WHAT EXPLAINS Russian conduct in its former sphere of influence? The question is again important, as Belarus faces an uprising, and the question of Ukraine and Georgia joining NATO is back to the forefront. Moscow’s revanchism is typically attributed to a variety of domestic factors, such as regime-stability, crony-corruption, a need for diversionary wars, to more systemic causations like Christian conservatism, hegemonic ambition and imperial expansionism, honor and wounded pride. The country is often dismissed as a weak declining power lashing out which can be ordered around by a degree of coercion. Former diplomat Michael McFaul, for example, claims that History—with a Hegelian capital H—is not on Putin’s side, just as Nikita Khrushchev once claimed History is not on the side of capitalism. And yet others, like historian Timothy Snyder, perceive Moscow to be the greatest challenge ever faced by the West.

But the answer to this question is key to American grand-strategy in Europe. If Moscow is imperial and expansionist, then, of course, there is logically no other option but to it resist by force and deterrence. If, however, Moscow’s actions show rationality, there are areas where one can find agreement and eventual détente. A detailed look at Russian balancing behavior in Ukraine, the most recent theatre of warfare within Europe, suggests that Russia reverts back to the status quo when it feels that “perceived threats” have been addressed. Put simply, to use realist terminology, Russia is a “security maximiser” in the European balance. Moscow is aggressive and even willing to initiate conflict when its “direct strategic interests” are threatened. When those perceived threats are neutralized, Moscow reverts back to the status quo. Moscow lacks the will and capability of being a regional hegemon, but is determined to defend already entrenched material, territorial, military, and strategic interests.

AS ONE observes the protests in Belarus, one should remember the recent history of Ukraine and Russia. The Orange Revolution in Ukraine came as a shock to Kremlin, where a similar scenario played out. Moscow immediately denounced it as an illegal coup d’état—the sort of which occur in fragile young states if external powers facilitate revolution instead of democratic norms. Russian officials accused the United States and NATO of fomenting unrest in Ukraine and renewed efforts to pressure the government in Kiev. Moscow’s reaction to the installation of a pro-Western regime in Ukraine was a combination of both political and economic coercion. Political rhetoric became harsher every passing day, as U.S.-associated supporters of the Orange Revolution included the Agency for International Development, as well as NGOs like Freedom House and the Open Society Institute.

Politically, Russia had always been critical of what it considered Western meddling in Ukraine through NGOs and civil society groups. After the color revolution though, Moscow considered these entities to be Western agents and infiltrators on a mission to destabilize the region. The National Security Concept of Russia accordingly highlighted that the main security threats to the nation included any weakening of Russian political or military influence, by strengthening of foreign military unions or blocs and weakening of the integration process of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Both the Russian government and intelligence apparatus increasingly started to view and refer to foreign NGOs as agents of the United States and NATO, and began to consider all matters regarding foreign organization and efforts in security terms. Moscow claimed that domestic actors in Ukraine also did not act alone: they had received funding and training from NGOs and organizations, and were trained in civil disobedience, as agents of the West. Similarly, the European Union monitors brought in during elections were regarded with utmost skepticism in Moscow. All these external supports were used by Russia to frame the Orange Revolution as an illegitimate, Western-backed coup meant to drive out Russia from its own sphere of influence.

The primary point of contention, however, was the new Ukrainian government’s political support of Georgia and its rhetoric against Russia’s Black Sea Fleet—the latter of which is considered vital to Russian force projection capabilities. NATO’s 2008 Bucharest summit, which welcomed Ukrainian and Georgian aspirations to NATO membership, was another red line for Moscow. At that point Russian think tanks, reflecting the position of Russia’s political and military elite, began to openly sound war drums over the fate of Crimea (where the Black Sea Fleet is stationed and headquartered). Given Moscow’s military history and its previous strategies regarding homeland defense, it very well may be that Moscow already had a plan in place for the annexation of Crimea in the event of Ukrainian defection over to NATO. At the time though, it was unnecessary: pro-Moscow candidate Viktor Yanukovych won in Ukraine’s 2010 presidential election, thereby (temporarily) reversing Ukraine’s pro-EU tilt.

