This article expresses my understanding of the viewpoints regarding the U.S. deterrence strategy over potential Taiwan Strait conflicts, made by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States, Mark Milley, on June 30, 2023. By examining the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) principle of unification with Taiwan in the context of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and explaining why the continuation of implementing this historical mission is unstoppable in the new era, I attempt to argue that relying solely on deterrence to stop Xi Jinping’s ambition would be imprudent and could even jeopardize U.S. national security although the deterrence strategy influences China’s decision-making process. I hope that the three parties, the PRC, Taiwan, and the United States, will reevaluate their strategies and adopt the right approach to promote peaceful triangular relations.

When Milley gave a speech at a National Press Club event in Washington on June 30, 2023, he commented on Xi’s stance on Taiwan. According to Milley, there is no concrete evidence suggesting that Xi has made a firm decision on ordering a military unification with Taiwan by 2027, but the decisionmaking process is still underway. Milley suggested the United States and its allies build up deterrence to ensure that every single day Xi wakes up and says today is not that day, and that decision never comes.

It is understandable when Milley emphasizes the significance of a deterrence strategy in influencing China’s decision-making process based on the historical experience of U.S. foreign policy and implementation. However, it would be imprudent and could even jeopardize U.S. national security if the policymakers believe that the deterrence strategy alone could change Xi’s determination to fulfill China’s historical mission of reunification of Taiwan in the context of China and the vision of the CCP.

The reunification of Taiwan is not Xi’s personal idea, but a longstanding principle upheld by all top leaders of the CCP. The founding father of the PRC, Mao Zedong, made it clear that Taiwan is part of China and pointed out that “Taiwan is ours, and we will never compromise on this issue, which is an issue of internal affairs.” Mao declared that the Chinese people will not tolerate foreign aggression or interference in our internal affairs because China does not fear its enemies. According to him, enemies are like flies: “On this tiny globe, a few flies dash themselves against the wall.” Mao tried to take over Taiwan several times by force, but unfortunately, he failed due to various factors, such as the ripple effects of the Cold War, the failure experience during the Taiwan Strait crises during 1954 and 1958, the interruption of the Cultural Revolution, the changing attitudes of the Taiwanese people and the U.S. intervention.

Although Deng Xiaoping prioritized the development of the Chinese economy in the post-Mao era and set forth a low-profile strategy, he still felt urgent to fulfill unification so he developed a roadmap toward the reunification of Taiwan by proposing the framework of “one country, two systems.” Jiang Zemin insisted that One China is the fundamental principle of reunification which is an inevitable trend of Chinese history by proposing an eight-point proposition for China’s reunification of Taiwan. Hu Jintao confirmed that China will continue to adhere to the One-China principle and firmly opposed any form of Taiwan independence and any attempts to create “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan.” Meanwhile, he urged unification with Taiwan. Despite that the PRC firmly insisted on the reunification of Taiwan, it still adopted a more pragmatic and flexible approach to the Taiwan issue under before the Xi administration.

It is not surprising that Xi has been taking a tougher stance on Taiwan as China has become the world’s second-largest economy because foreign policy always reflects national comprehensive power. Xi has promised that China must be and will be reunified and asserted that the problem of Taiwan cannot be passed on from generation to generation. He also warned that China makes no promise to renounce the use of force and reserves the option of taking all necessary measures to achieve the reunification of China. Yet, Xi’s view on unification with Taiwan is essentially the same as all his predecessors. Since the inception of the PRC, all of the five top CCP leaders uphold the One-China Principle as they believe that Taiwan is an integral part of China; they firmly reject any form of Taiwan independence; they vow to safeguard national sovereignty including Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan; they believe the reunification of Taiwan is an inevitable outcome and a historical trend; and they express a commitment to achieving reunification as an important aspect of maintaining national unity.

