A growing chorus of establishment pundits and policymakers have taken to branding anyone who calls for prioritizing diplomacy over force in U.S. foreign policy as “isolationist.”  

In official Washington, labeling an analyst, advocate, or organization isolationist is essentially an effort to convince the public at large that they are naive, and therefore not to be taken seriously. But recent history suggests that the “military first” (and second and third) approach favored by the Washington establishment is in fact the stance that is the most naive.

The direct U.S. wars of this century, including those in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, have done more harm than good, consuming vast quantities of blood and treasure in the process— $8 trillion and hundreds of thousands of lives, not to mention millions of displaced people, all  according to estimates by Brown University’s Costs of War project.  America’s slightly less direct wars – those we fund or supply with bombers and bombs – in Yemen, Gaza, and Ukraine are devastating and costly financially, environmentally, and in humanitarian impact. 

Interventionists – and their cheerleaders in the media and think tanks – are never held to account for their failures.   

Moreover, most advocates of greater restraint are not opposed to all uses of force. For example, U.S. support for Ukraine’s effort to fend off Russia’s invasion of their country is essential. But it must be accompanied by a diplomatic track aimed at preventing a long, grinding war that causes more death and destruction and precludes rebuilding, while constantly risking escalation to a direct U.S.-Russia or NATO-Russia conflict.  This view appears to be gaining traction with at least some U.S. officials. But when advocates of a diplomatic track raised the idea early in the conflict, many experts and policy advocates within the DC establishment mislabeled it as isolationist.

Given the challenges we face, from thwarting Russian aggression in Ukraine, to taking a balanced approach to the challenges posed by China, to stopping the slaughter in Gaza and heading off a region-wide Middle East war, America desperately needs a serious debate on what policies to pursue in a rapidly changing global security environment.  That means evaluating proposals grounded in a policy of restraint seriously, not dismissing them with misleading labels.  

A critical component of a more effective, more affordable approach to national security should be a more realistic view of the challenges posed by China. Unfortunately, many top U.S. officials are doing more to promote exaggerated views of a hostile Chinese regime bent on global domination than they are to encourage a factual assessment of Beijing’s intentions and capabilities. For example, at the recent Aspen Security Forum, Joint Chiefs chair Gen. Charles Brown warned that if the U.S. lapsed into isolationism – a term he did not define – it “opens the door to Xi Jinping and others who want to do unprovoked aggression . . .We have credibility at stake.”

The tensions between the United States and China are real, but there is little evidence to suggest that Beijing is chomping at the bit to invade its neighbors if the U.S. shifts to a more restrained, realistic strategy.  The most contentious issue –the future status of Taiwan – would be best addressed via diplomacy, in the form of a revival of the “One China” policy that has kept the peace in the Taiwan Straits for the past five decades.  The policy holds that the United States will not recognize Taiwan as a sovereign nation, and that it will maintain informal relations with Taipei and refrain from treating it as if it were a treaty ally. For its part, China would pledge to pursue unification with Taiwan via peaceful means only.

There are larger problems in the U.S.-China relationship, most notably an action-reaction cycle based on each side’s worst case assessment of the other’s motives and military might.  While neither side is actively seeking conflict, there is a danger that the two sides might stumble into war if they remain on their current paths. In this context, a truly defensive strategy in East Asia that seeks to deter Chinese military action against its neighbors while abandoning the more dangerous and costly goal of being able to “win” a war with that nation is the course most likely to establish stability in the region.

As we elect a new President and Congress, we should debate the future of U.S. foreign policy.  But let’s do it honestly, without throwing around misleading labels intended to shut down debate and to keep us mired in a deadly, expensive and counterproductive approach to world affairs.

About the Author: 

William D. Hartung is a senior research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.