Yanukovych also reversed Ukraine’s previous position of opposing Russia’s recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, blocked the Ukrainian bid towards further NATO accession, and, in 2013, signaled Ukrainian movement towards the Russian-led Eurasian Customs Union (EAEU). Russian offers of EAEU membership in place of the EU’s Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement seemed final. At the late 2013 EU summit in Vilnius, Yanukovych announced his decision to postpone the Association Agreement with the EU. By 2014, relations between the Russian government and the Ukrainian government seemed positive, even when Russian rhetoric continued to accuse NATO and the EU.

Around this point, the Ukrainian opposition, critical of the direction their country was taking, began to protest in and around the capital, centered around the city’s Maidan square. The protests soon escalated, culminating with a call for Yanukovych’s resignation. Ukraine slid into utter lawlessness, Yanukovych refused to accept the opposition’s demand, and the EU brokered agreement collapsed in February 2014. Yanukovych fled to East Ukraine, and then to Russia.

The Euromaidan revolution, as it is now called, precipitated a rapid strategic reversal in the region and established new rules on the ground. From the Russian perspective, this turn of events was interpreted as an “unconstitutional coup” in Kiev, and fueled worries of Ukraine joining the EU. There were two sides to this. First, there was the economic dimension, as Ukraine, with its population of 45 million, serves as an important market for Russian exporters. Any EU association agreement would hamper Russian exports, as Russian products don’t match the safety standards of European Union. But the second concern was geopolitical: the association agreement also included clauses which would integrate Ukraine to the EU’s common security and defense policy, reinforcing Moscow’s view that the EU is not just a political union, but an extension of NATO ambitions towards the east.

In the six weeks following the Euromaidan revolution, Russia moved swiftly and annexed Crimea while continuously denying that any Russian soldiers were involved in the effort. Following the annexation, Moscow demanded that Kiev initiate new constitutional changes to guarantee the protection of Russian speakers and to ensure decentralized leadership of the region. Over 30,000 Russian troops were amassed on the Russian-Ukrainian border, and Moscow retracted its financial aid and discounted energy supplies to Kiev. It shouldn’t have come as a surprise then that a pro-Russian rebel movement sprung up shortly thereafter in the eastern regions of the country.

TO USE former U.S. national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski’s terminology, without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a Eurasian empire. If Russia controls Ukraine, even as a satellite, it has an enormous territorial buffer, a market for Russian products and myriad strategic resources, and access to the Black Sea. Russian actions in Ukraine, in both after the Orange Revolution and after Euromaidan, has therefore been one of strategic denial.

Complicating matters is the fact that Russia’s military is heavily resource dependent on Ukraine. Prior to the annexation of Crimea, Ukrainian firms produced over three thousand components and armament systems for the Russian military, including the components for manufacture as well as maintenance of the primary vehicle of Russian nuclear deterrence: intercontinental ballistic missiles. These components are designed in Dnipropetrovsk, Ukraine. According to former Russian deputy prime minister Dmitry Rogozin, Russia is incapable of acquiring such products anywhere else. Ukraine also produced the guidance systems for the SS-25 mobile missile launchers and SS-19 silo-based strategic missiles in the eastern Ukrainian oblast of Kharkiv. Almost all Russian modern tank components are built in the Kharkiv Locomotive Factory.

Likewise, the Russian Navy is mostly built and maintained in Ukraine. The Mykolaiv oblast has been a key shipbuilding center since Soviet times, and continues to produce parts for the Russian Navy’s capital ships, including its flagship, the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov. Eastern Ukraine and the coast of the Black Sea, therefore, remains crucial for Russian naval deterrence. Then there is the Russian air force, which uses air-to-air missiles produced in eastern Ukraine. The maintenance of the hydraulic system for Russian jet fighters like Su-34 is also done in eastern Ukraine. Russian transport used jet engines made by Antonov factory in Ukraine.