Each leader’s viewpoints have unavoidably been influenced by their respective historical contexts and the evolving circumstances of the global community, so their viewpoints toward Taiwan’s reunification have varied over time in their emphasis, approach, and specific policies. While all five top CCP leaders express the goal of reunification, Deng, Jiang, and Hu, placed a stronger emphasis on peaceful means of achieving reunification, highlighting the importance of maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Mao and Xi, on the other hand, have a more assertive policy and practice, and they do not explicitly prioritize peaceful reunification. Each leader has pursued their own approach toward Taiwan’s reunification. Deng and Jiang advocated for the framework of “One Country, Two Systems,” which was implemented in Hong Kong and Macau, as a model for future reunification with Taiwan. Hu emphasized the importance of deepening exchanges and cooperation between the mainland and Taiwan, particularly in economic and cultural areas. Xi has emphasized the concept of the “China Dream“ as a broader framework for reunification. However, none of the five leaders explicitly renounced the option of unification by force.

Therefore, the unification task is the PRC’s consistent ideology and has become the untouchable foundation of the PRC’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The CCP won’t change its historical mission of unification with Taiwan. The CCP sees unification as a matter of national pride and a symbol of China’s unity, an opportunity for increased economic integration and development, and a means to preserve and strengthen the Chinese nation’s unity and cultural heritage. If the CCP gave up the principle, it would lose its ruling party’s legitimacy and authority of governance.

Undoubtedly, Xi’s tougher stance on Taiwan is not only driven by the CCP principle but also motivated by his personal ambition. He must have had a specific plan when he revised China’s constitution to make it possible for him to stay in power without term limits. Evidently, as Mao’s faithful disciple, he hopes to achieve what his predecessors failed to do—the unification with Taiwan and cement his place as a remarkable person in China’s history. The catchword “China dream” is the iconic mark of Xi’s worldview and reflects his ambition to make China a global power that can rival and surpass the United States. According to Xi, the China Dream is the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation that requires the reunification of greater China.

China’s global expansion is the external aspect of the China Dream. Xi envisions that the goal of unification with Taiwan could inspire the Chinese people, leading toward the future under the sole leadership of the CCP. A unified China would bolster China’s international standing and fortify its geopolitical position in the Asia-Pacific region, specifically by overcoming the obstacles posed by the first island chain—an area within which Taiwan holds immense strategic significance. Unification would help China improve its access to the Pacific Ocean, heighten its control over this crucial maritime zone, advance its ability to extend its military influence beyond the first island chain, secure its influence over vital resources and trade routes, safeguard its economic interests, and minimize potential vulnerabilities within the first island chain. Ultimately, China will attain a balanced distribution of power with the United States in both the Eastern and Western spheres.

It is noteworthy that the determination of unification with Taiwan does not only represent the interests of the CCP but also represents the will of the Chinese people. First of all, the common will of unification is due not only to patriotic nationalism but also arises from traditional Chinese culture—the idea of great harmony between individuals, nature, and human society. Mencius said that harmonious human relations are more important than good opportunities granted by Heaven and favorable geographic position (天时不如地利，地利不如人和). From Mencius’s idea to Dong Zhongzhu’s theory of the “interaction of heaven and People” (天人感应) to Zhu Xi’s theory of “unity of heaven and man unity” (天人合一), and to Sun Yat-sen’s harmonious world, 大同世界, the idea of the union of heaven and individuals is one of the basic principles of Confucianism-based Chinese traditional culture—traditional Chinese concept of all-under-heaven. The objective of a harmonious China and a harmonious world (大同世界) has been pursued by Chinese philosophers and politicians from ancient to communist China. The Chinese people believe that unification with Taiwan is the implementation of traditional Chinese culture, so the majority of the Chinese people will not relinquish this mission under any circumstance. Xi’s blueprint for building a community of shared future for mankind (建立人类命运共同体) or China Dream (中国梦) is a continuation of the concept of all-under-heaven.

Second, public opinion in China supports the idea of unification. According to a study conducted by Adam Y. Liu and Xiaojun Li, although public opinions toward the unification with Taiwan are mixed, 55 percent of the respondents supported “launching a unification war to take back Taiwan entirely,” while 33 percent opposed it and 12 percent were unsure. According to another online survey in China published in ThinkChina and Taiwan Inside, 53.1 percent supported armed unification with Taiwan, while 39.19 percent opposed it among Chinese elites. This shows that the CCP’s principle of unification with Taiwan has a broad popular base.

