THE RAPID spread of COVID-19 has caused cataclysmic disruptions in the global order and severely tested the ability of national governments to cope with this seemingly unstoppable and deadly enemy. The pandemic has subtly, but overwhelmingly, reinforced the notion that great power competition in the international system will continue to dominate geopolitics long after the virus subsides, and the world returns to a new state of normalcy. China’s brazen attempts to capitalize on the resulting chaos have deepened some fault lines and exposed others. Rather than pushing the world’s two largest economies into a unified front to fight the virus bilaterally or via a larger grouping such as the G20, the pandemic has further intensified an already tense relationship between the United States and China. Richard Fontaine highlighted this new dynamic in Foreign Policy: “COVID-19 is becoming one more feature of great-power competition, rather than an exception to it.”

Even seemingly ironclad areas of symbiosis in the bilateral relationship have been characterized by a zero-sum mentality. Reported attempts by Chinese cyber actors to hack American research centers and pharmaceutical companies in an attempt to speed up domestic coronavirus vaccine development are only the latest salvo in the increasingly tense conflict. This new phase of contention led historian Niall Ferguson to double down on previous characterizations of the relationship as Cold War II. The implications of failing to counter Chinese aggression were recently underscored by retired general and former National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster:

The party has no intention of playing by the rules associated with international law, trade, or commerce … Without effective pushback from the United States and like-minded nations, China will become even more aggressive in promoting its statist economy and authoritarian political model. 

Coronavirus may have weakened China’s soft power, but it has assuredly not reduced its desires for regional, and eventually, global hegemony. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has used its extensive domestic manufacturing capacity to export goodwill in the form of essential ventilators and personal protective equipment. From Latin America to Eastern Europe, China has worked to flip the narrative that, rather than the source, it is the world’s savior from the virus. These tactics are part of a broader strategy designed to exploit a perceived void in American global leadership. 

Beijing’s attempt to turn the crisis into a geopolitical windfall has significant implications beyond Sino-U.S. relations. From New Delhi, Canberra, and Tokyo, the region’s most influential democracies are scrambling to deal with the social, economic, and political impacts of the virus. As China moves incessantly toward hegemony, these liberal democracies must band together to check the CCP’s repressive and totalitarian vision for the Indo-Pacific region.

The Trump administration announced its grand strategy to meet the China challenge in November 2017 as a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” A November 2019 report from the State Department outlined the steps America will take in support of this strategy, and specifically highlighted how India, Australia, Japan, and the United States “elevated their Quadrilateral Consultation to the ministerial level in September 2019.” While this move is timely, the Quad must move beyond dialogue to security cooperation. Whether it remains Donald Trump, or transitions to Joe Biden, the next U.S. president needs to operationalize this vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific by bolstering America’s commitment to the region—the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue is the best place to start. We recommend this pledge include a name change to the Indo-Pacific Security Pact (IPSP) codified with a charter and grounded upon securing an Indo-Pacific that is free, fair, peaceful, and prosperous and buttressed by security cooperation and military exercises. 

THE QUADRILATERAL Security Dialogue represents an essential and timely convergence of both national values and strategic interests. Based on geography alone, the Quad aligns allies and partners in vastly distant areas of the Indo-Pacific region who are all simultaneously under pressure from an expansive and increasingly aggressive People’s Republic of China (PRC). Geography aside, the Quad nations share a commitment to democratic principles, individual freedom, and governmental transparency. Thus, the Quad represents the rarest coalition of partners—nations aligned by interests, political values, and adherence to international rules and norms that are physically arrayed to counter the sprawling Chinese threat. As the State Department report acknowledges, the Trump administration’s vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific is very closely aligned with similar strategies being pursued by India, Australia, and Japan. While these approaches do not name Beijing as the impetus, countering growing Chinese influence is the clear goal.

