Debate over the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) has reached a fever pitch in recent months as advocates and critics of the program battle it out in the pages of Beltway publications—all for the purpose of influencing congressional support of the program. With battle lines clearly drawn, it is worth taking an objective look at the key arguments raised by both sides.

On the one hand, there are those who believe the JSF is the right aircraft for the United States, even if some time is required to work out the technical issues that arise in such an advanced aircraft. Advocates in the services, industry, and associated think tanks view much of the criticism of the JSF as undeserved, shortsighted, biased, ill informed, and a misrepresentation of the platform’s capabilities and costs.

On the other hand, there are those who see the F-35 as a failed acquisition program that illustrates the inherent incompetence, graft and corruption all too common in Washington, DC, facilitated by deep-pocketed contractors stuffing the campaign coffers of Congressmen.

Needless to say, there is little consensus between the two sides, with all indicators suggesting that reaching common ground is unlikely. With much of the debate being a mix of tendentious argument and distaste for the other side, an unbiased look at the F-35 debate is conspicuously absent. While neither side has a clear silver-bullet argument, each side does offer points worth contemplating.  Thus, the remainder of this article examines the three strongest arguments made by advocates and critics, of the JSF. It also offers what are believed to be the most compelling recommendations made by each side.

F-35: Savior of American Airpower

Advocates make three arguments that, upon closer examination, are most persuasive for keeping the F-35:  acquisition history, allies, and options.

History Repeated

While much of the criticism of the F-35 has revolved around cost, schedule, and technical challenges, advocates make a logical case in countering such critiques of the program. Critics argue the JSF is over budget, behind schedule, and suffering from a variety of technological shortcomings and for the most part, these arguments are correct.  But to suggest the program should be cancelled because of these issues shows a poor understanding of airpower history. As Peter Grier has deftly noted, these same challenges were true for the F-15, AWACS, and C-17 programs as well. Every one of these programs was significantly over budget, far behind schedule and suffered a variety of technical challenges that critics thought were too difficult to overcome.

In 1982, Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) called the F-15 a “dubious purchase” and urged the Air Force to buy the less expensive F-14 instead. However, had Senator Stuart Symington (D-MO) had his way in 1973, the F-14 program would have never matured to the point that Senator Levin would have thought the plane a better investment than the F-15.  

In fact, Senator Levin was not the first person to find fault in the F-15 program. A decade earlier, in 1973, the House Armed Services Committee cut funding for the F-15 in half because of a string of engine fires that occurred. The humor and irony in this point is that one F-35 critic recently used the very same technical issue, an F-35 engine fire, to justify cancellation of the JSF program and continued investment in F-15 upgrades. Perhaps F-35 critics are unaware of their favored airplane’s bumpy development history.

What is most troubling is that if critics had their way, there would be no F-14 (no Maverick, no Goose, no Cougar, and no Charlie Blackwood), no F-15 (rated one of history’s top fighters by an F-35 critic, and no F-16 (which critics also sought to kill). Had critics been successful in ending these programs, for many of the same reasons as current critics are seeking to kill the F-35 program, the United States would still be flying the same F-4s it flew during Vietnam.

The E-3 AWACS (Airborne Early Warning and Control) was derided by the New Republic in April 1974 as a “complete phony” and an aircraft that would not survive in aerial combat and had little to no purpose. History has proven AWACS very useful in a number of scenarios that were not foreseen in 1974.

If the previous examples are not enough, in May of 1993 the Department of Defense notified McDonnell Douglas that it would cancel the C-17 unless the contractor overhauled the troubled program. Critics of the C-17 were ecstatic at the thought of the program being cancelled. They had long sought to end the purchase of an over budget, behind schedule, technically troubled airlifter that they thought the nation did not require. Fortunately for the United States, the C-17 program was not cancelled because American combat efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq were heavily reliant on the capability provided by US Air Force C-17s. These conflicts would have been very different had the C-17 program been cancelled in 1993 and not in a good way.

In a key instance where an aircraft acquisition program was terminated because it was over budget, behind schedule, and facing technical challenges, the strategic consequences have proven palpable. Currently, the United States’ long-range stealth bomber fleet numbers sixteen operationally deployable aircraft. Considering the number of stealth bombers, the ability of the United States to sustain a bombing campaign against an advanced adversary is greatly challenged. This should give Americans reason for pause as China, Iran, North Korea, Russia increasingly assert their interests in places and ways that challenge the United States.

Don’t Forget the Allies    

If airpower history and the striking similarities between the JSF and previous development and acquisition programs are not compelling, the needs of American allies should be considered. When Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, and the U.K. became international partners in the development and acquisition of the F-35 they placed a significant trust in the United States with the expectation that we would complete the aircraft’s development and field it in large enough numbers that it would be affordable for these nations to purchase.

