Uncle Sam in the Arab Street
Mini Teaser: If America promotes democracy in the Middle East, it must be prepared for some very unpleasant consequences.
It is established U.S. policy that the promotion of democracy in the Middle East is vitally necessary to secure America's strategic interests. Washington policymakers and pundits routinely proclaim the virtues of a democratic order and the seamless compatibility of America's interests and ideals. In light of the tragedies of September 11, Washington's long-standing approach that saw authoritarian rulers as the most suitable custodians of America's strategic imperatives seems naive, even reckless. President Bush's disdain for such realpolitik calculations was all too evident when he proclaimed that "sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe, because in the long-run stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty."
While historically empires have relied on local autocracies to curb popular passions, the Bush Administration's strategic planners have come to the paradoxical conclusion that the durability of America's hegemony in the region is contingent on the spread of democratic polities.
It is a compelling argument, since the existing Arab political order has succeeded only in producing unpalatable dictatorships, stagnant economies and militant ideologies. There are many indications that the rise of democracies in the Middle East is likely to lessen inter-state conflicts, diminish the zeal of radical Islam and its violent outbursts and even promote long-delayed economic reforms. However, the partisans of the "democratic thesis" must realize that there are tradeoffs. Prospective Arab democracies will not behave as compliant agents of the American empire.
On issues ranging from the Arab-Israeli peace process to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Washington may find a more democratic Middle East less prone to adhere to its mandates. Freed from the restraints of authoritarianism, the nationalistic Arab masses are unlikely to acclaim the merits of the liberal American imperium and eagerly embrace its priorities. In the end, while the spread of democratic rule in the Middle East is likely to stabilize one of the most volatile regions of the world, it will extract its costs in terms of key U.S. preferences.1
Voodoo Economics
The Middle East is not just a region of dysfunctional politics but also of broken economies. In the post-independence period, the generation of Middle Eastern leaders who defeated European imperialism insisted on monopolizing both political and economic power to advance their development agendas. Given their centralizing predilections, the ruling elites soon crafted command economies, resulting in cumbersome regulation, maldistribution of resources, bloated bureaucracies and rampant corruption. A decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall discredited the notion of socialist planning, Arab rulers maintain their fidelity to the God that failed. Such mismanagement has imposed a crushing burden on the region's populace, as high inflation and unemployment rates not only diminish the living standards of an enfeebled middle class, but confront already politically disenfranchised youth with a dim economic future. (There is no East Asian-style bargain where people forego political rights in return for guaranteed prosperity.) Because the region's governing regimes lack legitimacy, they are unwilling to institute the structural economic reforms that will initially cause an adverse popular reaction, especially since "initially" can be quite a long time. The Middle East today is immured in a debilitating cycle, as the ruling regimes are unwilling or unable to undertake the reforms necessary to prevent serious social problems and perhaps eventually a social implosion.
The peculiar tragedy of the Middle East is that the economic malaise sweeping the region impacts not just resource-poor states but also those with an abundance of subterranean wealth. An examination of key indicators of three leading states crystallizes the region's dire economic circumstances. Despite having the fifth-largest gas reserves in the world, Algeria continues to register a 31 percent unemployment rate. It is hard to see how Algeria can recover from its civil war and rehabilitate its social fabric while continuously suffering from double-digit unemployment rates. The case of the region's most populous state, Egypt, is no better. The Mubarak regime has largely abandoned its previous attempts to privatize the economy and has persisted with investment in unproductive heavy industries. As a result, in the past year Egypt attracted a mere $600 million in foreign investment. By the regime's own admission, 22 percent of its citizens live below the poverty line. Finally, the case of Saudi Arabia is especially troubling. A nation with a small population base of 24 million and the largest reserves of petroleum in the world (26 percent of proven reserves) is suffering from a 25 percent unemployment rate and a persistent economic recession. At a time when 42 percent of Saudi citizens are under the age of 14, such inefficiency and mismanagement may soon confront the regime with an explosive revolutionary problem. The region's future is even more daunting, as the Middle East needs to "create 100 million new jobs over the next 15 years" in order to absorb its demographic bulge.2
The central premise of Arab politics has been a tacit bargain between the rulers and the ruled. In exchange for political passivity and deference, the reigning leaders pledged provision of economic opportunities and subsidies. But the state has created expectations that it can no longer fulfill. It thus has to sustain itself by relying on the security services and symbolic gestures such as periodic parliamentary and municipal elections that in no way disturb the essential parameters of power. The Middle Eastern states increasingly resemble the Soviet Union of the 1970s, a corrupt, stagnant bureaucratic state shielding itself in rhetoric that convinces few and inspires even fewer.