Before the outbreak of COVID-19, each member of the Quad had separate and distinct flashpoints in its relationship with China. Chinese inroads into both Sri Lanka and the Maldives via the Belt and Road Initiative and a renewed standoff near a shared border with Bhutan greatly alarmed Indian policymakers and military officials. Australia was left stunned and reactionary in response to massive increases in Chinese investment in Oceania, an area referred to as “our patch” by Prime Minister Scott Morrison. In the East China Sea, Japanese and Chinese warships square off daily over the Senkaku Islands. Finally, China’s economic, military, and diplomatic resurgence threatens America’s post-WWII supremacy in the Asia-Pacific. 

Written directly in response to the first Indian military deaths along the Line of Actual Control in decades, a June 2020 op-ed in the Hindustan Times meshed lingering bilateral issues with new concerns over China’s handling of and behavior during the coronavirus pandemic:

At the macro-level, it is clear that China—under President Xi Jinping—believes the time has come to assert its power on the international stage. This has translated into China violating international norms and law (South China Sea); engaging in predatory, almost colonial, economic practices (Belt and Road Initiative); being brazen, rather than introspective and transparent, about its role in causing crises with global impact (the coronavirus pandemic); encroaching upon the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighbors (Japan and India); intervening in the politics of democracies (from European nations to Australia); exporting its own ideological worldview to other countries (especially in South Asia); and becoming even more repressive at home (Xinjiang, Tibet, and Hong Kong).

The author’s mention of China’s “violating of international norms and law” in the South China Sea is especially salient given China’s April creation of “two administrative districts covering the Spratly and Paracel” island chains. Speculation abounds that China will exploit the global coronavirus confusion to announce a long-anticipated Air Defense Identification Zone over the South China Sea. While America is not specifically named, it has an interest in all of the aforementioned topics. Therefore, the United States, along with the leading Indo-Pacific republics, should institutionalize “the Quad,” as it is known, to send a message to Beijing that its attempts to remake the liberal, rules-based order in its authoritarian image will not go unanswered. Late senator and then-presidential candidate John McCain advocated for such an approach in 2007: “As president, I will seek to institutionalize the new quadrilateral security partnership among the major Asia-Pacific democracies: Australia, India, Japan, and the United States.” This was not an empty presidential promise, instead the late senator saw the importance of regional democracies balancing the exponential rise, and threat, of the People’s Republic of China under the Communist Party.

SINCE A 1962 border war, India and China have been warily content to continue the status quo lest they get sucked into a more massive conflict that neither party wanted. China’s rapid economic growth and subsequent military modernization have allowed it to quietly change the balance of military power at the border. As the Economist has written:

To the east, China’s defense budget is now triple India’s. New roads and railways into Tibet allow the People’s Liberation Army to move troops to its disputed border with India quickly, while Indian forces are trapped in narrow valleys below.

The Doklam standoff near the tri-border region with Bhutan in the summer of 2017 was a wakeup call both for Narendra Modi and the Indian defense establishment. Likewise, the February 2019 terrorist attack against an Indian military convoy in Indian-administered Kashmir and the subsequent downing of an Indian fighter jet by Pakistan were glaring reminders for the Indian political and military elite of the security implications of a burgeoning China-Pakistan relationship.

At the outset of the global COVID-19 pandemic, India was initially spared from the high infection rates and fatalities that have struck parts of Europe and the United States. Yet as of May 16, it surpassed China in total number of coronavirus cases and on July 17, India surged past one million infections. These sharp increases come in spite of a strict nationwide lockdown that has taken a disproportionate toll on the nation’s large migrant population and those living in extreme poverty. An already overstretched healthcare system combined with some of the world’s highest pollution levels has led one of the country’s leading virologists to predict an “avalanche of an epidemic.” Amid the chaos, the Indian government has looked warily toward its neighbor to the northeast. Tanvi Madan, the director of the Brookings Institution’s India Project, has described this concern mainly in the context of China seeking to take advantage of the crisis in three ways: first, attempting to acquire vulnerable India companies; second, increasing its influence in India’s neighborhood; third, portraying its system and global and regional leadership as more effective than others.

