THE 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) describes China as a revisionist power seeking to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region. It is an accurate characterization which was resisted by previous American administrations despite there being little evidence that China is content to be a “responsible stakeholder” under a U.S.-led order.

The Chinese desire to gradually exclude the United States and reduce the latter’s role in strategic affairs in the region preceded the current regime of Xi Jinping. However, Xi has intensified China’s use of all the instruments of national power to further its goal of regaining the preponderant position in East Asia. Given explicit U.S. security guarantees offered to Japan, South Korea and Taiwan—themselves formidable military powers—Beijing has identified Southeast Asia as a region of immense strategic importance and opportunity. It is in this sub-region consisting of eleven countries and home to over six hundred million people that China has been the most proactive and assertive.

Consider China’s illegal artificial island building program and militarization of features in the South China Sea which have accelerated in the Xi era. This is designed to extend Beijing’s control of those areas and increase its capacity to defend them against “intrusions.” It also enhances China’s ability to inflict heavy and possibly “prohibitive” costs on military assets of other countries including the United States. It also extends Beijing’s capacity to implement its “active defense” approach which states that an effective counter-attack is only possible when the People’s Liberation Army can negate the enemy’s offensive military assets in pre-determined areas.

The purpose of this approach is not simply a one-dimensional one of winning any potential battle with the United States or another adversary. China does not need the capacity to win a “battle” to win the “war.” If it can create the reasonable expectation that the real prospect of military conflict will cause the United States to back away—either because of the “prohibitive” threat of loss of major military assets and personnel or unacceptable economic disruption—the damage to the relevance and reliability of the United States as an alliance partner and security guarantor becomes considerable.

Similarly, China uses its economic role and weight to seduce, trap or else coerce smaller nations to agree with or else remain neutral when it comes to Beijing’s activities in the region, albeit with mixed results. Its covert influence and political interference activities are also designed in large part to reduce enthusiasm for existing alliances and security relationships with the United States, increase support for Chinese policies and silence dissenting voices in target countries.

Chinese strategy is about countering the United States. It seeks to vitiate existing U.S. alliances and security partnerships in the region and restrict the latter’s access to the regional commons needed to secure and extend U.S. power, influence and forward presence. China has moved on from seeking to understand the sources of American power and influence toward increasingly bold attempts to limit, circumvent, bind or otherwise reduce American power and influence. Southeast Asia is the frontline of this strategy.

Moreover, Chinese gains in the South China Sea reinforce the conviction that Chinese predominance is inevitable, fast approaching, and the United States has little ability or will to counter Chinese actions or reverse the broader trendline. These messages reinforce a further Chinese narrative: that American presence in the region is a historical accident and that the latter is here by choice rather than geographical necessity. As the reasoning goes, it is more prudent for Southeast Asian allies and partners to hedge rather than balance against China as a peripatetic United States is likely to abandon its commitments should they become too onerous—better for regional nations to remain neutral and stay on the sidelines than join in futile balancing and countering efforts against China.

IN APRIL 2017, Japan released its “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy,” which describes how Tokyo will broaden its worldview and strategic role in the Indo-Pacific as part of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s long-standing desire to make a “proactive contribution to peace.” In November 2017, Australia released its Foreign Policy White Paper, which is the country’s first comprehensive blueprint to guide Australia’s external engagement since 2003. The key theme of the white paper is the strengthening and defense of “an open, inclusive and prosperous Indo-Pacific region.”

One month later, the White House released the National Security Strategy of the United States of America. The NSS promised that the United States will “respond to the growing political, economic, and military competitions we face around the world.” The NSS identified China and Russia as seeking to “challenge American power, influence, and interests” whilst attempting to “erode American security and prosperity.” In placing the NSS in a regional context, the document argues that “[a] geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order is taking place in the Indo-Pacific region.” The strategic response is to “redouble our commitment to established alliances and partnerships, while expanding and deepening relationships with new partners that share respect for sovereignty, fair and reciprocal trade, and the rule of law.”