Due to logistical and trade reasons, Ukraine’s military-industrial complex is almost entirely located in southern and eastern Ukraine, and is now currently the scene of heavy rebel activity. Losing these would be an existential loss to Russia’s great power status. Critical Ukrainian components and their servicing make up nearly 80 percent of Russia’s strategic missiles forces, and without eastern Ukraine, both Russian nuclear deterrence and naval forces collapse. It is also no coincidence that the heavy fighting around the city of Kramatorsk is over the control of the nkmz industrial complex, which produces hardware, like mining equipment and steel mills, for the Russian military. Russian control of Crimea, for example, granted numerous defense companies located between Donetsk and Luhansk to de facto Russian control. These are of invaluable importance to any Russian plan for massive military rearmament, and Russian independent deterrence depends on the maintenance of these supply and logistics chains.

Russian military gains after the acquisition of Crimea were historic and substantial in terms of strategic capabilities and potential. The annexation created a new fait accompli and resolved any uncertainty over Russian basing rights. The April 2010 ratification of the quarter-century lease of Sevastopol was conditional to whoever was in power in Kiev, and after Euromaidan, Moscow couldn’t be sure of the new Ukrainian government’s intentions. The Kremlin certainly wasn’t happy over the constraints regarding the type of crafts and treaty terms which prevented any expansion of the Black Sea Fleet, and was in a continuous legal conflict with the exact wording of the Ukrainian constitution, which prohibits foreign bases. All those constraints were essentially swept away.

Russian control, including retaining and scuttling the Ukrainian fleet, meant that Russia eclipsed Turkey as the biggest naval power of the region. Russia also took possession of Ukrainian naval bases and a marine infantry base at Feodosiya, alongside Sevastopol. Possession of Sevastopol also meant no more leasing payments, and a halt to Ukrainian aid funding freed up an enormous amount of money which could freely be used in military rearmament programs. 

Shortly after the annexation, Russian forces under the command of the Southern Military District were being deployed to the area in self-sufficient groups to provide military reinforcement, restore the Black Sea Fleet, upgrade naval weapons in Feodosiya, reactivate a dormant submarine base in Sevastopol, and establish long-range bombers in former Soviet-era bases. The Russian Air Force’s strategic aviation division, meant solely to deter NATO forces, began planning new patrol routes as Russian territorial waters had expanded. Russian troop reinforcement plans included new coastal defense and artillery units, as well as naval exercises simulating attacks on NATO warship detachments in nearby seas. Control over Crimea also resulted in the Kerch Strait coming under the full control of Moscow, along with Russian dominion over the Ukrainian continental shelf and exclusive economic zone and hydrocarbon resources. The strategic significance of Crimea to the Russian military elite was enormous, and the peninsula’s annexation was influenced by broader strategic considerations to enhance Russian military powers abroad.

In short, Russian actions in Ukraine, in both after the Orange Revolution and after the Euromaidan Revolution, have been focused on strategic denial. There is no evidence of these movements spreading to Kiev, simply because Moscow is satisfied with neutralizing the threat and achieving the strategic upper hand. Moreover, Moscow lacks the ideological zeal, will, and capability to push forward with a Neo-Tsarist empire. Moscow had indeed originally stated that Western interference with Ukraine and Georgia are red lines, and that the two countries joining NATO could lead to a colossal shift in the European balance of power. Moreover, Russia also viewed Ukraine as vital to its own national security interest, not only due to Ukraine’s location and historical ties with Russia, but also because of its critical industrial sector its links to Russian military capabilities. The closer NATO borders approach to Russia, the more acute the perceived threat is. This threat becomes existential the moment a Ukranian addition to the alliance becomes a viable prospect. Whether or not NATO would accept Ukraine was irrelevant, as Russia considers the mere possibility disconcerting enough to warrant a muscular response.

IF ONE considers Moscow’s actions in Ukraine, alongside the limited Russian war in Georgia and military intervention in Syria, one can draw some logical and reasonable conclusions about Moscow’s future inevitable aggression. It seems clear that Russia has a specific set of geopolitical interests. These are not ideological, nor contingent to the regime in Moscow. It is also apparent that there are potential areas of rapprochement and engagement where interests overlap, which need to be put under consideration. Russia may be an adversarial power, but it is not a power willing or perhaps even truly capable of radically upending the status quo. Russian aggression is predicated on what it perceives to be the established balance of power, and Moscow’s expansionism is not “mindless,” but rather based on a strong rational understanding of cost-benefit analysis, as well as opportunism.