In response to the first concern, India passed new rules to scrutinize foreign investment from “an entity of a country, which shares a land border with India.” Though China was not explicitly named, the target of the new regulations is widely evident.

The second concern first manifested itself on May 11. While it is not clear who instigated the brawl, a spokesman for the Indian Ministry of Defense confirmed “an “aggressive” cross-border skirmish between Chinese and Indian forces” had taken place along the border in North Sikkim. Eleven soldiers, four Indian and seven Chinese, were also reported injured in the scuffle. A month later, the situation escalated as twenty Indian soldiers were killed in a clash, marking the first combat deaths along the border since 1975. The military fatalities came in the same week India reported its largest increase in coronavirus infections with 11,500 new cases in a single day. 

Despite the sizable military force presence on both sides of the disputed border, physical altercations are rare. Former Indian ambassador to China, Nirupama Rao, characterized the skirmish in the context of a “‘new edge’ to China’s attitude. This assertiveness, this readiness to throw [away] internationally accepted behavior to advance their claims and interests, it’s worrisome for so many countries.” This “new edge” is not being felt by India alone.

WEDGED GEOPOLITICALLY between the United States and China, Australia faces an uneasy tension between its Western values and cultural ties, and its reliance on exports for sustained economic growth. With bilateral trade flows valued in the hundreds of billions, China is Australia’s largest trading partner and export market. Yet, Australia enjoys a robust security relationship with America, to include a security treaty alliance. Consequently, Australia has been put in the unenviable position of relying on America for its physical security while relying on China for its economic security. While HMAS warships have joined their American counterparts in the South China Sea in apparent protest to excessive Chinese claims, Australia has to walk a tight line. Australia’s August 2018 decision to ban Chinese technology firms Huawei and ZTE from its telecommunications grid highlighted this tenuous geopolitical balance between national security and economic growth.

In the political sphere, Australian leaders have looked on wearily as Chinese influence in internal issues has risen commensurate with its economic power. In late 2017, Sam Dastyari, an Australian mp and up-and-comer in the opposition Labor Party, was forced to resign after allegations surfaced that he had received financial assistance from and passed sensitive counter-intelligence surveillance information to Chinese billionaire Huang Xiangmo. In a veiled swipe at China, then-Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull declared “foreign powers are making unprecedented and increasingly sophisticated attempts to influence the political process, both here and abroad.” Furthermore, he acknowledged the existence of “disturbing reports about Chinese influence.” While not officially aimed at China, the Australian parliament passed a sweeping series of laws in mid-2018 designed to limit overseas influence in domestic affairs. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded by declaring “that China does not interfere in other countries’ affairs” and urged all countries to “cast off a Cold War mind-set.” The diplomatic fallout led to disruptions in Australian wine exports to the lucrative Chinese market.

COVID-19 has brought the Sino-Australian relationship to new lows. While an inconvenient truth before, the pandemic has highlighted just how vulnerable Australia is to Chinese economic coercion. Australia’s appeal for an independent investigation into the origins of the virus and a call for an end to wet markets was met with fierce Chinese opposition and hostility. Chinese state media referred to Australia as “gum stuck to the bottom of China’s shoe,” and China’s ambassador to Canberra questioned future Chinese consumer demand for critical Australian exports of wine and beef. China subsequently levied tariffs on Australian barley and beef from four meat processing plants. In the spiraling feud, Australian foreign minister Marise Payne accused China of producing “disinformation” and, publicly put China on blast: “It is troubling that some countries are using the pandemic to undermine liberal democracy to promote their own more authoritarian models.”

Chinese intelligence penetration of the Australian political establishment seems unlikely to have been limited to Dastyari. On June 26, it was reported that the office of Australian lawmaker Shaoquett Moselmane was raided by law enforcement in response to an “ongoing investigation” by police and intelligence agencies into his “alleged links to China.” Prime Minister Morrison confirmed the investigation and commented that it had been “going on for some time.” While national security appears to have been the only pre-COVID area to which Canberra and Washington were allied, threats to its economic prosperity and political sovereignty may have changed Australia’s national calculus.

