the Russian version of the card game "Preference", the Kremlin team engages in "defensive bidding" at this time, seeking to build a stronger hand. In matters such as the termination of the ABM Treaty or America's decision to go to war in Iraq, the Putin team calculated that Russia had nothing to gain by engaging in fruitless attempts to forestall American action. Its overall foreign policy objective has been to give Russia the breathing room it needs to complete its reform process, which is, after all, a very Stolypinesque policy.13

Putin has no illusions about the country's weaknesses. In November 2001 he castigated the Russian defense establishment, describing it as "archaic" and unable to "meet modern military and political challenges." A more open Russian society--and one that is more integrated into the global economic system--is the only way Russia can obtain the funds and investment needed to conduct "technical and technological modernization" in a timely and efficient manner.

Yet Russia does possess several valuable geostrategic cards--oil and natural gas, geographic location and intelligence assets, among others. And the current regime is not gambling for the world as did its Soviet predecessors. It has more modest and achievable wants--restoring Russia as the regional hegemon of Eurasia and retaining membership in the club of the world's great powers.

Unlike the Stalinist Soviet Union after World War II, contemporary Russia is prepared to accept a role within an American-led international system, provided it has the ability to influence the agenda. Putin is not seeking to return to any sort of superpower rivalry with the West, but he also does not believe that Russia should have little or no influence in the world.

Indeed, when one looks at the major foreign policy issues that bedevil the United States, Moscow believes that Russia has the contacts, the network and the infrastructure that can facilitate positive outcomes for the United States in support of its vital interests. Winning the War on Terror, achieving a non-nuclear Korean peninsula, stemming the proliferation of WMD technologies, putting the Western world's energy supply on a more secure footing--Russia is an integral part of the solution.

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the Kremlin hoped that the United States would recognize Russia as a "regional superpower" and provide appropriate levels of support so that Moscow could act as Washington's proxy in Eurasia. Many in the Russian foreign policy establishment were heartened by Secretary of State Colin Powell's proclamation that the war against international terror, beginning in Afghanistan, would be a joint effort. Some even envisioned a "special relationship" with Russia as America's interlocutor to Central Asian and continental European states alike.

Yet, if a closer relationship with the United States does not help to realize these objectives, the Kremlin is prepared to utilize an alternative strategy: raising the cost for the United States to act unilaterally by declining to offer active support for U.S. initiatives and by working with other powers--France, Germany and China, in particular--to try to counterbalance U.S. actions. Here, Putin's policy is designed, in part, to force the United States to prioritize its own strategic interests. The Russians want to make it clear that the United States cannot take their country's acquiescence for granted. In particular, Washington cannot ignore or oppose Moscow's concerns while expecting the Kremlin to accommodate American priorities.

Putin believes placing the U.S.-Russia partnership on a firm footing is a desirable goal--but only if both sides benefit. Should partnership not be forthcoming, however, Russia still has other options. While the United States may be the world's only remaining superpower, it cannot be everywhere at once or at all times--and this is especially true in Eurasia, Russia's traditional backyard.

The Near Abroad

It should be clearly stated: restoration of the USSR is not a goal of the present leadership. Yet there is a reason Russians of all political stripes refer to the other Eurasian states as "the near abroad." Russia's lines of communication to the rest of the world pass through these states. They, particularly the Central Asian states, shield the Russian heartland from hostile forces, especially Islamic radicalism. There is an intricate web of markets, infrastructure nodes (such as pipelines and railways), cultural institutions and even shared personal ties that define a "common Eurasian space."14

There is almost universal agreement with the proposition advanced by the former foreign minister, Igor Ivanov, in his 2002 book The New Russian Diplomacy that "it is natural to suppose a pivotal role for Russia in [Eurasia] by virtue of its size, its population, and its economic capability." Even if Russia is poor and underdeveloped by Western standards, it remains the metropolitan power of Eurasia. And as the leading power of the region, it is committed to a strategy that prevents any outside actor from undermining Russian interests. On this point, the liberal democratic parties are in accord with the Kremlin, even if they differ over means. On September 25, 2003, speaking at a commencement ceremony in St. Petersburg, ANATOly Chubais, one of the leaders of the Union of Right Forces, proposed the creation of a Russian "liberal empire" through the wholesale expansion of Russian business interests throughout the Eurasian space. "Russia should provide assistance to other cis [Commonwealth of Independent States] countries as it has the highest standard of living and is the natural leader among CIS countries." In this view, Russia can remain a great power and a peer of the United States, China and the European Union only by reconstituting a Russian-led Eurasian zone. Washington's favorite Russian politician, Yabloko leader Gregory Yavlinsky, has been more circumspect--warning that the aggressive promotion of Russian interests in the CIS might lead to conflicts with other states--but even he acknowledges that a revived Russia would nonetheless "become the center of gravity" within Eurasia.

Thus, "the problem of creating a new system of international relations in the space of the former USSR continues to be one of the highest foreign policy priorities for the Russian leadership", Ivanov observes. Of particular concern to Russia is when other Eurasian governments seek to involve outside powers as a way to exercise leverage against Russia--a Russian version of the Monroe Doctrine, if you will.

