On the day of the U.S. midterm elections, as most Americans shifted their attention away from China, Chinese leader Xi Jinping made his most alarming speech since securing his historic third term at the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 20th National Party Congress. Speaking as commander-in-chief of the Joint Operations of the Central Military Commission, Xi said, “Today, I and members of the Central Military Commission came…to make it clear to all of you that the new Central Military Commission will solidly align itself with the spirit of the 20th National Congress to comprehensively strengthen our position of troop training to prepare for war.” This remark was made during a visit to the joint operations command center, a bunker buried several hundred meters deep on the outskirts of Beijing.

Is this troop training an indication that Xi is preparing China for war over Taiwan? While many people are reluctant to acknowledge that as an immediate reality, determining instead that Xi’s remarks are standard rhetoric for the commander of a war unit whose purpose is to get ready for battle, ambiguity over Taiwan is rarely Xi’s intention. On the contrary, Xi wants to be very clear to the world about his intention to take control of Taiwan.

Later in the same speech, Xi said that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) must prioritize the only fundamental standard: combat effectiveness. The Chinese military must focus all its energy on fighting and enhancing its ability to win wars.

This is quite different from what Xi said five years ago when he visited the same joint operations command center after the 19th Party Congress. At that time, he asked the military to "strengthen responsibility, strengthen reform and innovation, strengthen implementation, and comprehensively improve the ability to prepare for war in the new era.”

Five years ago, Xi ordered the military to prepare for war; today, the order is to win a war.

But to win a war against whom? The direct target is clearly Taiwan, but the PLA’s real rival is America and its allies, who are likely to come to Taiwan’s defense should China invade the island.

If America and its allies join the fight over Taiwan, it will not be the quick battle Xi has hoped for, even if the PLA gains the upper hand early. It will be a long, hard war on the battlefield and at home, as Xi works to first gain support from his nation and then sustain that support through lengthy battles and what will surely be extensive loss of life. But, as a closer look into the new top leadership of the CCP reveals, that is exactly what Xi appears to be preparing for. Xi has formed a wartime cabinet that is able to efficiently draw resources from and ready the entire nation for war.

Following the 20^th Party Congress, a new Central Military Commission (CMC) was put in charge of the two-million-strong PLA. The most striking difference between Xi’s new CMC and the previous one is that the current leadership is narrowly focused on Taiwan and waging war. Adm. He Weidong, the new vice-chairman of the CMC, previously led the Eastern Theater Command, whose primary responsibility is the recapture of Taiwan by force. He also oversaw China’s large-scale live-fire military around Taiwan in the wake of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s August visit to the island. His promotion to vice-chairman is considered by many to be an astounding departure from China’s pattern of political promotions, given that He had not previously been a member of the CMC or the Party’s Central Committee. Xi’s willingness to radically depart from established political patterns demonstrates his central focus on Taiwan.

Adm. Zhang Youxiao remained as another CMC vice-chairman and is one of two members who have seen time in battle, having participated in the 1979 China-Vietnam War. This choice was more expected, given that Zhang and Xi’s fathers had worked together during the Chinese Civil War in the 1940s and the two families continue to have a good relationship. Moreover, despite the fact that many CMC members have not personally seen time in battle, all are hostile to the idea of Taiwan’s self-determination.

That a large portion of the PLA’s top leadership is optimized for invading Taiwan says a lot about Xi’s intentions for his third term in office. But wanting to fight a war is a far cry from having the resources and strategies necessary to win a war that is sure to involve many global superpowers. There are indications, though, that Xi has fine-tuned his plan for fighting a war over Taiwan.

The CCP’s Politburo is a powerful ruling body, second only to the Politburo Standing Committee. Seven provincial heads were added to the 20th Politburo, making up 40 percent of the twenty-four-member Politburo, excluding the Standing Committee members. This is a deep departure from the norm, which raises questions about Xi’s motivations for appointing so many provincial heads as members of the Politburo. On further examination, we see that these local party secretaries fall into three categories: those who have been senior technocrats in military-related fields, those who demonstrate excellence in coordinating and executing efforts in a province that will be directly involved in a war over Taiwan, and those who are Xi’s close confidants in such provinces.