We must also reconsider the true capabilities of Russia’s armed forces. The Russian military suffers from very real and massive disadvantages, and would effectively cease to be a great power if both the Ukrainian industrial base and defensible terrains and buffers are lost. The country’s fieldable manpower is already dwarfed by that of NATO forces. While the overwhelming understanding in Russian political and military circle is that Russia is qualitatively inferior to NATO, the military has shown an appetite for conflict against smaller adversaries as a broader show of force and deterrence against what it considers NATO intentions and designs in Moscow’s sphere.

Russia clearly considers NATO enlargement in Ukraine and Georgia as a threat, and does not differentiate between EU, NATO, and the United States. Russian rhetoric about EU interference in Belarus is similar. It is perpetually worried about NATO troops and armor being placed close to Russian borders. Moscow’s intention of safeguarding its own sphere of influence naturally leads to a clash of interests in countries like Georgia and Ukraine, which have repeatedly expressed a desire to join Euro-Atlantic institutions. With Russia’s rearmament, EU expansion and NATO enlargement, and the erosion of buffer zones, the opportunities for a conflict breaking out have increased, even though there’s no evidence of active American support coming to the defense of Ukraine and Georgia.

The chances of a ground war with Russia are, however, rather thin. It is unlikely that Moscow—given its narrow security interests, goals, and strategy—is planning such a war, nor has any intention in initiating a conflict of that scale. Moscow is also constrained by geography, demographics, economy, technology, industrial efficiency, and manpower. It has also not faced any concerted pushback, and remains numerically inferior to NATO ground troops. This remains a dilemma for both NATO and Russian forces. While Russian force concentration in its near abroad is higher compared to NATO, and according to estimates Russia can conquer the Baltics within a matter of weeks before NATO even fully steps in, that is unlikely given that Moscow shows no intention of expansionism. Russian military literature, and as well as behavior within its elite class, also indicate acknowledgement that the country won’t be able to prevail in a full-scale conventional war with NATO without resorting to nuclear weapons. Nor will it be capable of a war of conquest and subsequent counterinsurgency operations to stabilize the entirety of Georgia, Ukraine, or Belarus. Nonetheless, recent experiences have demonstrated that Moscow can easily salami-slice regions and enclaves of countries which are still not part of NATO, creating new instances of fait-accompli and strengthening its regional strategic position.

Both NATO and the United States are helpless in preventing these sorts of changes. For one, there is no evidence that either Europeans or Americans are willing to confront Russia militarily over its sphere of influence. This was evident by the lack of direct action undertaken during both Bush and Obama administrations in regards to the Georgian war in 2008 and the war in Ukraine from 2014 onwards. That is a prudent policy, as great powers should be wary of being drawn in a conflict with peer powers, dragged by smaller states. It is a policy that is unlikely to change, even with events in Belarus, regardless of which party is in power in Washington. At the end of the day, the choice whether to allow Moscow to keep its own sphere of influence, or push incessantly and invite a bigger blowback, is a purely political choice for Western leaders.

But by every measurable index, Western policy towards Russia has failed. The country is nowhere close to transforming into a liberal-internationalist great power anytime soon, and it is a futile effort to either encircle Moscow (and overstretch in regions of minor Western strategic interests), or win over by supporting liberal forces within. No serious war simulation anticipates a full-scale military conflict, and there is no indication of either Russia or the West actively seeking a peer-to-peer great power conflict anywhere across the globe. Russian military journals and strategy doctrines continuously highlight an acknowledgement of relative martial inferiority, and Americans urgently need to focus on the far greater threat of a rising China. Moscow’s aggression does remain a concern though. At the risk of making an understatement, one might say that the assessment of former U.S. president Barack Obama and former Secretary of State John Kerry about Russia being a regional power acting like it is nineteenth century, to eventually be righted by a march of progress, were only partially accurate. Yet conservatives and foreign policy realists, from George Kennan to Henry Kissinger, have suggested a narrow, prudential approach based on aligned interests, not zealous liberal rights promotion. There is no sound reason to deviate from their counsel.

Sumantra Maitra is a doctoral researcher at the University of Nottingham.

Image: Reuters