And a leadership that embraces managed pluralism at home applies this mindset in structuring its relations with its Eurasian neighbors. Just as the Putin Administration has no desire to renationalize economic assets (and thus take over direct management), there is little enthusiasm for re-incorporating the other states into a new Soviet Union. No responsible figure in Russia wants to divert the country's precious resources to recreate the failed Soviet empire. Maintaining independent states suits Russian interests, since it means that other Eurasian governments must take upon themselves primary responsibility for meeting the social welfare needs of their populations. (Why should it be Russia's problem whether citizens in Tbilisi, Tashkent or Kiev have sufficient power and heat during the winter, or an effective healthcare and educational system?)

So, within limits, Russia has no objection to other Eurasian states developing supplemental political and economic ties to other states--so long as Russian vital interests are respected. But Russia wants to create a Eurasian economic and political zone where Moscow sets the overall agenda.

The recovery of the Russian economy from the 1998 crash coupled with high oil prices over the last several years have given Russian economic conglomerates a good deal of cash with which to purchase key economic assets in Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and the Central Asian states, as well as in the former "Soviet bloc" countries of eastern Europe. In some cases, this process has been aided by the departure of U.S. and European firms which have sold assets--in Georgia, Lithuania and Bulgaria, for example. Russian influence has also grown in the last several years as leaders in other Eurasian states uncertain of their own position have sought to improve relations with Moscow. For the first time since the Soviet collapse, Russia now has real opportunities to shape everything from the composition of governments to the promulgation of economic policies in the other Eurasian states.

Russia has been using these levers to try to bring about the following outcomes. Its principal goals are to ensure that no other Eurasian state can obstruct Russian engagement with the outside world through its territory and that no foreign troops are based anywhere in Eurasia unless such a deployment occurs with Russian blessing (for example, to combat international terrorism). No Eurasian state should belong to a military bloc or alliance of which Russia is not also a member. In this regard, Russia has promoted the development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)--bringing together Russia, China and the Central Asian states--as a more preferable alternative for enhancing collective security in the region than the U.S.-sponsored GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova) grouping. (And there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the SCO has been more effective, from promoting anti-terrorist cooperation to laying the groundwork for closer economic cooperation among its members, than GUUAM, despite active U.S. assistance to the latter organization.)

The Russian Federation also wants to create a single economic zone--not unlike the original conception of the European Community--so that Russian capital and goods can move more efficiently across boundaries. While it does not seek isolation from the larger world, particularly the developed West, Russia wants to be the motor driving further integration with the Euro-Atlantic community. The slogan often heard in Ukraine, "To Europe, with Russia", sums up this approach.

There are limits, of course. Both the United States and the European Union made it clear to Russia that the Baltic States did not fall within the "Eurasian space." They backed this claim up not only by vigorous diplomatic protestations, but by committing substantial resources to enforce their rhetoric (and finding governments in those states receptive to undertaking real reform). What puzzles the leadership in Moscow is why they should accept changes in the geostrategic situation elsewhere in Eurasia in the absence of any such concerted Western effort. What astounds them even more is that they should be asked to subsidize the erosion of their own interests, as in Georgia. Keeping the lights on across the post-Soviet space and providing implicit social subsidies for the citizens of other Eurasian states (a discounted price for natural gas or rights to live and work in Russia) so that their governments can ignore Russian commercial and security concerns is an illogical policy for any Russian government to adopt--especially when nothing substantive is offered in return.

The American Response

Many Americans--both Democrats and Republicans--are not pleased with contemporary Russia. It is neither a fully liberal state nor a "reliable" ally. A variety of domestic U.S. interest groups--from religious freedom advocates to press monitors--are not happy with the restricted zone of civil and political liberties in Putin's Russia. There is also unease that a reviving Russia seemingly has no interest in promoting a 21st-century version of the "Open Door" in Eurasia--allowing other states to pursue their own agendas with no considerations whatsoever for Russian interests. Yet even with all these disappointments, is this a Russia with which we can live?

Consider the anecdote about an exchange between an American businessman and an unidentified member of the St. Petersburg government in 1992. "Right now, Russia may be on her knees", the man said. "But when she gets up, she'll remember how she was treated." American policy, however, seems predicated on the assumption that Russia will remain in the debilitating condition of the 1990s and will have no choice but to accept Washington's diktat. If Russia does "get up" in the next decade, any policy that assumes that Russia will accept a status quo in Eurasia and the world predicated on Russian weakness is foolhardy and dangerous.

Of course, Putin's revival may prove to be ephemeral. The high oil prices that have sustained Russia's economic recovery might crash. Russia itself may prove unable to cope with its severe demographic crisis. Putin's gamble that managed pluralism today will produce social harmony and economic prosperity tomorrow might fail. Plainly put, it is very possible that the "Russia question" could be solved by the complete collapse of the Russian state.

