Here's What You Need to Remember: Every time the Australian Strategic Policy Institute has looked at the path to acquiring nuclear boats we’ve concluded that Australia still needs a new conventional submarine to ensure we can safely transition to a nuclear fleet. Yet the government has cancelled the Attack program and burned its bridges behind it. So, the final question is, what gives the government such confidence that this plan is going to work?

It is correct, as former prime minister Malcolm Turnbull has asserted, that few of the questions raised by the government’s announcement that Australia will acquire nuclear-propelled submarines (SSNs) have been answered.

The particular question Mr Turnbull raised goes to the nature of the nuclear industry needed to support the submarines but there are others that are just as essential to the success of the enterprise.

On this question, the government has suggested the “game-changer” enabling us to acquire SSNs is the development of reactors that don’t need to be refueled over the life of the submarines, meaning we don’t need a civil nuclear industry to support them. However, operating submarines that don’t need refueling still requires a nuclear industry – it just isn’t the industry you might first imagine.

You can’t have an effective military capability if you need to return it to the US any time there is a defect.

We may not need civil nuclear power plants, or facilities that can enrich uranium to fuel the submarine’s reactor, but we’ll still need to perform maintenance and repair on the submarines, including the reactor. You can’t have an effective military capability if you need to return it to the US any time there is a defect. Deeper maintenance will require putting the boats in dry dock, shutting down the reactor, working on it and starting it up again in an absolutely safe manner. We’ll need to develop that maintenance workforce from a very low base.

We’ll also need an independent and highly skilled workforce that can establish and enforce the rigorous safety regime that is absolutely critical to the operation of a nuclear fleet. That regulatory workforce will need to be built almost from scratch.

It may be possible to develop that workforce without a civil nuclear sector but it’s misleading to say we won’t have a nuclear industry. Any enterprise where you are operating, shutting down, restarting, and maintaining reactors – all in a robust and trustworthy regulatory and safety environment – is an industry. And much of that industry needs to be under Australian control, otherwise we won’t have sovereign control of our most significant military capability.

What is the scale of that workforce and how do we develop it? Hopefully in the year of discussions leading up to the government’s announcement the Department of Defense was able to develop a reasonable understanding of the answer to the question.

But there are other unanswered questions that are just as critical to the success of the enterprise.

First, with the first SSN not entering service until the late 2030s, how will we maintain an effective submarine capability? On that schedule, our Collins submarines will be older than the Indonesian submarine KRI Nanggala that was lost with all hands in a training accident earlier this year.

Fifty per cent more than the $90 billion for the Attack class could be a safe starting assumption.

Second, what’s it going to cost? The government has said it will cost more than the cancelled Attack class. A lot will depend on which boat we select and the size of the enabling industry and workforce. Fifty per cent more than the $90 billion for the Attack class could be a safe starting assumption.

Third, what is the role of Australian industry in the building and sustainment of the SSNs. Australians would like to see a lot of that money stay here but they also don’t want to see requirements for Australian industry involvement slow down delivery and drive costs up.

Fourth, how are we going to generate the much larger uniformed workforce needed to operate the new fleet? The US Navy’s Virginia class SSNs have a crew of about 130, compared with the Collins’ 56. We’ll likely need to grow at least twice as many while simultaneously imparting nuclear engineering skills.

That gets to the final question. During the Attack program, many observers called for a Plan B due to its cost, schedule and capability. The government has now jumped from the previous Plan A to something completely different. But, in light of these unanswered questions, there are already calls for another Plan B in case the new plan doesn’t deliver.

Every time the Australian Strategic Policy Institute has looked at the path to acquiring nuclear boats we’ve concluded that Australia still needs a new conventional submarine to ensure we can safely transition to a nuclear fleet. Yet the government has cancelled the Attack program and burned its bridges behind it. So, the final question is, what gives the government such confidence that this plan is going to work?

Marcus is a Senior Analyst focusing on Defense economics and military capability.

This article was originally published by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

Image: Reuters