AT THE height of Bahrain’s riots and protests in 2011 and 2012, some, including certain figures in the U.S. government, argued that Bahrain’s royal family had to give way to the protesters’ demands or be swept away by the tides of history. They were wrong. The protests were suppressed; the parties that voiced their demands were banned and their leaders jailed. Bahrain is recovering economically. Repression, it was observed, worked.

Yet Bahrain’s story is more complicated than that. The simple narrative in the Western press of a democratic revolt crushed by a ruling minority is simplistic. Bahrain’s leaders do have a view of where they are going. It is a long-term strategy which faces some internal contradictions and, ultimately, may be insufficient to the need. But make no mistake: there is a strategy.

A three-day trip in February 2019 was certainly insufficient to pretend a complete understanding of a small yet very complicated country. But meetings with senior government officials, royal family members, old friends and some figures who were close to the opposition gave a broad enough, if still partial and admittedly impressionistic, picture. While some parts of this picture may be wrong or need correction, it is nonetheless worth recording—if for no other reason than that so little is now being written about Bahrain, and most of that from the single standpoint of human rights concerns.

THE CRUSHING of the opposition in Bahrain has been harsh. Prison terms are long. The stripping of citizenship (one contact claimed that there were some 800 cases, although the king restored nationality to 551 in April) leaves the victim free but hopeless; without a legal identity to open a bank account or a credit card, unable to send children to school or to work, or, if still residing inside Bahrain, to attain a passport and leave. In some cases, the standards of evidence are open to question. Things such as this have been reported before, leaving readers with a certain impression of Bahrain. What these stories leave out though is the broader context necessary for understanding the country—something that does not automatically change judgments but often makes them more difficult.

I, among others, have written elsewhere about the complexity of the struggle that broke out in 2011, and of various efforts undertaken to resolve it over several years through negotiations, dialogue and, in part, an election held last year.

There were many reasons for why productive dialogue was not achieved. The ruling government offered less than what demonstrators wanted, but the opposition was fundamentally unable to make compromises at key points, repeatedly overplayed its hand and made decisions that left it weaker. Suspicions were mutual, but power was in the hands of the government, and it ended up convinced that compromise was impossible. They could be right.

Before the leaders of the now-banned Al Wefaq—formerly the country’s largest and foremost Shia political party—were imprisoned, I asked some of them, more than once, a basic question: if they were able to make a deal, and others in their community refused it and took to the street, would they be able to stick with the deal, and therefore the government, against their former allies? They could never answer. And if they could not tell me that they could keep a deal, how could they possibly persuade a suspicious government that compromise would lead them anywhere except to a weakened government faced with further demands in a repetitive, downward cycle?

Compounding the problem was the matter of Iranian influence. Concerns about Tehran’s scheming were ever-present even when I served in Bahrain from 2001 to 2004. It may have been exaggerated, but the presence of some posters of Iranian ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in some religious processions in Bahrain did nothing to remove it. The most influential Bahraini Shia religious leader, Isa Qassim, looked to the Iranian city of Qom for inspiration. When he was finally released from house arrest for medical treatment in London in 2018, his subsequent trip to Iran and his April 3 statement denouncing Bahrain for hosting an Israeli delegation at an investment conference reinforced governmental suspicions.

As violence increased during the struggle, so did Iranian influence. Weapons from across the Persian Gulf began to show up in Bahrain in larger quantities. The combination of homemade and imported weapons killed and/or injured over 2,000 Bahraini policemen, at least according to the Bahraini government. While the monopoly of force remained overwhelmingly with the police, they were confronting something more than mere “peaceful” protesters. At one point, the Bahraini police uncovered the machinery to manufacture shaped projectiles to pierce armored vehicles; a technology that Iran has used against Americans in Iraq with deadly effectiveness.