Apparently, unification with Taiwan has been an established goal for the CCP and the Chinese people. If Xi gave up this objective, he would be seen as abandoning his core mission and betraying his own promise. In addition, he would likely face serious political consequences within the CCP and among the Chinese people, lose credibility and legitimacy as a leader who can defend China’s national interests and dignity against external pressures and challenges, and face criticism, opposition, or even a coup from within the party or the military. More seriously, he would also risk provoking social unrest or nationalist backlash from the public, who have been indoctrinated with patriotic education and propaganda for decades. Xi’s legitimacy has been largely based on the unification with Taiwan since the 20th National Congress of the CCP. Therefore, he cannot afford to give up his historical unification task voluntarily.

While U.S. deterrence strategy may cause the CCP to reconsider its actions and carefully evaluate its approach to unification, it won’t halt China’s progression in that direction.

The CCP may postpone the implementation of the unification mission under certain circumstances: Significant shifts in the regional or global landscape might prompt a reassessment of priorities. Substantial domestic opposition to the unification task or mounting international pressure could compel a leader to reconsider their top priority. The potential Chinese domestic political fallout may lead to backlash from factions or interest groups within China. A change in the CCP’s political ideology can also influence a leader’s position on the unification task. A significant shift in public attitudes toward the unification task has the potential to influence a leader’s decisionmaking process and could also create opportunities for alternative arrangements and potentially reduce the urgency of pursuing reunification through military force. Nevertheless, all these hypothetical conditions are highly unlikely to occur under any CCP administration.

Therefore, the CCP’s mission to take over Taiwan is inevitable sooner or later. While Xi has not ruled out the use of force, he has also expressed his preference for peaceful reunification based on the One-China principle and the 1992 Consensus. Is it possible for the PRC to reach the goal of peaceful unification with Taiwan based on the 1992 Consensus? Reality shows that since Taiwan transitioned to democracy in the 1980s, Taiwanese people’s minds are getting farther and farther away from the PRC.

In a poll conducted by Pew Research Center in 2020, the majority of Taiwanese hold a negative view of China, and about 66 percent of Taiwanese people identify solely as Taiwanese. The numbers of Taiwanese who hold a negative view of China continue to grow and about 90 percent of Taiwanese identify themselves as “Taiwanese” according to a survey in 2021. Although more than 90 percent of Taiwanese originally came from mainland China, they are now embracing an identity that is distinct from the PRC. The Taiwanese people’s desire for unification with China fell further to a near-record low in 2022, and only 1.3 percent of respondents wanted unification with China as soon as possible.

Taiwanese public opinions will drive the Taiwanese government to make tougher policies toward the PRC, but it could also drive nationalism in the mainland to run higher and create more difficulties for the PRC to fulfill a peaceful reunification. This suggests that the window of peaceful reunification is closing. Twenty years ago, in my book Remaking China’s Public Philosophy for the Twenty-first Century, I posited that reshaping China’s political institutions through the transformation of its public philosophy would be the most effective means to address the potential conflict in the Taiwan Straits. However, it has now become a distant possibility.

Thus, a critical question remains: is it more advantageous for China to achieve early reunification with Taiwan? Or is it more advantageous for China to achieve reunification with Taiwan later? With the intensification of competition between China and the United States and the gradual deterioration of China’s international situation, it is increasingly preferable for China to unify Taiwan earlier rather than later.

Under Xi’s regime, China has been promoting the process of military modernization at unprecedented speed and preparing for an armed occupation of Taiwan on a massive scale. China has upgraded its missile bases and deployed a new hypersonic missile along the mainland’s eastern coast, which could target Taiwan and U.S. bases in the region. China has been conducting large military exercises near Taiwan, simulating amphibious landings, air assaults, and missile attacks, as well as crossing the median line of the Taiwan Strait, which had been a tacit boundary for decades. The United States has recognized that China’s military has reached or is approaching the ability to take over Taiwan.