Although the post-Cold War period has produced global triumph of democracy, it led to a widespread recognition of the superiority of market economies. But the preconditions for a successful market transition, such as the rule of law, competing centers of power, transparency and cohesive administrative networks are also essential pillars of a democratic polity. Only legitimate regimes resting on popular support can undertake painful structural reforms. A more or less liberal polity that cedes power to the private sector is well suited to rekindling the confidence of diverse international investors and meeting the standards of the global economy. Both eastern Europe and Latin America testify to the fact that an expanding entrepreneurial class has historically proven to be the most enduring nemesis of autocratic rule. In the end, free societies are the most effective way to create prosperous economies.
Democratic Peace, Democratic Tradeoffs
It is rare for the arcane deliberations of political scientists to infiltrate the popular discourse and influence elected politicians. However, the democratic peace theory--that is, the claim that democracies do not wage war against each other--has achieved that distinction. American presidents now routinely invoke its verdicts as an intellectual endorsement of their Wilsonian pieties. In his important speech to the National Endowment of Democracy, President Bush paid homage to these beliefs when he proclaimed, "As in Europe, as in Asia, as in every region of the world, the advance of freedom leads to peace." But, does a theory largely derived from the European experience have any utility in our attempt to understand the Arab world? Would prospective Arab democracies necessarily behave in a more pacific manner? This question has to be pondered not only in terms of inter-Arab relations, but also in terms of the Arab states' approach toward Israel and their relationship with an American imperium. And once we examine the Middle East through that pair of spectacles, the American promotion of democracy may seem much more contentious, even self-defeating to us. In the Arab world, the rhetoric of democracy is seen as the mask of imperialism.
It is too facile to suggest that popular sovereignty dispels conflict. The Balkan experience shows that the rise of political pluralism can intensify nationalism and further exacerbate ethnic cleavages. Yet, the notions that citizenries in most places most of the time are generally averse to conflicts with long-term costs, and that democracy restrains aggressive rulers, have merit. Fully constitutional rule would lead to an independent legislature examining the causes of war, a free press assessing the claims of the executive and an informed public questioning the necessity of the burdens it must bear. Democracies may not necessarily be peaceful, but neither are they naturally prone to indiscriminate belligerence and adventurism. For Arab dictatorships that have often viewed war as a means of enhancing their prestige, an injection of democratic accountability can go a long way toward arresting some of their impetuous impulses.
Even a cursory examination of the post-independence Middle East reveals that far from being a stable and placid region, the Arab world has been marked by persistent inter-state conflict. Under the banner of its transnational ideologies, the aspiring hegemons have waged war and conspired against their fellow rulers. Egypt's Gamal Abdul Nasser and his brand of Pan-Arabism, Saddam and his Ba'athist creed and Iran's Ayatollahs with their mandate from heaven have all engaged in prolonged conflicts with their neighbors. Subversion, proxy war, assassination attempts and even outright military aggression have been the currency of Arab international relations, belying the realpolitik confidence in the strategic stability of Arab autocracy.
Would Arab democracies have behaved differently? Counterfactual history is always a precarious exercise. However, a case can be made that a more democratic Iraq and Iran would likely not have waged an eight-year war against one another that was largely sustained by the personal animus of their leaders. Similarly, a pluralistic Iraq would likely have settled its dispute with Kuwait in a more peaceful manner and not undertaken another costly invasion shortly after the end of an exhausting war with Iran. It is not unreasonable to assume that a more democratic Egyptian ruler needing public support would likely have avoided Nasser's 1962 Yemeni quagmire that was utterly inconsistent with Egypt's strategic interests.
If the spread of democracy might stabilize inter-Arab relations, how would emerging democracies deal with an intrusive American presence and its expansive regional agenda? In her August 2003 Washington Post op-ed advocating the promotion of democracy, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice proclaimed, "A democratic Iraq can become a key element of a very different Middle East." Indeed, it can. For instance, Iraq's contending ethnic and religious factions have arrived at a rare consensus in their demand for eviction of American forces. Despite the enterprising efforts of the Coalition Provisional Authority, 58 percent of Iraqis demanded to be allowed to "work this out themselves", according to a recent poll conducted in four major Iraqi cities, including in Shi'a Basra and Kurdish Kirkuk. The ongoing acts of resistance--as well as the growing frustration with the presence of U.S. and British forces even in the Shi'a areas of the country--suggest a nationalistic rejection of the occupation. Iraqis were happy to be rid of Saddam but show limited inclination to be directed by the United States in any aspect of domestic and foreign policy. Under such conditions, it is difficult for a leader to be responsive to American concerns and, at the same time, seek an electoral mandate from a disgruntled populace that does not necessarily share America's vision.