In the end, the government moved for the complete suppression of all political parties. That is where things stand today: politics is dead, or at least exists in a state of suspension. Because of this, there is a sense of political suffocation among the country’s Shia. What I heard repeatedly is that they have, at least for the time being, given up on politics. One spoke of the fear of informants, meaning that discussion is limited even within groups.

Though physical violence has largely died out, a few flickers occur in the villages where the February 14 Youth Coalition—a youth group of activists that calls for demonstrations and the fall of the regime—appears still to have some followers. The overwhelming sentiment I heard is of a desire for normalcy and for people to be able to get on with their lives. The grievances, the sense that there is discrimination against the Shia in jobs and economic opportunity, has not gone away. But for now, it has little to no political expression. How much support remains for the imprisoned leaders of Al Wefaq and other political groups is very difficult to tell. I heard of Shia who reproached these leaders for making bad decisions and not exploiting opportunities for negotiations when they were possible.

While politics in Bahrain may be suspended in practice, it is nominally still active. The parliamentary elections in November of last year saw a large turnout. It is unknown whether it reached the 67 percent turnout rate claimed by the government, but foreign as well as Bahraini observers felt that, whatever the exact turnout was, it was indeed significant, and opinion polling taken before the vote had predicted a similar result. This large turnout was enough to allow the government to credibly claim that things are returning to normal in the country.

The National Assembly, Bahrain’s parliament, has had its powers reduced, and electoral districts have been redrawn to avoid a Shia majority. Critics say the Assembly is a tame creation, effectively amounting to a rubber stamp. Others say that it will be a force the government will have to reckon with, at least on economic and social issues—although certainly not on political ones. It will take time to see how the Assembly acts and whether either the claims of a somewhat representative or a reliably compliant body prove out. Yet even if the Assembly is fairly tame, it is nonetheless significantly ahead in terms of democratic development when compared to similar institutions in many other Arab states.

Outside of the political sphere, aspects of social liberalization remain strong in Bahrain. Christians and Jews are able to worship freely in the country, and the number of churches present might surprise visitors. Women are active both in business and in social affairs, and, to some extent, in politics. The current speaker of the lower house of the National Assembly is a woman. Yet despite these enviable advances, there is little space at present for the active civil society that characterized Bahrain before the protests of 2011 began.

In short, while peace and stability has been restored in Bahrain, politics, as a matter of fact, have all but ground to a halt in the country.

BAHRAIN EXISTS in the midst of a troubled region, which has a significant effect on how the nation’s leaders view their political choices. From the Bahraini perspective, Iran is more dangerous than ever. It has expanded into Syria and has a major presence (along with sizeable influence) in Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen. Analysts may dispute exactly how great or significant the Iranian influence or control is in each of these places, but from the perspective of the Bahraini government, what matters is that Iran’s expanding influence, and its potential threat to Bahrain, is undeniable. “Iran has subverted the national character of four Arab states,” is how one senior interlocutor phrased it to me.

Iran is not the only worry. Saudi Arabia is critical to both Bahrain’s economy and security. For many, Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) is seen as an essential figure, driven to carry out vitally necessary reforms if the Saudi Kingdom is to develop as it needs to. But at the same time, Saudi Arabia is involved in a war in Yemen and an ongoing feud with Qatar. Both of these now involve Bahrain, which has little choice except to follow the Saudi lead.

Further complicating the situation is how MBS is being attacked by many Western countries for the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. The moral certainty of the West is incomprehensible to many Bahrainis. As some Bahraini businessmen pointed out to me, the West and America, in particular, have ignored similar murders presumably orchestrated by Russia’s Vladimir Putin and other dictators. It also ignores Palestinian deaths and is itself responsible for the numerous assassinations and killings in Iraq. Why get so steamed up over one murder when it endangers the stability of a key American friend and jeopardizes Bahrain?