The five top technocrats in the new Politburo are Li Ganjie, a nuclear expert from Shandong Province; Ma Xingrui, an aerospace expert from Xinjiang; Zhang Guoqing, who comes from Liaoning and was the general manager of the China Ordnance Industry Group; and Yuan Jiaun from Zhejiang, another aerospace expert.

These officials all began to take on increasingly complex and powerful governmental positions after Xi became general secretary of the CCP at the end of 2012, and all of them were promoted to their current provincial party secretary positions in late 2020 and 2021, after Xi had made international news for his positions on Taiwan. A closer examination reveals that the professional backgrounds of these secretaries are strongly correlated with the provinces they are currently governing and China’s potential needs in a war with Taiwan.

Li Ganjie, Shandong’s party secretary and a nuclear expert, worked in the nuclear sector for the majority of his career, eventually serving as deputy minister of environmental protection and director of the national nuclear safety administration. He began taking local governing positions in 2016, and in September 2021, he became the party secretary of Shandong. Li was likely appointed to that position because Shandong is a key base for the development of China's nuclear industry. China is quickly expanding its nuclear arsenal and developing nuclear power to increase its energy independence.

The second member, aerospace expert and Xinjiang Party Secretary Ma Xingrui, has held top leadership positions in aerospace and technology companies for many years, leading the efforts behind China's manned spaceflight and next-generation launch vehicles. Ma was given the party secretary role in Xinjiang because China’s major aerospace bases are located in the northwest and its most important satellite navigation system, Beidou, is headquartered in Xinjiang.

Beidou was designed to compete with and serve as a substitute for American-made GPS technology. In addition to its civilian uses, Beidou can navigate military vehicles and could guide precision strike weapons such as ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and air-to-ground missiles. The precise strike capability provided by Beidou could potentially enable "decapitation" missile attacks against Taiwan's political centers or important military facilities. In a conflict with America, the PLA will be able to launch precision missile attacks against U.S. military bases in Guam and maritime targets such as aircraft carriers using the Beidou navigation system.

The third military-focused member of the CMC is Liaoning Province’s Party Secretary, Zhang Guoqing. Zhang began his career at the China North Industries Corporation, which later changed its name to the China Ordnance Industries Group Corporation and is globally known as the Norinco Group. Norinco is a large state-owned enterprise whose manufacturing center is in Shen Yang, Liaoning’s capital. Unlike other state-owned companies, Norinco is directly managed by the central government. The company is the main research and production base for the PLA and provides weapons, ammunition, and equipment for numerous branches of the Chinese military, the armed police, and the public security forces, making it critical to China's national defense. Zhang has worked with Norinco for twenty-three years and was the general manager before entering government service.  

The CMC’s fourth newly-appointed military technocrat is Liu Guozhong, who worked in one of China's earliest bomb and missile factories before entering politics. In 2016, Liu began his tenure in local political positions and, in 2020, was appointed party secretary of the Shaanxi Province, a primary weapon production center with the manufacturing base for large transport aircraft located in Xi’an, its capital.

The fifth and final technocrat is Party Secretary of Zhejiang province and aerospace expert Yuan Jiajun. Yuan was the commander-in-chief of the Shenzhou spacecraft program and president of the China Aerospace Science and Technology Institute before being appointed to a series of provincial positions within Zhejiang province starting in 2014. He was appointed party secretary of that province in August 2020.

From a military point of view, the provinces of Zhejiang, Fujian, and Jiangxi would be central to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, in large part because of their proximity to the island. Additionally, Zhejiang is notable for the strength of its economy and its role as a rising technology center. It has been identified by the central government as a key development area for China’s aerospace industry, with a heavy focus on R&D in aircraft and drone manufacturing. That will certainly factor into the increase of “intelligent” equipment—including unmanned systems, artificial intelligence, and hypersonic missiles—announced by Xi in a report submitted to the 20th National Congress.

In addition to these five technocrats, Xi has appointed long-time loyalist Huang Kunming to the position of party secretary of Guangdong province. The importance of that province to a potential invasion of Taiwan was made clear by a leaked recording of a Southern Theater Command meeting in May, which revealed that Guangdong would bear the responsibility of providing equipment, logistics, and troop supplies to the PLA in any conflict with Taiwan.