Yet the United States needs to evaluate seriously whether such a Russian decline is in its vital interests. The spillover effects of Russia's disintegration to the rest of the Eurasian space and beyond could be contained if there was a cordon sanitaire of strong, effective states on the periphery. But there isn't, and it's unlikely to be created in a few short years: Ukraine, Georgia and Uzbekistan hardly fit the bill. All indications are that the United States and its Western partners are unwilling to spend the vast amounts of funds and energy that would be needed to transform policy wishes into on-the-ground realities. The United States has poured more than $10 billion into Georgia over the last decade, yet this massive amount of aid has done little to solve that small state's protracted ethnic and regional conflicts or ease its massive energy and economic dependence on Russia. While some advocate vigorous and bottomless American support for romantic visions of Black-to-Baltic Sea Commonwealths or Silk Road associations, the plain truth is that the costs are simply too great to bear. The United States has other more pressing matters to attend to in East Asia and the Middle East and even desires Russian assistance to achieve these objectives. If Eurasia was the only item on the agenda, things might be different. But it isn't. 9/11 made sure of that.

To put it bluntly, there is no policy of rolling back Russian influence in Eurasia that can be had on the cheap. The United States cannot expect to have the Russia/Eurasia policy equivalent of a five-star dinner at Maxim's for the price of a Happy Meal at McDonald's--and expect Russia to pick up the check to boot. At present, U.S. efforts appear to be designed to strengthen Eurasian states--but the long-term impact of such programs will only be to give the states of the periphery more leverage vis-Ã -vis Russia, not to break them out of the Russian sphere altogether. The cultural, economic and political links that tie the Eurasian states to Russia are too strong to be sundered by small-scale "Train and Equip"-style programs.

The word "appeasement" easily drips from the lips of those who dislike this analysis. They believe that selling out the "freedom-loving" countries of Eurasia for Russian support constitutes a latter-day Yalta. But the United States, if it so desired, could marshal the resources necessary to renovate the Eurasian states and hold Russia at bay. The problem, as Robert D. Kaplan concluded, is that "remaking this part of the world . . . would take both the resolve of a missionary and a sheer appetite for power that the West could probably never muster, especially given the difficulties it was having in the relatively nearby and less challenging Balkans."15 The belief that the United States can try to pressure Russia to abandon the pursuit of what it considers to be its legitimate interests without having truly to invest much time or effort is naive at best and counterproductive at worst.

And the notion that the countries of Eurasia can be folded simply into an ever-expanding European Union--especially on the heels of this year's massive enlargement--and thus removed from the "Russian" sphere, is not rooted in reality. Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission, made this perfectly clear at the close of 2002:

"The integration of the Balkans into the European Union will complete the unification of the continent. . . . I do not deny that this process has worked very well. But we cannot go on enlarging forever. We cannot water down the European political project and turn the European Union into just a free trade area on a continental scale."16

To the extent that the EU engages Eurasia in the coming years, it will be within the framework of the Common European Economic Area and the Common European Social Area, both of which have been generated from the dialogue between Moscow and Brussels.

So the question is whether the United States can reach a modus vivendi with Russia to secure its own interests in Eurasia as a reviving Russia assumes a greater political and economic role in Eurasia. And here, it is important to note a fundamental difference from Kennan's time. In 1947, Soviet domination of Eurasia gave the USSR the ability to threaten war-ravaged Western Europe and East Asia. Today, even if Russia were to achieve total control over Eurasia--an objective far too costly for Moscow to envision--it would nonetheless be hemmed in by the EU, China and Japan.

It is also essential to draw a clear distinction between American interests and the interests of the other Eurasian states. Georgia, Ukraine or Uzbekistan (and their American advocates) may want the United States to do everything necessary to neutralize Russian economic and political influence. But a level-headed policy toward Russia should be based on analysis, not advocacy. And the deployment of U.S. forces to Eurasia after 9/11 to support operations in Afghanistan demonstrates that when a vital U.S. interest is at stake, the United States can undertake a targeted, limited and successful intervention into the Eurasian space and obtain Russian acquiescence.17

The United States is not pleased with the Russia that is emerging. Yet for all the defects, there are many ways in which Russia can be successfully engaged. Isolating Russia is counterproductive at this juncture. Even under present conditions, there remain significant openings through which the United States and other Western states can influence and shape developments in Russia.18 Russia's desire for access to capital and markets gives it a stake in promoting regional stability. As commercial and political ties mature, Russia's own national interests will become increasingly tied to those of the larger Euro-Atlantic community. And as its interests become more secure, Russia's behavior, especially in Eurasia, will become more predictable and transparent.

Kennan concluded more than fifty years ago that "it is a sine qua non of successful dealing with Russia that the foreign government in question should remain at all times cool and collected and that its demands on Russian policy should be put forward in such a manner as to leave the way open for a compliance not too detrimental to Russian prestige." When considering the sources of Russian conduct in the 21st century, this remains sound advice for us to follow.

Nikolas K. Gvosdev is Executive Editor of The National Interest and Senior Fellow for Strategic Studies at the Nixon Center.