Editor's note: Ahmed Chalabi is either a consequential figure of opaque, backstage talents, or he has an uncanny ability to the ride the momentum of enormously consequential events-placing himself at the right place, at the right time, among the right people to his overwhelming benefit. In an interview with National Interest online editor, Ximena Ortiz, Chalabi pointed to two events he sees positively: Washington's announced willingness to participate in a regional conference, which will include Iran and Syria, and the recent restraint of Sadrists in the face of repeated provocation by Sunni death squads. Chalabi strongly suggested he played a role in helping to stay the hand of the Sadrists, which points to another of Chalabi's seemingly oxymoronic relationship-with Moqtada Sadr. His functional ties go beyond Shi‘a officialdom in Baghdad, reaching unofficial Shi‘a powerbrokers. Despite what Chalabi himself acknowledges as his association with the U.S. invasion of Iraq, he maintains close ties with one of the most fervent opponents of that the U.S. presence in Iraq: Sadr.

Once regarded as a pawn of American neoconservatives, Chalabi now maintains a close relationship with that group's most loathed entity: the Iranian regime. That tie may have been aided by Chalabi's most visible break with Washington, which he concedes has strengthened his credibility with Iraqis. He said he is no longer seen as a guardian of Washington's interests, but rather of "an Iraqi agenda."

Regardless of just whose agenda Chalabi promotes, one thing remains clear: he is nobody's pawn-not in the long-term, at least. Chalabi has recently been awarded an important new position within Iraq's Maliki government that could affect President Bush's latest "surge" plan for Iraq. He is now tasked-given his leadership of the new "popular committee for mobilizing the people"-to build or maintain support for the ramped up security regime by ensuring that the Iraqi people are compensated for any damage or fallout resulting from more aggressive security.

NIo: Some have called you a polarizing figure, one that has strong associations with certain parties, such as Iran, the Iraqi Shi‘a and, once upon a time, American neoconservatives and Bush Administration officials. You are now in a position geared towards fostering broad support, across all religious and ethnic groups, for ramped up security in Iraq, especially Baghdad.

To what degree will your efforts now be consumed with overcoming others' preconceptions regarding your sympathies and associations?

AC: The description you give of polarization and various associations-that is a concept that exists in the media in the United States and elsewhere in the Arab world. However, this is certainly not the case in Iraq. People do not perceive barriers in this way, and it is not even a subject for discussion at the popular level. It is a non-issue in Iraq, basically.

The point is that people here need to see that they are supported. That their fear of the future-the lack of security, the lack of services, that both those issues are addressed.

NIo: You have recently returned from a trip to Syria, on behalf of the Maliki government. To what degree can Iraq find accommodation with both Syria and Iran, independent of what the United States may or may not do vis a vis those countries?

And could the regional players, including also Saudi Arabia and Turkey, potentially cooperate in terms of moderating sectarian tensions and preventing the flow of weapons and fighters into Iraq, should the United States not play a major, or even minor, role in such talks?

AC: [Tuesday] the United States announced that they are going to participate in meetings with Iran and Syria in Baghdad in the second week of March.

NIo: Right, but U.S. officials have been very circumspect about what the significance of that is. They've said they will participate, but they've been asked directly whether they will play a role in negotiating with both Iran and Syria, and they've not wanted to specify. Do you have a sense of whether they will be willing to be an active participant, or is it your view, and are you hearing, that U.S. officials will be more or less spectators there?

AC: U.S. officials without question represent the strongest force, both politically and military, in Iraq. Therefore, it is not serious to pursue their role as spectators. They will have a significant role to play, and I believe that by the mere factor of being present in the same conference room as the Syrians and the Iranians at this level in Baghdad is very significant. I mean, after all, we tried very hard to get this meeting going last year, almost one year ago. It almost happened then. But then it was foiled at the last minute. One year later, they are back to the same situation, except now it is a multilateral thing-with the U.S. and Iran to sit in the same conference room.

NIo: So do you think that this represents an evolution in Washington's foreign-policy thinking, the fact that they are willing to be present?

AC: Clearly. They have established that confrontation with Iran is counterproductive and will complicate the path of the Iraqi government in establishing security in the country.

NIo: Do you feel that these regional players could reach an accommodation amongst themselves, regardless of what the U.S. role ends up being?

AC: The answer is yes. Syria and Iran can play a very significant role in establishing civil peace in Iraq. It is now established that the Syrians have influence among the armed groups in the west, and Iran has influence among the armed groups in Baghdad and the south. And they can play in a moderating role with those people. I believe that the neighboring countries that are of significance in Iraq now-and that can help the government establish civil peace in the country-are Syria, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia.