The final province critical to a potential invasion of Taiwan is Fujian province, which is located directly across from Taiwan. For that geographically critical region, Xi tapped public health expert and Xi loyalist Yin Li, who had previously been favored by Xi for his efficient and decisive anti-pandemic policies during his tenure as governor of Sichuan province. He was also recognized for his preemptive grid management, a skill that will be critical for a front-line province during wartime, as decisive mobility and efficient coordination will be essential.

These appointments will allow Xi to effectively use the knowledge and talent of his key insiders to develop military technology, establish civil-military cooperation mechanisms, and produce the weapons needed to succeed in an assault on Taiwan. This idea is reminiscent, to an alarming degree, of the opening statement of the book Dertotale Krieg (The Total War), written by Erich Friedrich Wilhelm Ludendorff, a German general and military theorist who contributed significantly to the Nazis' rise to power. In the opening remarks, Ludendorff argues that “the future world war will no longer be an action to pursue limited political goals by military means, but a comprehensive and absolute struggle for survival by giant nations. Therefore, before the outbreak of the next war, Germany must transform its political structure, economic industry, social appearance and popular psychology into a form suitable for achieving maximum military effectiveness.” Ludendorff argued that while victory depended on decisive battles, the mobilization and equipping of the army was a national undertaking that must be placed above all goals.

Xi has set about transforming the political structure of the CPP, particularly the Politburo, in order to strengthen China for a battle against Taiwan and, potentially, the world. He has also altered China’s “social appearance and popular psychology” through rising state controls over Chinese society and industry. Xi has been transforming the economy in a myriad of ways, most notably with the restoration of state-run “supply and marketing cooperatives,” which were prevalent during China’s command economy more than half a century ago and allow the supply and sale of goods to be controlled by the government.

Accompanying the cooperatives are further public-private partnerships, tightened taxation monitoring mechanisms targeting the rich, restrictions on citizens’ overseas travel, and even state-run community kitchens whose main goal, at least according to the Chinese government, is to provide convenience to the elderly in need of care. While that may be true to some degree, by enabling the state to collect and distribute resources and by driving people toward collective activities, these measures increase the government’s control over resource distribution, which will conveniently suit wartime management of societal resources and needs.

John Culver, a retired CIA researcher and senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, recently wrote that there is no sign of an imminent invasion of Taiwan by the PLA, at least before 2024. Culver argues that if war was Beijing’s plan, there would be reliable indications that it is coming, including surging production of various missiles, rockets, and key munitions, which would be noticed by international governmental and nongovernmental observers alike. He also says that China would take visible steps to insulate its economy, military, and key industries from disruptions and sanctions and would start preparing the population psychologically for the cost of the war. So far, as Culver notes, such indications have not appeared.

Although we may not have seen mobilization in ways that would suggest a known start date for a war, Xi is clearly determined to wage such a war in the not-too-distant future, as indicated by how the new Politburo and CMC were composed.

One of Mao Zedong’s famous military doctrines was to never fight battles that the military was unprepared for or unconfident in its ability to win. However, war is often about exceptions. Adolf Hitler would have liked to have started World War II in 1941 after Germany was fully prepared. However, Germany’s dire economic conditions and the alarm set off by the United Kingdom and France in response to the German aggression forced Hitler to begin the invasion eighteen months earlier than he had planned. Similarly, it is not impossible that Xi would launch an attack before China is fully prepared if he saw an opportunity that he believed would provide a strategic advantage, such as by catching the rest of the world off-guard, capitalizing on the chaos and distraction in other countries.

The CCP claims to hold three magic weapons necessary for victory: the populist route, armed struggle, and stealth wars. Among the three, stealth war is the most powerful, as it can initiate and spread chaos and then defeat those weakened and distracted enemies. America and Taiwan should be on high alert for such operations, especially during 2024, when both countries will hold important presidential elections.

Simone Gao is an award-winning investigative journalist and documentarian whose work has been focused on China. She is the host of the in-depth report program “Zooming In with Simone Gao.”

Image: Reuters.