Recent comments by General Valery Zaluzhny, Ukraine’s military Commander-in-Chief, that “there will most likely be no deep and beautiful breakthrough” of Russian lines soon dashed many hopes that an end game was near. As the war’s second anniversary approaches in February, today’s narrative has devolved into one of stalemate and the conflict becoming a protracted war of attrition.

Yet, major conflicts over the last century indicate that modern wars are seldom short and bloodless. Moreover, breakthrough operations—an attacker’s ability to penetrate an enemy’s fixed defenses in depth—are second only to amphibious assaults (from the sea) in their complexity and difficulty. In both cases, a diverse number of “near-miracles” must occur for either to succeed. Appreciating such operational complexity is a prerequisite to managing political, military, and domestic expectations. 

A Realistic Appraisal

Strategically decisive breakthroughs or coup de mains—like General Douglas MacArthur’s bold Incheon landing during the Korean War—are historical rarities. As Max Boot notes, without air superiority or an assailable flank that enables Ukraine to attack Russian forces from the rear, it is virtually impossible for Ukraine to maneuver with the same speed and decisiveness U.S. forces used at Incheon and to overwhelm the Iraqis in 1990 during Operation Desert Storm. Boot rightly notes that the Iraqi army’s rapid collapse was preceded by a relentless five-week air campaign that attrited the enemy and facilitated the subsequent decisive maneuver by U.S. and coalition ground forces. Similar conditions do not exist today in Ukraine, and it is unrealistic to expect Ukraine’s forces to attempt a coup de main using shock and awe.

Russia’s Advantages 

Russian forces have had nearly two years to prepare their fortifications along a front that stretches 1,000 km (600 miles). These fortifications are constructed with concrete, steel, and wire obstacles; they include minefields to disable and destroy vehicles and kill dismounted infantry.

Russian minefields are purposely designed with gaps to entice attacking forces into less mined and obstacle-laden areas. Many of these are Russian killing zones where indirect fires (i.e., mortars, artillery, missiles), direct fires (i.e., machineguns, grenade launchers, other automatic weapons), and air-delivered ordnance (from drones, armed helicopters, fighter jets, and bombers) strike advancing Ukrainian forces at will.

While Russian forces do not know precisely where Ukrainian troops will attempt to penetrate, Russia’s unmanned surveillance drones, satellites, and other intelligence collection capabilities provide early warning. They also report the disposition of Ukrainian forces attempting a breakthrough and, most importantly, offer Russian long-range fire units with targeting data. Ukraine must also contend with Russia’s mobile reserves that can counterattack Ukrainian forces that breach holes in the Russian lines.

Notwithstanding the current stalemate, Russian forces have a history of preparing in-depth defenses. Prior to the 1943 German attack on the city of Kursk, Russia constructed eight defensive lines—with 2,200 anti-tank and 2,500 anti-personnel landmines per mile of frontage—extending to a depth of 120-180 miles. This is slightly deeper than the width of Russian-occupied Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts today. While current Russian defenses are estimated to be less formidable than in 1943, this will likely change over time. 

Ukraine’s Advantages

Ukraine’s situation may appear bleak, but it is far from hopeless. For starters, Ukrainian forces are defending their homeland from invasion; they repulsed Russia’s attack on Kyiv at the war’s outset; they kept Russia from encircling their troops in the first Battle of Bakhmut and performed well during the Kharkiv counter-offensive. So, Ukraine enjoys a moral advantage, and its troops continue to display valor in taking the fight to the enemy. Moreover, Ukraine’s robust drone fleet identifies roughly 86 percent of Russian targets that are struck with remarkable speed using a variety of apps that can be accessed down to the small unit level. Data also reveals that the density of Russian troops defending the frontline is about a tenth of what it was in World War II. Ukraine can exploit these strengths and opportunities while grappling with ammunition shortages, a lack of air superiority, and a general deficit in modern military technology. Most importantly, Ukraine appreciates that it must maintain pressure on Russian forces without falling victim to operational overreach.

Overcoming an Intractable Problem

An alternative to attempting a coup de main is to try to break through enemy fortifications on a narrow frontage and advance only to a depth required to seize and temporarily hold defensible terrain inside Russia’s lines. If successful, follow-on Ukrainian breakthrough forces can be adequately postured to leap-frog forward and repeat the same play against Russia’s successive defensive belts.

Selecting advantageous terrain that can be temporarily defended once inside Russia’s lines is a prerequisite to Ukraine avoiding long operational pauses before resuming the offense. Ideally, these defensive positions—constructed around farms, villages, and small urban areas—are purposively designed to avoid being isolated or becoming a salient the Russians can target and defeat piecemeal. They must be non-linear and mutually supporting strong points or elaborate hedgehog defenses. This means that if Russian ground forces attack one Ukrainian position, they expose themselves to deadly direct and indirect fires from an adjacent position. This defensive web can serve as a stepping-stone for follow-on Ukrainian breakthrough efforts. 

But, creating favorable conditions on the ground that make this possible is extraordinarily difficult. Multiple supporting actions must be aligned in time and space. Like a symphony conductor who brings together precision notes from a large orchestra to create harmony, a breakthrough commander must integrate many disparate activities to succeed. The remainder of the article addresses the major parts and pieces of the breakthrough puzzle that must be integrated. 

Find or Create Gaps

Russian defenses are uneven along the 600-mile front—some areas are more heavily defended than others. The goal of Ukraine’s reconnaissance effort—using ground, aerial, and space assets—is to identify potential weak points to try to break through. Reconnaissance seeks to obtain vital information in three key areas: determine the minefield’s composition, density, and depth; locate Russian heavy weapons over-watching the minefield to be targeted; and understand the defender’s pattern of life to begin the operation when the enemy is least alert.