And I believe that there is a possibility that the Turkish prime minister will visit Baghdad in the next two weeks. So Turkey is now interested in playing a role. The Sunni community of Saudi Arabia is now playing a role. They are trying to establish contacts with communities in Iraq. And I think that these new developments will help the establishment of peace in the country. I think everybody saw the stupidity of making Iraq the battleground between countries who have quarrels outside Iraq.

NIo: You are perceived as having a more distant relationship from the U.S. government than you've had in the past nowadays. Do you believe that distancing, or perceived distancing, helps to bolster your credibility among the Iraqis?

AC: Well, the answer is this: due to the major press campaign that was done in the U.S. to give me a leading, a major, role in getting the U.S. to come here and overthrow Saddam, Iraqis are happy, because most Iraqis are happy that Saddam is gone.

However, my position since I've been to Iraq, even before I got here, has been: I have an Iraqi agenda; I do what is best for Iraq. And I have disagreements with the U.S. I have had disagreements with the CPA, with Ambassador Bremer, with Secretary Powell about sovereignty for Iraq. I stood up for Iraqis against the use of massive force towards Iraqi communities in Najaf, in Fallujah.

So this has of course helped me clear the perception that some had that I represent just U.S. interests.

NIo: In your new capacity, could you effectively function as an interlocutor with some of the leaders of Shi‘a sectarian groups in Iraq, such as Moqtada al-Sadr? And would such an ability allow you, do you think, to convince the sectarian leaders of armed groups to refrain both from retaliating against, or initiating, attacks on the Sunni?

AC: You notice that there has been very little activity by the Sadrists in the past six weeks, despite major provocation with bomb attacks and assassinations, kidnappings, that have happened frequently-yet they have not responded. That is a significant factor.

This outcome did not happen in a vacuum. There was major effort to persuade the Sadrists. Many people participated in it. There were feted meetings with the mayor of Sadr City-who is not part of the Sadrist movement or the Mahdi Army, but he has authority from them to pursue these meetings-and the multinational force, and political officers from the embassy.

All these are positive developments, because there have been many provocations. Today, there was, for example, an attack in the morning by the 36^th Battalion, which is under U.S. command, on houses in Sadr City. The tension rose. There were contacts with the radicals and those 16 were released and the thing was resolved. This is the kind of work that is going on a daily basis.

NIo: Now you say that these developments are positive. Can you qualify just how positive they are? Does it, in your view, signal that there could in the future be a decrease in tit-for-tat sectarian attacks?

AC: Look, these are beginnings. And they could easily be overturned. Let us not make any exaggerated claims at this stage, but they are positive beginnings.

Here is another issue: Yesterday, in probably the most dangerous area of Baghdad-Hai'amil, or the "Worker's Quarter in the southwest of the city-there are Shi‘a and Sunnis living there, and there was a protracted conflict between the Mahdi Army and the Sunni armed force in the area. There was tension. So, we went there yesterday, along with the commander or the deputy commander of the Baghdad security plan, and we went there to a Sunni mosque and held a meeting. People saw that we were there. They came out of their homes and attended, and it was broadcast on Iraqi TV. It had a positive effect, and the parties agreed to form a committee and work normally, and the situation is quiet there now.

If we do not build on this, if we do not provide the people something-they have had no electricity for months, they've had no food distribution for months, they've have almost no fuel, they could not go out of their area-then I cannot guarantee anything.

But again, the sense is that people are fed-up with the violence. They have seen the brink and they don't like it. They are trying to work back from the brink

Now the prime minister is supporting this effort very much, and he in fact has from his own prime minister's office budget, he is granting a million dinars to every family that returns that was forcibly evicted from their area. So many people are returning, and the moves that we made in returning mosques to various communities that were taken from them is helping secure this kind of feeling among the people there.

So the work is going on in the city at the popular level, and if there is to be successful reconciliation, I believe that it also has to be done in the neighborhoods among the neighbors who had been living together for many years and when this sectarian violence emerged, they began to fight each other. Let me emphasize to you that the areas of conflict in Baghdad are no more than 25 neighborhoods out of a total of 800. 

NIo: Do you feel that the Maliki government has anyone on the Sunni side who could similarly serve as an informal interlocutor with armed Sunni groups, particularly the ones facing off with the Shi‘a? And does that person have the ties and credibility to similarly prevent Sunni retaliation and unprovoked attack on the Shi‘a?

AC: There is a Sunni politician, a senior figure in the Islamic Party, his name is Naseer al-Ani, who was vice president of the National Assembly, and he is working alongside me in those committees. He comes to all the meetings, and we are working together with all the communities.

NIo: Is there anything you would like to add?

AC: After security is improved security, the Iraqi government has to take responsibility for providing a better output of products and services for the people.

This something that needs to be thought about and addressed with some depth. We have now a decline in, as we speak, the amount of oil exported. We are now down to 1.3 million barrels a day; the budget is based on 1.6 million barrels a day at $50 a barrel, so we are 20 percent below that. And we need serious consideration about the oil sector.