IN HIS “Confluence of the Two Seas” speech to the Indian Parliament in August 2007, Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe famously advocated for the creation of an “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity … along the outer rim of the Eurasian continent.” His vision for this regional grouping spanned the entirety of the Pacific Ocean, and in addition to Japan and India, would be buttressed and bounded by America and Australia. Prime Minister Abe has been the most stalwart supporter of advancing the Quad beyond a strategic vision and loose alignment of like-minded democracies. His support has hardened into desperation.

From the outset, Prime Minister Abe prioritized his relationship with President Trump. Reflecting on this effort, Princeton doctoral candidate Ayumi Teraoka commented, “No foreign leader has closer ties with President Donald Trump than Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Since the 2016 presidential election, the two leaders have met 20 times, played 5 rounds of golf, and had 32 phone calls, at times speaking twice a week.” This bromance may have grown out of tee times and video chats, but it was rooted in realism. More so than any other Quad member, Japan faces the realities of a resurgent and increasingly aggressive China on a daily basis.

The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) modernization and mounting confidence are pushing the limits of a capable but overworked Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF). Chinese Coast Guard vessels and surface combatants of the PLA Navy (PLAN) are in a constant game of maritime chicken with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force over the disputed, but Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands (referred to as Diaoyu by China) in the East China Sea. The threat of a future PLA amphibious invasion of these islands was underpinned by the April launch of the PLAN’s second 40,000-ton Type 075 amphibious assault ship capable of carrying 900 troops, in addition to heavy equipment, landing craft and up to thirty helicopters. In the skies, the Japan Air Self-Defense Force has been stretched to its limit by continually having to scramble fighters in response to PLA Air Force and PLAN aircraft sorties near the Japanese mainland, the Miyako Strait, and Okinawa.

This growing asymmetry in military strength led Tokyo to announce in 2019 that the nation’s greatest national security threat was now the PRC, rather than North Korea. At a press briefing, Defense Minister Taro Kono underlined this switch: 

The reality is that China is rapidly increasing military spending, and so people can grasp that we need more pages. China is deploying air and sea assets in the Western Pacific and through the Tsushima Strait into the Sea of Japan with greater frequency.

While it has increased its defense spending for an eighth consecutive year, Beijing still outspends Tokyo threefold on its defense. With its back to the wall, Japan has been courting like-minded partners to help offset this conventional force imbalance. In early July, it announced changes to its state secrets law intended to expand intelligence exchanges with countries beyond the United States to partners such as India, Australia and the uk.

As regional navies, including the United States, have been fixated with containing the spread of COVID-19 aboard their vessels, the PLAN has been flexing its muscles in the East China Sea and Taiwan Strait. While American aircraft carriers remained confined to port in the early months of the pandemic, the PLAN aircraft carrier Liaoning along with five escort warships transited through the Miyako, and later the Taiwan Strait. This deployment is a harsh message for the JSDF; staring down the PLAN can be a lonely endeavor without allies at your back. 

THE UNITED States has always claimed to be a Pacific nation and premised its foreign policy on preventing a single hegemon from dominating the region—an area of the world to which its future prosperity is undoubtedly tied. Given China’s swift resurgence to great power status, America has a rapidly closing window of time to enter and compete in the new great game for regional dominance.

The 2017 National Security Strategy marked a sea change in America’s battle to compete with, challenge, and confront the PRC. Specifically, it states, “Today, the United States must compete for positive relationships around the world … We will seek to increase quadrilateral cooperation with Japan, Australia, and India.”