Most recently, the People’s Liberation Army has expanded testing and evaluation of its weapons systems to simulate a total war waged on a global scale, especially with the United States. This is another example indicating that China is speedily preparing for the worst-case scenario—reunification with Taiwan by military force. On July 6, 2023, the same day that the U.S. secretary of treasury, Janet Yellen, arrived in Beijing, Xi inspected Eastern Theatre Command, the branch central to keeping up cross-strait pressure on Taiwan, saying that the PLA must deepen its planning on war and combat and improve its ability to win any war. This sent a signal to the United States that the reunification of Taiwan is China’s core interest. The PRC is approaching the verge of reunifying Taiwan by military force to fulfill the CCP’s historical mission of the reunification of Taiwan and Xi’s global ambitions.

For now, it is hard to precisely assess if China could win a war with Taiwan; yet, it is certain that U.S. deterrence strategy is based on the idea that the United States can prevent China from using military force against Taiwan by making the costs of such action outweigh the benefits, and by signaling the U.S. commitment and capability to defend its interests and allies in the region. It is also clear that U.S. deterrence strategy is built upon assumptions that underestimate China’s resolve and ambition to achieve its national goal of unification with Taiwan.

Even assuming that the United States did not overestimate its ability and willingness to intervene in a cross-strait conflict, the Taiwan Relations Act does not explicitly guarantee U.S. military intervention in the event of a Chinese takeover of Taiwan by force. Even if the United States ends up getting involved in a possible war across the Taiwan Strait, the initial defense will rely on Taiwan’s own military capabilities and the Taiwanese people’s determination to counter Chinese military actions. However, the Taiwanese government and its people are far from fully prepared to defend the island. According to a survey conducted by the Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation in 2022, about 51.5 percent of Taiwanese lack confidence in the country’s defense capacity and their government’s ability to deter possible Chinese military action. Taiwan’s politics are divided along pro-independence and pro-unification lines, making it difficult for the government to mobilize public support and allocate resources for island defense. Most Taiwanese prefer to maintain the current status quo to avoid provoking China or engaging in a military conflict over sovereignty. Instead of making a commitment to defend their territory, most Taiwanese people have a huge hope to rely on external support, particularly from the United States in the event of a war in the Taiwan Strait.

As a result, Taiwan’s military lags behind China’s military buildup and faces shortages in personnel and equipment, along with low availability rates and obsolescence of certain platforms, which adversely affect training and readiness. Under the current conscription system, all qualified male citizens of military age are only required to perform either 1 year of active-duty military service or receive 4 months of military training. Clearly, this system does not meet the needs of the Taiwanese defense. Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen announced a plan to extend the compulsory conscription program but received backlash from younger Taiwanese. U.S. deterrence strategy without sufficient Taiwanese military capability and determination of Taiwanese people would lose its solid foundation.

Conclusion

After tracing the historical context and evolution of the CCP’s stance on Taiwan, exploring the consistent ideology and principles of the CCP, delving into Xi’s personal ambition and plan, and discussing the differences of people’s attitudes in Taiwan and the PRC toward the “unification,” it is apparent that peaceful reunification is increasingly unlikely. Considering Xi’s efforts to maintain his legitimacy for a possible life-long tenure, the reasons stated above, and the current domestic problems and international pressures facing China, it is likely that Beijing will act early against Taiwan. The secret meetings held between former senior U.S. national security officials and prominent Russians, allegedly aiming to lay “the groundwork for negotiations to end the war in Ukraine,” could even further encourage China to speed up the unification of Taiwan. The PRC will use force to ultimately solve the Taiwan issue if it does not have any other feasible options. It is wishful thinking if the United States believes it can only rely on a deterrence strategy to stop the process of the PRC’s unification with Taiwan. In fact, U.S. deterrence strategy lacks solid ground based on the reality of Taiwan’s preparation regardless of the actual preparation of the U.S. side. While developing a comprehensive strategy toward China, it is imperative to understand the CCP’s intentions and objectives in the Chinese way in the Chinese context.

Dr. Jinghao Zhou is an associate professor of Asian studies at Hobart and William Smith Colleges. His research focuses on Chinese ideology, politics, religion, and U.S.- China relations. He has published dozens of journal and news articles and six books. His latest book is Great Power Competition as the New Normal of China-U.S. Relations (2023).

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