With an incorrigible Iran across the Gulf, a now less-friendly Qatar on one side and an assertive Saudi Arabia on the other, Bahrain senses trouble. With so much uncertainty around them and so little ability to predict how any sudden change will impact Bahraini stability, there is no appetite for bold political action. “This is not the time for grand politics,” is how one thoughtful Bahraini leader put it to me.

WITH THE political opposition suppressed, the initiative to drive social change lies with the government. It, however, no longer has any interest in a political deal, nor with trying to work with the Islamic opposition. Some observers had speculated that there would be a limited political opening for the opposition in the 2018 parliamentary elections, such as turning a blind eye to Al Wefaq members running as independents. The government rejected any such approach. It saw Al Wefaq as “fascists with beards”—troublemakers masquerading as democrats but, in reality, both wholly sectarian and foreign directed. Instead, the government now wants to move away from religious sectarianism altogether.

Its plan has two major lines of effort. One is a drive to get Bahrainis to submerge sectarian identity in a national “Bahraini” identity. The other is a redoubled effort to improve the country’s social and economic conditions as a way of absorbing much of the bitterness of the past few years and providing a future for Bahrain’s disaffected youth. There are efforts to push forward with these aims, and each faces many obstacles.

In the realm of education, work is being done to upgrade the quality of secondary school teaching. A recently established polytechnic college, based upon a successful model pioneered in New Zealand, serves as an example.  It takes students in strictly on the basis of merit, is responsible to market demands and has a good record in onward employment. Coupled with this educational endeavor is a new focus on youth education in partnership with DARE (Drug Abuse Resistance Education). While the American model of this sort of program is (as DARE’s name would imply) significantly directed against drugs, the Bahraini program also has an element of combatting violent extremism. A strong element of existing and planned efforts is a campaign to persuade Bahrainis to move away from their sectarian identity and see themselves as solely Bahrainis. This is a matter of much discussion within the senior Bahraini leadership.

However, for this campaign to have any chance of working the government will have to prove that it is willing to deliver social services on an equal basis. That has not been the perception among Shia, who have felt discriminated against in the provision of housing, government jobs and employment in the security services. The latter is unlikely to change, but there have been efforts to expand other services. More housing for low-income Bahrainis has been talked about for years and publicized in the papers, yet for almost as many years there has been little to no movement on it. That picture seems to be changing. Plans to expand housing are now moving along quickly, funded in part by a generous subvention from Bahrain’s Gulf Cooperation Council neighbors. The jury is out on whether the housing is being distributed more equitably, with very different perceptions from different observers—though some are saying there has been a recent and noticeable improvement. I was told that the health sector will be a forthcoming area for major attention.

In some ministries, Shia are clearly being hired and put to work. But Bahrain’s large and growing unemployment problem cannot be solved solely by providing government jobs. The solution will have to be found in the private sector, if it can be found at all. In this, several things constrain Bahrain: it is a small country with a small economy; it has limited financial resources; and it has faced intense competition from its neighbors, including Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Doha.

There is a basic understanding that to improve investment, particularly foreign investment, the government must be a facilitator rather than an employer. Changes in labor laws, work visas for foreigners and other regulations are part of this undertaking. While the jury is still out on the long-term effectiveness of such laws, the effort is impressive and reflects considerable thought and planning. Amazon’s opening of an office in Bahrain is claimed as one success of this new project. The office, according to Amazon’s press release, is to “support organizations of all sizes, from start-ups to government institutions, as they make the transition to the [Amazon Web Services] AWS Cloud”—an effort which may encourage other investments. There is long-term planning underway to expand tourism and find new markets, along with a parallel proposal to open new air links. All this is helped by recent developments, such as improvement in the price of oil, a low level of consumer price inflation and a bustling port that sees plenty of commercial activity.