These positions are variations in pursuit of what the three countries now refer to as a vision for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). This is essentially a reaffirmation of security and economic principles which have evolved since after the Second World War, especially as they relate to freedom of the regional and global commons such as sea, air and cyberspace, and of the way nations conduct economic affairs.

The reaction of states belonging to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to FOIP is underwhelming. Vietnam appears to be the most supportive. Singapore and Thailand are not inherently opposed to the FOIP but have reservations about juxtaposing a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” to China’s preferred view of a hierarchical regional order. Indonesia appears the most supportive of the Indo-Pacific as a geostrategic concept but only if it enhances ASEAN’s presence in that broader construct. Malaysia, the Philippines, Cambodia and Laos have remained silent. Although the FOIP is discussed by Southeast Asian states behind closed doors, none have offered public or (to this author’s knowledge) private endorsement of the FOIP.

A free and open region guided by rules and international law ought to be inherently appealing to ASEAN and the majority of its member states seeking checks on Chinese activities in the South China Sea. Current reluctance to endorse the FOIP concept arises for several reasons.

First, the change of focus from the Asia-Pacific to the Indo-Pacific gives rise to unease. ASEAN is aware that the Indian and Pacific Oceans are increasingly linked in strategic, economic and logistical ways. ASEAN states are also supportive of India’s “Act East” policy and welcome a greater role for India in regional affairs.

However, there are fears that the change in—and widening of—geostrategic focus will diminish the diplomatic centrality and relevance of ASEAN even though ASEAN-led meetings such as the East Asia Summit include India and are increasingly taking on an Indo-Pacific perspective. The fact that the newfound interest in the Indo-Pacific was an initiative by non-ASEAN countries heightens ASEAN’s apprehension that diplomatic events and discussion may well transcend ASEAN centrality.

Indeed, for some ASEAN states, the reestablishment of the Quad—a formal meeting between officials from the United States, Japan, India and Australia—is the quintessential Indo-Pacific initiative. It may well be a glimpse of a post-ASEAN future within which ASEAN’s standing and ability to set the regional agenda and lead discussion are diminished. It is not lost on members that the Quad brings together four democratic countries with considerable hard power resources that exceeds those of ASEAN member states by a considerable margin.

If groupings such as the Quad become more significant, many believe ASEAN centrality is inherently threatened. Democratic nations like South Korea and perhaps Indonesia may well become more interested in such groupings at ASEAN’s expense. Moreover, a privilege of ASEAN centrality lies in the diplomatic capacity to include or exclude countries in major forums. It is feared that privilege will be diluted.

Second, states seek to manage relationships with great powers by championing the principles of inclusiveness and neutrality (and maximizing diplomatic leverage through demanding the right to define what these terms mean.) If ASEAN is seen to support American and allied actions, it believes its cover of inclusiveness and neutrality will be blown. The consequences of Chinese displeasure are unknown but will cause deep apprehension nevertheless. As Singaporean prime minister Lee Hsien Loong argued when asked about his country’s reaction to the FOIP concept during his visit to Australia for the ASEAN-Australia Special Summit earlier in March, “we do not want to end up with rival blocs forming or countries having to take one side or the other.”

Third, ASEAN insists on the principle of “consensus” to minimize overt disagreement amongst its member states and to offer the convenient fiction that ASEAN represents a unified bloc. It is believed that presenting itself as a unified bloc provides a louder voice and greater leverage for Southeast Asian states when dealing with larger powers. As there is no consensus amongst ASEAN states on the FOIP, ASEAN is unable to offer any clear position vis-à-vis the concept. Rather than allow differences of view to play out into the open, ASEAN considers it better to not engage with the FOIP concept.

In the last few decades, ASEAN centrality and the principles of neutrality and inclusiveness have served ASEAN and the region well: it has allowed ASEAN to take the lead in building essential multilateral diplomatic architecture while member states and other countries retain a free hand in pursuing their own security relationships and interests.

