As American Secretary of State Mike Pompeo travels to North Korea this week, it's easy to be cynical about the Singapore Summit. Rather than briefly suspending judgment while we see whether Singapore was the start of a "Sadat Moment" involving a momentous geopolitical shift, most commentators have been quick to focus on what wasn't immediately achieved.

The summit's official outcome—in the form of the joint declaration and public remarks by Secretary Pompeo—is short on details, especially in comparison to agreements inked by previous U.S. Administrations with North Korea. Pundits are correct to note the absence of a clear, unambiguous commitment by the North in the document to "complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization" (CVID). That said, North Korea never honored its previous written agreements with the U.S. anyway, so it is not clear that such comparisons are relevant. Instead, the question now is whether the shock and momentum generated by the Singapore summit will finally propel North Korea along the path of productive, good-faith negotiations—or not.

Short-Term Gains for North Korea

Given North Korea's track record, there is much cause to doubt Kim Jong Un's sincerity or to assume he is just focusing on immediate-term problems. Facing immense economic and political challenges under the weight of the Trump Administration's highly effective "maximum pressure" campaign, North Korea seems strongly motivated to dissipate the existing sanctions and gut the momentum for further sanctions. From this perspective, the summit has given China and South Korea a convenient excuse to dial back sanction enforcement, not to mention any sanction expansion or tightening.

Kim increased his international and domestic political stature by meeting the President of the United States as a nominal equal. Meanwhile, through his decision to suspend major exercises with South Korea, President Trump seems also to have adopted de facto the Chinese formula of a double freeze, which the U.S. had long rejected: Namely, the double freeze called for no American-South Korean military exercises in return for no North Korean missile or nuclear tests. Although technically this arrangement was phased and not officially a direct trade-off, the result is the same.

That Trump took this step without consulting or alerting Tokyo or Seoul has caused concern in both capitals. But this was tempered by South Korea lauding the exercise suspension as consonant with President Moon's soft stance toward the North—not to mention that South Korean leaders were secretly happy the U.S. did it so they didn't have to be the ones to ask. Additionally, the United States and South Korea confirmed June 19 that they are suspending this August's joint Ulchi Freedom Guardian military exercise.

Kim also succeeded in creating the impression that he is deterrable—in other words, that he is not a madman prone to launching weapons of mass destruction without provocation or even reason. Ultimately, Kim would like to convince the U.S. that North Korea today resembles China in the 1960’s—working toward proportional deterrence, but not an existential threat that must be eliminated. By seeming to be reasonable and even statesmanlike, Kim successfully put a damper on any public debate, for the time being, about “bloody nose” options or regime change.

However, the key takeaway here is that Kim's achievements would rapidly evaporate should it become clear that he did not operate in good faith. If Kim were to revert to form and renege on his repeated pledges to pursue productive, good-faith negotiations for denuclearization, it should be expected that America too would reverse course. As a result of Kim's reversal, the atmosphere of good will would dissipate, and suspension of major American-South Korea exercises would be the first thing to go.

Jumpstarting Denuclearization

Secretary Pompeo stated publicly that “not all of that work” between the U.S. and North Korean negotiating teams “appeared in the final document” but there were “lots of other places where there were understandings reached” that were not reduced to writing.

Kim now has the opportunity to build on those understandings, and to work toward confidence building and relationship building with the United States through concrete denuclearization. If Kim persists in thinking small, the familiar historical pattern will repeat: the usual North Korean efforts to trade incremental, reversible micro-concessions for significant breathing space or irreversible concessions by America and its allies, until the jig is up.

The logical first step would be for North Korea to provide a complete accounting of its nuclear activities as a prelude to inspections and removal of nuclear materials. That is perfectly reasonable, given repeated denuclearization assurances by Kim. That said, the North Korean regime is likely to balk at providing up front a complete targeting solution of its nuclear program to the United States. Given their past behavior patterns, it is most likely that the North Koreans will stall.

But denuclearization has to start somewhere. Rather than getting bogged down with North Korean lies and stalling, one option is to get the North to start taking concrete measures, rather than just talk about them. For instance, America could propose several North Korean sites to serve as a prototype for an inspection regime, which would lead to concrete denuclearization and also serve as a confidence-building measure. One of those sites could be the missile engine testing site Kim reportedly promised to dismantle. A team of international inspectors, including U.S. experts and perhaps some from other legitimate nuclear weapon states (P-5), would move rapidly to inspect those sites to their satisfaction. The United States and North Korea would then review the experience, discuss how to improve and build upon it, and begin developing a schedule for inspecting additional sites, including especially previously undeclared ones. This schedule would also include removal of nuclear material.

U.S. negotiators should keep their eyes on the prize: CVID. Confidence building in this manner should be just a means to that end. As has been discussed elsewhere, this should include a full declaration of heretofore undeclared aspects of the North Korean nuclear program, including facilities, fissile material, and so on; followed by visits by international inspectors, and ultimately, removal of North Korean nuclear materials, including warheads and missiles. Numerous variations on this theme could, in theory, also be negotiated. Timelines have been floated ranging from immediate denuclearization to fifteen years. But U.S. negotiators need to get Kim as close as possible to complete nuclear disarmament as quickly as possible. This is because America conceding to any nuclear weapons retention by North Korea will de facto legitimize North Korea's possession of them.