In support of this endeavor, Trump formed a fast friendship with Indian prime minister Narendra Modi. Ahead of a February meeting—the fifth such gathering between the two leaders in an eight-month period—India and America finalized two defense deals worth a combined value of over $3.5 billion. The two men spoke of their geopolitical views and goals in a joint speech in New Delhi. In stark contrast to the often characterized “most important relationship” in the world between the United States and China, Modi referred to U.S.-India relations as the “most important partnership of the 21st century.” In the same speech, Trump highlighted how he and Modi “are revitalizing the Quad Initiative with the United States, India, Australia, and Japan.”

In late 2019, the United States, along with Australia and Japan, announced the formation of the Blue Dot Network on the sidelines of the Indo-Pacific Business Forum in Thailand. The aim of the organization is to “promote quality infrastructure investment that is open and inclusive, transparent, economically viable, financially, environmentally and socially sustainable, and compliant with international standards, laws, and regulations.” Though the State Department website names no target or focus for the initiative, it says that it “builds on the success of Japan’s G20 leadership in building consensus on the Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment, which is the basis for the visions of the Blue Dot Network.” These veiled descriptions point squarely to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

THE QUAD’S ability to check Chinese aggression and influence has been traditionally downplayed by a seemingly divergent set of national security interests among member states. While bilateral issues remain distinct, each Quad nation’s greatest national security threat is undeniably China. 

The CCP can be held to account for trying to strengthen its military position in disputed territory while India prioritizes the health of its people over the security of its borders. It is directly responsible for threatening to disrupt Australian exports during a global economic contraction. It consciously exploited a COVID-driven decline in military readiness to flex its muscles in the East China Sea and Taiwan Strait. Finally, the PRC is accountable for the unsubstantiated claims made by Zhao Lijian, deputy director-general for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information Department, that the U.S. Army brought the coronavirus to Wuhan.

While the bilateral disputes between Quad nations and China remain, COVID-19 has highlighted a collective threat. The CCP’s domestic response to the coronavirus and subsequent attempts to exploit the resulting global disarray have demonstrated that it cares far more about maintaining its tenuous grip on power than adopting a responsible position within the region and the wider international community. Its reckless authoritarianism is no longer just a threat to its citizens.

A future IPSP should hold annual summits for principals, biannual gatherings of senior defense officials, and quarterly meetings of mid-level military officers to coordinate and synchronize operations. These missions should begin with foreign humanitarian assistance training given its role in initially bringing the Quad’s predecessor—the Tsunami Core Group—together from 2004 to 2005. Combined infantry exercises would give ground force commanders an opportunity to swap tactics, techniques, and procedures. U.S. Army officers could learn best practices for fighting at extreme elevations from their Indian counterparts and could offer their lessons learned on integrating fires and close air support into larger infantry operations. Royal Australian Navy vessels could join their Japanese counterparts in a joint maritime exercise in the East China Sea. IPSP operations could expand to include combined naval and air exercises in the Indian Ocean, South China Sea, or Western Pacific. IPSP intelligence sharing would vastly increase the pact’s overall maritime domain awareness on PLAN activity.

China’s domestic authoritarianism runs starkly counter to the free and open societies so cherished by the Quad nations. China has used the pandemic to validate the superiority of its authoritarian efficiency over the clumsy and internally divided democracies of the United States and Western Europe. A future IPSP is an opportunity to counter this narrative by demonstrating an enduring strength of free nations: friends and allies. The strongest democracies in the Indo-Pacific have the most to lose in this regional competition for power and influence. Only together, can India, Australia, Japan, and the United States advance a common vision for an Indo-Pacific based on freedom and transparency, rather than repression, coercion, and deceit.

Nicholas Hanson is a class of 2023 joint degree mpp and mba candidate at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government and the Harvard Business School. He is a 2011 graduate of the United States Naval Academy and a former officer in the United States Marine Corps.

David Laszcz is currently serving as an officer in the United States Marine Corps. He received his mpp as a member of the Harvard Kennedy School of Government class of 2020 as a Pat Tillman Scholar and Harry S. Truman Scholar.

The opinions expressed are those of the authors alone and do not reflect those of the U.S. Marine Corps, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.