This arrangement had broad support in the last decade of the previous century and the first decade of the current century because security competition between the great powers was minimized: U.S. allies and security partners were content to contribute to and exist under American preeminence; other member states supported American preeminence because it dampened security competition and allowed regional countries to focus on development; and a rising China was content to free-ride within that security system without ever genuinely committing to the rules, institutions and practices of that order.

In the contemporary environment, what worked in the past will no longer suffice. ASEAN’s preferred principles of neutrality and inclusiveness are ideally suited for an environment within which there are no major disputes between great powers (and between ASEAN states) and when major states are seeking to find common ground, compromise and maximize cooperation on strategic issues. Such principles come under strain when strategic competition between the United States and its allies, on the one hand, and China, on the other, is intensifying. Strategic competition and rivalry will inevitably deepen because of China’s willingness to change the strategic and territorial order in the region and threaten the core interests and/or territorial integrity of other states.

FOR THE moment, the United States, Japan and Australia will pay lip service to ASEAN centrality and have resisted criticizing the former’s management of South China Sea issues beyond expressing the preference that the Code of Conduct (COC) being negotiated between ASEAN and China will be consistent with international law and binding on all sides—unlikely given the initial drafts of the negotiating documents. While the United States, Japan, Australia and even India have all reaffirmed the importance of adhering to established rules and international law, ASEAN continues to have difficulty agreeing on common words with respect to the South China Sea and even mentioning the importance of international law as it applies to these disputes.

Over time, the United States, Japan and Australia are likely to become less and less sympathetic to the passive approach by ASEAN and many of its member states. Refusing to focus on points of disagreement with China will not protect Southeast Asian, American and allied interests. Declining to take a strong stand is indeed an active and consequential decision when China is pushing, challenging and changing external rules and the strategic environment. Washington and its allies will seek to refute the logic and question the effectiveness of the Southeast Asian approach and assert themselves with or without ASEAN involvement or consent.

An immediate target will be the COC process or even a concluded COC itself. Even if the COC is signed, there is little expectation it would rein in Chinese activity and no expectation that illegal Chinese gains will be reversed. As Chinese policies in the disputed areas have profound strategic and other implications for the entire region, the United States, Japan and Australia will become openly unaccepting of the perspective that disagreements in the South China Sea are primarily an ASEAN-China issue and only amenable to an ASEAN-China solution. Indeed, it is worth noting that only five of the ten ASEAN states—Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei—are claimants.

Although ASEAN is not a unified strategic entity, it does have the capacity to raise the diplomatic heat on countries through collective approbation—something it has refused to do against China. Several member states will grow increasingly frustrated with ASEAN’s reluctance or else inability to voice greater disapproval of Chinese actions. The Philippines took its disputes to an Arbitration Tribunal convened under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea only for the Rodrigo Duterte government to downplay the favorable ruling. Vietnam and Indonesia have been more vocal than peers in criticizing Chinese behavior but have been unable to persuade ASEAN colleagues to follow their lead. Unlike his predecessor Najib Razak, one hopes Malaysia under Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad might well adopt a prickly approach toward China in defense of its own interests.

GIVEN ASEAN’S inability to come to any consensus required to take a harder line vis-à-vis China, several anxious Southeast Asian states will eventually look beyond ASEAN when it comes to increasing diplomatic pressure and costs on China—assuming they are not prepared to quietly cede control of their maritime periphery and existing claims. The United States, Japan and Australia already have established and institutionalized dialogues. It would be a relatively easy matter to include willing Southeast Asian members in an ad hoc manner and issue collective or coordinated diplomatic statements against Chinese behavior. If India decided to commit more enthusiastically to the Quad, as the other three members have done, then a Quad-led response involving other Southeast Asian players could be considered.