The case of Iraq is not unique. The most significant political force in today's Middle East is nationalism--and that nationalism insists on autonomy from superpower domination. Various public opinion surveys point to the manifold problems that the United States confronts in the region. The most recent Pew Survey on Global Attitudes conducted in December 2003 reveals that a "very favorable view" of the United States did not reach double digits even in the most moderate regional states with long-standing ties to the United States. In Jordan, only 6 percent had a positive view of the United States, while Pakistan and Egypt recorded equally dismal statistics of 2 and 3 percent respectively. In a similar poll conducted in March 2002 in nine Arab countries, respondents overwhelmingly denounced U.S. policies as "ruthless, aggressive, conceited and arrogant." The State Department's own Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World concluded that "the bottom has fallen out of support for the United States."
Beyond public opinion samples, free elections do not necessarily bring forth groups willing to accommodate a U.S. presence. In two countries on the periphery of the Middle East--Turkey and Pakistan--both with relatively free legislative contests, elections have resulted in parliaments suspicious of American priorities. In both states the Islamist and secular parties have managed to set aside their other differences and oppose the U.S. agenda. The parliamentary elections held in October 2003 in Pakistan witnessed the emergence of such a coalition, as the Pakistan People's Party, the Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid, the Muttahida Majlis-I-Amal (MMA) and the National Alliance. This coalition demanded that President Musharraf reconsider his close relationship with Washington. The freely elected Turkish parliament may feature contenting ideological parties, but they all cooperated with each other in rejecting an American request to invade Iraq through its territory. In both cases, such actions were widely popular. All this is not to suggest an unfolding clash of civilizations, but merely a nationalistic rejection of an imperial power by a region that has been subject to relentless external intervention for the past century. The challenge at hand is not to craft glossy public diplomacy campaigns, as the region's anguish is not about lack of information but the reality of American power.
It is customary for the unsettled Washington establishment to blame such daunting numbers on regimes that castigate the United States as a means of deflecting attention from their own deficiencies. But the opposite may actually be the case--namely that the regimes' campaigns are not designed to cultivate anti-Americanism but actually placate public opinion that is strongly averse to U.S. policies. The Arab masses actually do admire, in their own way, American values, culture and technological prowess, but merely seek liberation from a series of Western empires that have historically arrogated to themselves the right to condition the region's political order. Democratic Arab states would certainly seek diplomatic, trade and cultural ties with the United States, but would object to America's cumbersome presence with its military garrisons and national security doctrines that legitimize pre-emptive warfare--doctrines that apply only to America. Democratic peace theory has clearly failed to assess relations between imperial powers and their dependencies once public opinion enters the political scene.
Nor would a more democratic Middle East necessarily serve the cause of the Arab-Israeli peace process and the integration of Israel into the regional order. The intensity of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict may obscure the historical pattern of gradual accommodation between the Arab states and Israel. The fact remains that during the past two decades, much-maligned autocracies have gradually come to terms with the Israeli state. Two of Israel's neighbors, Jordan and Egypt, have even signed formal peace treaties with their erstwhile nemesis. Such a halting process of normalization would likely be reversed if Arab regimes become responsive to their respective collective wills. The region's public opinion continues to reject Israel as an agent of an alien and pernicious ideology and a usurper of Arab lands. Such rejectionist views go far beyond the Islamist parties that are the chief opponents of the peace process. In Egypt, the state with the oldest peace treaty with Israel, the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood and the secular Wafd party find common ground in denouncing the Camp David Accords.
In a similar vein, a Jordanian parliament that features both Islamists and secular parties routinely calls on King Abdullah to abandon the 1994 peace treaty between Amman and Jerusalem. Throughout the region, anti-peace process campaigns emanate not just from Islamist circles but also from the secular parties with leftist pretensions. The neo-conservative assumption that democratic Middle Eastern states would lessen their enmity toward Israel is not substantiated by evidence.
All this is not to suggest the imminence of war between Israel and more democratic Arab states. The prevailing balance of military power, including Israel's formidable retaliatory capacity--which reportedly includes several hundred nuclear weapons--will still deter against rash Arab designs. But the prevailing cold peace is likely to be transformed into a cold war and the prospect of Israel's integration into the Middle Eastern landscape measurably reduced. Among the debilitating consequences of such a cold war would be an arms race and a corresponding search for weapons of mass destruction.