Moreover, American negotiators should not hesitate to emphasize that the United States removed its last nuclear weapons from South Korea in December 1991 and that North Korean should reciprocate. If raised, they should also note that references to Libya are being (deliberately) conflated. Libya in the disarmament context means CVID: it was a full eight years after handing over the Libyan nascent nuclear program that Qadafi was overthrown, and nuclear weapons wouldn't have made a difference.

Investing Kim in the Process

Kim was reportedly very nervous before meeting with President Trump, perhaps concerned that it was all a trick. Now, he seems to be transforming into an enthusiastic globetrotter. The United States should endeavor to get Kim invested in this process and to make clear that its continuation depends on his producing concrete, tangible progress on denuclearization.

The United Nations General Assembly's annual General Debate will be Tuesday, 25 September 2018, and is scheduled to last nine working days. National leaders may elect to speak, and no special invitation is required. This would be the perfect opportunity for Kim to appear and proclaim to the world the concrete, meaningful steps toward CVID that North Korea has taken and will take. America should consider using this as a forcing event to get Kim to agree to concrete actions—and even begin taking them—before September. Another meeting with President Trump in New York, or even Washington, could be offered if Kim makes significant progress.

More broadly, if Kim seizes the opportunity offered by the United States to undertake a fundamental reappraisal of his strategic interests, he would be able to reduce North Korea’s long-standing dependency on China by diversifying. While North Korea’s leadership has attempted to resist Chinese domination, and the Chinese generally use a relatively light touch in pressuring Pyongyang, ultimately Pyongyang knows Beijing has the wherewithal to bring North Korea to its knees. Small wonder that Kim has felt it necessary to meet with China’s President Xi at every stage of the U.S.-North Korea rapprochement. Getting out from under Beijing’s thumb would no doubt be welcome to Kim, and American officials should subtly touch on this prospect.

Kim seemed entranced (if a bit terrified) by his tour of Singapore’s bustling metropolis, and the slick and alluring presentation the United States side gave him of a prosperous future for North Korea no doubt made a positive impact. President Trump’s vision of hotels and residences on North Korean beaches imbued the concept of a U.S.-North Korean “condominium relationship” with new meaning.

This is offset to some extent by the fact that, ultimately, Kim is concerned only about his well-being and that of North Korean elites that maintain him in power, not the majority of the North Korean people. North Korea's moniker of "Hermit Kingdom" is well-earned: Kim has much to fear from outside contact by average North Koreans with the outside world, even with China.

Isolation has not been entirely to North Korea's disadvantage, even if the extent of that isolation may have exceeded its utility. During the height of the Cold War, 90% of East Germans could watch West German television, and the reality of day-to-day news reporting and glimpses of Western standards of living had an enormously corrosive effect on the German Democratic Republic's ability to limit public expectations. Prospects for hordes of South Koreans, Americans, or even Chinese swarming all over Pyongyang or an exclusive economic zone would be viewed as destabilizing by the North Korean security services, not to mention the North Korean political leadership. If America wants to avoid scaring Kim off, Washington may need to emphasize that economic development would proceed at a measured, controllable pace.

Offering to normalize diplomatic relations with North Korea is another possible enticement for Kim. This move would confer an additional degree of legitimacy on North Korea that he would no doubt welcome. A related question would be establishing a U.S. Embassy or representative office by another name in Pyongyang. That would mean friendly, Korean-fluent U.S. diplomats wandering around the capital, speaking with and possible influencing North Korean elites, and serving as a visual, physical symbol of the democratic and prosperous U.S. system. (North Korean diplomats at the UN already serve as de facto representatives to the U.S.) North Korean security services might balk at such a move, although they seem to have tolerated the presence of Western representatives of the World Food Program, among others. Kim might best be incentivized with an offer to establish relatively small liaison offices, to start.

A major incentive for Kim would be a peace treaty officially ending the Korean War. The political theater involved would be momentous, but the practical implications are mostly negative for the United States. A peace treaty would make it politically difficult for the U.S. to tighten sanctions against North Korea or even enforce them, given the predictable euphoria in Seoul and the inevitability that Beijing and Moscow would fully capitalize on the new atmosphere. Additionally, pressure on U.S. troops to withdraw from the South would intensify. The United Nations Command in Korea would be abolished, as would the United Nations Command-Rear in Japan, both of which help legitimize the U.S. military presence in their respective countries. The sense that North Korea is standing alone against the world community would diminish, and U.S. military cooperation with South Korea would be circumscribed by the perceived need to avoid being "provocative." America must plan for this eventuality, but must also make clear to Kim that a peace treaty will only materialize in the final stages of the denuclearization process.

If Not Now, When?

The North Koreans have expressed support for complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula much in the same way that old Soviet leaders used to show support for world peace—as a pleasant fiction. The United States needs to make clear that it expects rapid, visible, and physical progress by North Korea on CVID. If Kim balks even at this incremental approach, at least it will be clear to the world that America went the extra mile to give North Korea every possible chance to negotiate its way to a solution.

Thomas Cynkin is the Vice President of External Affairs at the Daniel Morgan Graduate School of National Security. He is also a former Foreign Service Officer and was the Asian affairs advisor to two U.S. Ambassadors to the U.N. and two Deputy Secretaries of State.

Image: FILE PHOTO: U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un (L) arrive to sign a document to acknowledge the progress of the talks and pledge to keep momentum going, after their summit at the Capella Hotel on Sentosa island in Singapore, June 12, 2018. REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst/File Photo