Bear in mind that the primary objective is not to precipitate the irrelevance of ASEAN and heighten the anxiety of relatively small and weak Southeast Asian states. But the twin arguments that ASEAN centrality ought to be uncontested and that Southeast Asian states must not be forced to choose between sides are no longer tenable. The centrality of an organization which refuses to respond when the strategic interests of its own members are being eroded in an ongoing and rapid manner cannot endure in the rough and tumble world of international politics. The usefulness of ASEAN’s diplomatic centrality with respect to achieving strategic objectives will come under scrutiny from within and without. This is not a threat to be issued to ASEAN but a reality that ought to be brought to its attention.

Moreover, Southeast Asian nations that believe there is a “no cost” approach to China are living in a fool’s paradise: Beijing has already built up enough military infrastructure with which to challenge the U.S. presence in the region and overwhelm the military forces of any other South China Sea claimants, according to the commander of Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Philip S. Davidson. It is difficult to see how that constitutes a “no cost” or even “low cost” approach to China.

It is also worth reminding Southeast Asians that just as the grand strategy of the United States since the beginning of the previous century has been to prevent the emergence of a potentially hostile hegemon on either side of the Eurasian landmass, the grand objective of Asian maritime nations over the same period has been to prevent the emergence of another Asian hegemon in the region. Regional states might resent pressure being brought to bear against their emollient approaches, but a disengaged America is the worst of all outcomes.

This is the reason why American preeminence was always, and remains, much preferred. By Southeast Asia’s own standard, the cost of the current approach ought to be already unacceptably high. Surely merely avoiding Chinese opprobrium is not the end-game when Beijing has illegally created and is in the process of militarizing 3,200 acres of land in the South China Sea over the past five years. Regional states should also be told in explicit terms that the price of regional passivity and willingness to bend-the-knee to China is fast becoming prohibitive for the United States and its allies.

SOUTHEAST ASIAN states must choose wisely. Diplomatic messaging matters because failure to criticize Chinese actions (and support U.S. policies and actions) allows Beijing to legitimize illegal behavior, deflect criticism and broadcast the narrative of American weakness, lack of resolve and fading relevance. Beijing labels American actions such as its periodic Freedom of Navigation Operations near Chinese-held land features as “destabilizing” and “provocative” when it is China’s illegal behavior which is the revisionist challenge to international law and the status quo. China accuses the United States of “sowing discord” when the latter enhances its security networks in the region in response to Chinese assertiveness. This perverse logic is effective because it is uncontested and generally met with silence from Southeast Asia.

One priority is to address paralysis resulting from the need to secure unanimity in ASEAN’s decisionmaking by including stronger statements of its position on issues. Under the present system, China need only buy-off or else threaten one or more states to prevent ASEAN behaving more boldly to advance its members’ key interests.

Just as majority verdicts replaced the strict requirement for unanimity to prevent the prevalence of “hung juries” damaging the institution of trial by jury in many jurisdictions, it could be proposed to ASEAN that it abandon its cherished convention of decisionmaking by full consensus—perhaps to allow decisionmaking through agreement by a quorum of eight or nine states. Such a change, although momentous, is not prohibited by its charter, which is silent on this issue.

Initially, the proposal would be strongly resisted by all members. Over time, and once the seed of the idea is planted, reluctance may well subside. It should be made clear to member states that the inevitable consequence over time of continued paralysis is lessening of emphasis on ASEAN by external powers and several of its own member states. Its diplomatic centrality can only remain if the organization serves to advance the interests of its own members and that of like-minded great powers. On the other hand, if stubborn adherence to unanimous decisionmaking persists, then its members will be the unchangeable guardians overseeing that organization’s demise.

Moreover, the reluctance of Southeast Asian nations to endorse the principles of the FOIP on the basis that it would antagonize China and deepen regional competition demonstrates the muddled strategic reasoning which must be confronted. During the Obama administration, these states lamented that the “pivot to Asia” was not more effective in providing checks against Chinese actions. In the face of ongoing and illegal Chinese advances in disputed areas, these same states are distancing themselves from principles designed to champion their rights and interests. In doing so, China has more and not less incentive to accelerate the consolidation of footholds in the South China Sea even as ASEAN states blithely demand stability and a reduction of tensions in the region.