The attempt to halt the trend toward the accumulation of weapons of mass destruction has been one of the Bush Administration's central pre-occupations. Under the auspices of its new national security doctrine, Washington has even argued in favor of pre-emptive military intervention as a tool of counter-proliferation. However, the aspirants of greater democracy in the Middle East may find a more intensified regional commitment to production of such deadly arsenals should elected regimes come to power. Nations pursue weapons of mass destruction for a variety of strategic and nationalistic reasons. However, potential Arab democracies would face enormous popular pressure for achieving military parity with Israel. A public that complains about the inequality of an Israeli nuclear monopoly is likely to press elected leaders toward modernizing their armed forces and even acquiring the "strategic weapon." Through political pressure and even bribery, the United States has been relatively successful in compelling Arab despots to adhere to their non-proliferation commitments. But such leverage would be less effective against leaders who rely on democratic majorities that demand a viable balance of power with Israel. In the end, the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict and the inevitable surge of nationalism that democratic polities experience would further complicate America's attempt to reduce the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
The Question of Stability
The long-term stability of the Arab world is contingent on a governing order that is responsive to its constituents. The region's declining economic fortunes, its problems of institutional decay and the demographic crisis cannot be assuaged by the region's current collection of unaccountable princes and presidents. A cursory examination of reports from human rights organizations reveals the toll that despotic rule has taken on the Arab populace. Torture, arbitrary arrests and executions are the survival strategies of Arab authoritarianism and censorship and corruption are the daily reminders of unaccountable rule. The brutalized Arab citizenry deserves better treatment than leaders who have proven adept at mismanaging their state and misappropriating its wealth.
Yet most of the opponents of democracy-promotion in the Middle East argue that premature elections will bring radical forces to power. After all, the Islamists possess the most vibrant ideology and the most cohesive organizational infrastructure. The specter of Algeria haunts this debate. An ill-prepared Algerian society was launched on the path of rapid democratization in 1990, only to witness the electoral triumph of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). The military's intervention and the end of the democratic process has led to an unspeakably violent civil war that has thus far cost over 100,000 lives. The region's princes and lifetime presidents routinely deflect demands for liberalization by casually invoking the "lessons of Algeria." These arguments, though self-serving, are not entirely spurious. Properly considered, they lead to the conclusion that any transition to democracy needs to be carefully managed, not that it is bound to produce chaos.
The current autocratic order generates its own pathologies. Radical Islam may not provide effective policy solutions to the political and economic crises besetting the region, but as an ideology of wrath directed against the status quo it has been remarkably effective. Islamism is after all rooted in a religion with an intense emphasis on social justice and the necessity of conforming temporal affairs to divine injunctions. An ideology that advocates decent and efficient government by pious men stands in stark contrast to the realities of the Middle East. Given the Arab world's provocative class stratification and the near absence of any space for political activity, Islamists are able to transform the legitimate right of protest into an obligation of violent resistance. The prevailing regimes' corruption and mismanagement have led to the rise of a disaffected generation easily deceived by the false utopia offered by radical Islam. Terrorism and Islamic militancy are merely the most visible manifestations of a dysfunctional political system that criminalizes dissent and eviscerates civil society. The Arab status quo has palpable costs, a cost that 9/11 demonstrated is no longer confined to the Middle East.
Today, the only way to disarm radicalism is to liberalize political society. An expanding marketplace of ideas will not only expose the intellectual poverty of Islamism but undermine its claim that only violence can serve as an agent of constructive change. The relatively progressive Jordanian monarchy has demonstrated the utility of inclusive politics, as its Islamists parties, the Muslim Brotherhood and in a more recent incarnation, the Islamic Action Front, have been able to contest parliamentary elections and therefore to be consulted by its executive. Largely because of this, Jordan has been spared the type of Islamist violence that has afflicted closed societies such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
The value of democratic rule is not just that it constrains rulers by fostering competing institutions and a critical public, but that it engenders a political culture that emphasizes consensus-building, transparency, tolerance and suspicion of radical solutions. By claiming to avoid radicalism, genocidal despots such as Saddam Hussein and profligate monarchies such as the House of Saud also avoid these long-term advantages. This is no longer an acceptable excuse.
While democratic rule in the region might eventually produce more stable and productive societies, it will also lead to polities that reject key aspects of U.S. policy with much more speed. From its peace treaties with Israel to its disarmament injunctions, Washington will find a region less hospitable to its imperatives. The United States faces a strategic dilemma best formulated in the form of a choice. It can either continue to conspire with existing autocracies to prolong their rule, or it can accept the democratic verdict with its objections to many of the policies desired by the American imperium.
The emergence of democracy promotion as the central tenet of the Bush Administration's vision marks an important attempt to finally bring America's Middle East policies into conformity with its ideals. It remains to be seen whether the lure of petroleum and the imperative of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict--which in the past have propelled American policymakers toward the embrace of authoritarian rulers who pledged stability--will win out again. The cataclysmic events of September 11 and the surge of Islamic radicalism have jolted the American elite and seemingly invalidated the old bargain. However, the debate on democracy promotion needs to transcend its superficial parameters, and its costs and tradeoffs must be more clearly understood.
Essay Types: Essay