Until recently, all these expansive plans have been constrained by Bahrain’s limited budget. The fall in oil prices hit Bahrain hard, as did the continued decline in production from Bahrain’s limited oil fields, which are the oldest in the Gulf. In addition to politically difficult reductions in subsidies (some of which were reversed under pressure) and increased taxes, Bahrain had to resort to substantial foreign borrowing. Its foreign debt increased substantially. Its investment rating by the credit rating agency Moody’s declined as a result, although it improved slightly at the end of 2018. Nevertheless, Bahrain’s economy remained under pressure. Substantial grants from Saudi Arabia and the UAE of over $7 billion dollars broadened Bahrain’s margin for maneuver, though this was not a dependable long-term fix. However, economic relief may be in sight.

A new offshore oil field has been discovered and, in April 2018, Bahrain’s oil minister announced that this new reserve contains at least 80 billion barrels of tight (i.e., locked in rock formations requiring fracking) oil and between 10 to 20 trillion cubic feet of deep natural gas. Exploitation of this new source will require new fracking technology. As such, Bahrain is in negotiation with foreign firms—particularly American ones, since they are at the forefront of the necessary technology—to exploit the find. A good deal of work and time will be necessary to determine exactly what is in this reserve and how much Bahrain will profit from it. Several years will be needed before the new finds can inject new money into the Bahraini economy. Nevertheless, the chances appear good that Bahrain will have an increased ability to invest more in its extensive economic and social planning.

WHERE DOES all this leave Bahrain? For the moment, the government and the royal family are secure. Widespread opposition has ceased. Not only have Shia-based parties ended work, but several Sunni organizations have largely gone quiet. Support from the Saudis and the UAE is solid. Official American pressure on human rights has subsided and the Bahraini government is euphoric about the Trump administration, which is more supportive than the Obama administration. There is hope both for economic expansion and for efforts to bear fruit in expanding employment and social services. For the next several years, there are solid reasons to suppose that Bahrain can continue its chosen course. Yet, at the same time, there is also reason for concern about the long term.

The Trump administration will not continue forever, and a successor administration, particularly a Democratic one, might return to pressuring Manama on its human rights record—though the critical basing of the U.S. Fifth Fleet in Bahrain is likely to limit such pressure. While such newfound pressure might not be any more effective than it was under President Barack Obama, it would certainly make things less comfortable for Bahrain.

The continued stability of Bahrain’s Arab neighbors seems likely but is not guaranteed. Various sources of regional instability remain, including the war in Yemen, the difficulties with Qatar, harrying from Iran and the fluctuating worries that the United States may stumble into a war with Iran.

Above all, there is reason to question whether even successful efforts to expand social and political opportunity and submerge sectarian identity in a larger Bahraini nationalism will be sufficient in the long run. The historical record of removing sectarian or other identities anywhere is not encouraging. From Eastern Europe to Central Asia, long dormant tensions reawaken when given the chance: Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime stands as a glaring example for many observers. Bahrain’s situation is milder than that, but it does serve to illustrate the challenge Manama faces in trying to substitute economic and social development for political change. At the same time, the results of rapid political change in Libya, Egypt and Yemen scarcely hold out the promise of an easy solution through political change either.

For now, Bahrain has the political space to try to absorb some of the wounds of the past through an expanding economy if it is also able to generate a new—and up to now, lacking—sense that economic benefits will be shared fairly. The Shia population may have a limited opportunity to channel demands through social and economic issues, and perhaps they will make use of those possibilities. The newly elected National Assembly could evolve in ways that create a sense of some real participation in decisionmaking.

How each of these threads—social services, education, job expansion and whether parliament becomes a serious vehicle for discussing economic change—develop will influence Bahrain’s future stability. At the same time, the continuation of heavy-handed control will keep some resentment alive. Eventually, Bahrain will need to test the progress its plans have made by lightening repression. Finding that time and avoiding another explosion of unrest will require wisdom from all sides—not just the government’s.

Ronald E. Neumann is the president of the American Academy of Diplomacy. He has served as U.S. Ambassador to Bahrain, Algeria and Afghanistan.

Image: Reuters