If considered on its merits, ASEAN and its member states should be comfortable with the principles of the FOIP as it is a reassertion of a beneficial normative and strategic order which protects the sovereignty and rights of smaller states. The United States and its allies should present a binary choice to ASEAN member states: endorse the principles of the FOIP or those practiced by China. Using the current nomenclature, one either accepts the rules-based order and international law or rejects it. Those choosing to sit on the fence ought to feel the need to justify that decision. The objective is to put the onus on Southeast Asian states to choose between “free and repressive visions of world order [which] is taking place in the Indo-Pacific” as the NSS puts it. Given that Southeast Asian states are already reluctant to criticize Chinese policies, refusing to choose in this context only helps pave the way for Chinese regional hegemony.

Even so, the conversation can be more about carrots rather than sticks. The United States and its allies should seek to persuade Southeast Asian states that it is in their interest to engage formally and substantially with the United States, Japan and Australia with respect to the operationalization of the FOIP concept, even if much of this will be done so behind closed doors.

Doing so would signal approval of the basic framework and principles of the FOIP and allow regional states a greater role in shaping the policy agenda for the three FOIP countries. This might include the future direction of the Quad, coming to agreement on an appropriate diplomatic role for ASEAN vis-à-vis the FOIP concept, and common messages with respect to Chinese activities. It would lock in ASEAN as a critical diplomatic entity in a discussion of enduring importance.

INCLUDING DISCUSSION of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept on the ASEAN agenda, and the bilateral conversation when member states engage with the United States and its allies, would also give ASEAN and key states a new and important purpose: assist the three external states to develop more credible and constructive economic diplomacy approaches for the region. Such an economic element is still substantially lacking in the operationalization of the concept.

There is also the vexed issue of how China would respond if ASEAN were to collectively engage constructively with the United States, Japan and Australia on the concept. Beijing might well accuse ASEAN of “taking sides.” The plausible response would be that engaging with a concept which advocates for a rules-based order is not an inherently hostile act against China. It merely proscribes certain behaviors and policies which have been adopted by China. As the self-appointed guardian of regional norms and supporter of international law, ASEAN and other countries are simply using their collective weight to increase diplomatic pressure on countries that violate long-standing rules, practices and international law.

Moreover, it would not serve China’s interest to simply “walk away” from relations with ASEAN given that Beijing’s diplomatic strategy is to find ways to decrease the relevance of the United States in regional disputes. Even China downgrading relations with ASEAN in this context would offer enhanced diplomatic opportunities for the United States which would be anathema to China’s interests. Instead, Beijing should be forced to engage and justify its policies to as wide and public an audience as possible.

Finally, forcing a change in Southeast Asia’s diplomatic approach is highly complementary to a broader balancing and countering strategy already taking place in Washington, Tokyo and Canberra. The United States, Japan and Australia have established deepening security relations with Singapore, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand. Undermining the effectiveness of greater security networking between the United States and its allies and partners is regional diplomacy which has refused to recognize the reality of Chinese actions. Beijing has exploited the lack of criticism against it to minimize costs for itself.

Every action, and inaction, has costs. It is time for Southeast Asian states and ASEAN to think, act and speak consistently and clearly for their own interests—or else court irrelevance and the ruin of their own strategic objectives.

John Lee is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a professor at the United States Studies Center at the University of Sydney. From 2016–2018, he served as senior national security adviser to the Australian foreign minister.

Image: A Vietnamese soldier marches to take his post for the opening session of the World Economic Forum on ASEAN at the National Convention Center in Hanoi, Vietnam September 12, 2018. Bullit Marquez/Pool via REUTERS.