Achieve Tactical Surprise

Ukraine’s successful Kharkiv offensive in September 2022 is mainly attributed to Russian forces being dispatched to meet Ukraine’s feint further south in the Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts. This reduced the density of frontline Russian troops in the Kharkiv sector and the number of Russian reserve units available to counterattack. Similar efforts, even on a smaller scale, will be required if Ukraine is to obtain tactical surprise in the future.

Massed indirect fires can help deceive Russian frontline forces about the actual location of Ukraine’s breakthrough. Inclement weather can also be exploited as rain, snow, fog, and heavy wind obscures a defender’s vision and muffles an attacker’s audible signatures. In short, concealing the time and location of Ukraine’s intended breakthrough is necessary to achieve surprise. Unsurprisingly, Ukraine cannot achieve superiority at the decisive point.

Position Forces for Success

Assembling breakthrough forces at the intended point of penetration requires concealment (to avoid enemy detection) and cover (protection from enemy fires). Neither is easy to acquire, given Russia’s ubiquitous use of surveillance drones. Thus, Ukrainian formations must disperse and mask their assembly in forests, ravines, and urban sprawl. Geography is frequently uncooperative, which brings into play two other force positioning considerations.

First, engineers require an over-watch force to deliver effective suppressive fires on Russian defenders while mine and obstacle-clearing operations are underway. Second, the breakthrough force must not be so dispersed that it is slow to “shoot the gap” once mines and obstacles are reduced, or the Russians will reconstitute their defense. 

Deliver Accurate Suppressive Fire

Localized suppressive fires must keep Russian defenders hunkered down in their trenches. Random area bombing does not suffice. Failure to effectively suppress can be catastrophic because it allows Russian defenders to return lethal fires on Ukrainian engineers and the breakthrough force while they are the most exposed. For this reason, Ukrainian counter-battery fires are critical to helping silence Russian artillery.

The past is a prologue to this issue. As a young German officer in WWI, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel discovered that a four-to-one ratio between the size of the suppression element and the remaining breakthrough force was required to succeed.

Operation Goodwood in WWII reinforces the same point. As Stephen Biddle notes, the battle began with one of the most intense preparatory bombardments in history: more than 4,500 allied aircraft carpet-bombed German defenses with 7,900 tons of ordnance and 800 tons of naval gunfire support—the equivalent of eight one-kiloton tactical nuclear weapons over three hours. But this area bombing was not enough to suppress the German 88-mm anti-tank guns dug in on key terrain that decisively repulsed the breakthrough—at the cost of 400–500 British tanks.

These insights from Rommel and Operation Goodwood are germane to Ukraine. Attacking deep strategic targets (i.e., supply depots and transportation nodes) may advance broader campaign objectives in the future; however, they are of marginal value to a breakthrough commander waging a highly localized fight. 

Clear Minefields and Obstacles

Ukrainian engineers need time to clear, proof, and mark minefields and obstacles protecting Russian defenses. The attacker seeks to remove as few mines and obstacles as possible to penetrate successfully. Typically, this means a lane no wider than what is required for three armored vehicles to pass through abreast. This enables two-way traffic and permits Ukrainian vehicles to bypass their disabled counterparts without the lane becoming impassible.

Ukrainian engineers use mine-clearing line charges and robotic technology when these assets are available. If they are in short supply, then Bangalore torpedoes and other explosive devices are used to conserve time and avoid the deadly task of probing for mines with bayonets.

Finally, engineers are racing against the clock as the element of surprise is lost once clearing operations begin—ceding time and tempo to Russian defenders—and lengthening the duration Ukraine must sustain its’ suppressive fires.

Penetrate and Exploit the Breakthrough 

The assault element (usually infantry) from the larger breakthrough force must rapidly penetrate the opening engineers have created and attack Russian defenders in trenches on the flanks of the penetration point. Once these trenches are cleared, the assault element must hold this ground—the shoulders of the gap—long enough for an exploitation element (normally mechanized infantry and armor) to pass through and conduct hasty attacks on enemy forces being re-positioned to help blunt the penetration. These attacks are treated as expedient meeting engagements as the exploitation element must avoid becoming decisively engaged while pressing forward to seize key defensible terrain deeper inside Russian-held territory. 

Consolidate the Defense and Repeat 

Once the breakthrough force reaches its advance limit, it must harden its defensive position, site its heavy weapons to support adjacent Ukrainian defensive positions, and prepare for Russian counterattacks. Additional engineers, artillery, and critical supplies must be poised to push forward to these enclaves to reconstitute Ukrainian forces further to repeat the cycle. 

Adapting in War

Ukrainian forces have demonstrated a high capacity to learn from prior tactical engagements and adapt their operations to meet emerging realities on the ground. As General Zaluzhny reported to The Economist, he does not expect robust deliveries of advanced technology to arrive from the West and produce victory. So, limited Ukrainian manpower and legacy machines must be skillfully integrated into tactical approaches, enabling his forces to stay on the tactical offense to recover Ukraine’s lost territory. These operations will be inherently slow and require exquisite synchronization to succeed. As the General noted, they will be neither “deep [n]or beautiful.” However, they are more likely to achieve the war aims Ukraine and the West seek than any other approach.

About the Author

Thomas C. Greenwood, Colonel USMC (Ret.), is a research staff member at the Institute for Defense Analyses. He was an infantryman with subsequent assignments in the Pentagon and the National Security Council staff.