What many critics fail to appreciate is both the unprecedented cooperation that was required to bring such a large group of international partners together for such a critical joint development program and the harm to America’s reputation and credibility that will result from reducing the buy or terminating the program. For many of the nations involved, and other allies expected to purchase the JSF, they have already begun decommissioning older aircraft so that they may be replaced by the F-35. For these nations there is no backup plan.

It is not just the international partners involved in the JSF program that we should be concerned with. Countries like India, Japan, and Korea are watching this drama unfold in order to make a determination as to how reliable of a partner the United States will prove. For a country that seeks to lead the world, credibility is everything.

Options, What Options?

The reality of the JSF program is that it was purposefully designed to be large in terms of aircraft produced and dispersed across a large number of congressional districts so per unit fly away costs could be driven down and that the program could survive eventual setbacks—as history shows are inevitable. And with domestic spending placing ever increasing pressure on defense budgets, the Department of Defense sought to do what it had failed repeatedly to accomplish in the past, build one fighter for the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy.

The result of these largely political considerations leaves the services in a situation where options are limited and marginal tradeoffs are painful. The publicly available information from recent exercises suggests the F-35 is superior to fourth generation aircraft in air-to-air combat. Thus, the Air Force Chief of Staff, Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps cannot, in good conscience, argue that the best course of action is to send American Airmen, Sailors, and Marines into combat in inferior aircraft. Such considerations are taken seriously by senior leaders and cannot be dismissed by critics.

For the services, which must play the hands they are dealt, the lack of viable options makes the best option continuation of the JSF program, all while working to bring flyaway costs down and resolve technical challenges. If history is any indicator of the future, critics of the F-35 replacement, twenty or thirty years from now, will likely argue that the nation should forgo a new fighter and stick with the JSF. 

Recommendations

There are significant ways to improve the F-35 program, bringing both flyaway cost down and addressing a variety of technical issues. Four recommendations offered by program advocates are of the greatest utility.

First, cost reduction is best achieved through high-rate production. The JSFs high cost through early production is largely the result of the small number of aircraft purchased. By contrast, the F-16, despite persistent technical issues, went into high rate production from the beginning, allowing the aircraft to be produced economically.

Second, rather than expecting every F-35 to roll off the assembly line with the exact same capabilities, we should allow for a number of versions that incorporate new technology as it is developed. With the F-16, 138 versions were produced which were not retrofitted every time a new capability was developed. Instead, older aircraft performed the missions they were best suited for and waited until a regular block upgrade was scheduled. Only then were early, and less capable, F-16s given the latest technology—keeping costs down.

Third, affordability is largely dependent upon the number of aircraft produced. Increasing the number of international partners and approving wider sale of the aircraft internationally will go a long way toward decreasing fly-away costs. With Russia and China acting increasingly assertive, there is every reason for allies in Europe and Asia to take a hard look at the JSF as a core component of their national defense.

For advocates of the F-35, the growing chorus of critics is little different from that of F-14 critics in the late 1960s and early 1970s, F-15 critics in the 1970s and early 1980s, or F-16 critics in the 1980s. In each case, an aircraft that was over budget, behind schedule, and facing technical challenges went on to become a vaunted fighter that today’s JSF critics believe are a better option for the United States. Critics were wrong then, and they are wrong now.     

F-35: Albatross of the Asia-Pacific

Perhaps the strongest argument made by critics suggests that the JSF is the wrong aircraft for a potential conflict in the Asia-Pacific. Among the most detailed and credible critiques of the F-35s relevant capability shortfalls comes from Col Michael W. Pietrucha, who wrote a blistering article, “The Comanche and the Albatross,” which appeared in Air & Space Power Journal earlier this year. He thoroughly highlights some of the relative weaknesses in the JSF as a tactical fighter, many of which are relevant because of the likelihood that the F-35 will play a central role in a potential Asia-Pacific conflict.

In short, Asia-centric critics argue the F-35 suffers from three critical weaknesses. First, it lacks sufficient range to be relevant in an Asia-Pacific fight, particularly where basing within the first island chain is vulnerable. Second, the JSF’s jamming capabilities may prove inadequate to the task without significant additional investment. Third, developments in Russian and Chinese radar technology are likely to limit the stealth capability that makes the F-35 an attractive aircraft.

The Challenge of Short Legs

The “tyranny of distance” is a major factor for combat operations in the Asia-Pacific region. The F-35 is estimated to have a combat mission radius of 584 nautical miles—two hundred miles less than the F-15E. Such short legs are problematic because of the distances between the first and second island chains and anticipated areas of operation. The geography of the challenge results in basing becoming a center of gravity for the US.

To hold US basing at risk, on land or at sea, China has embarked on a ballistic and cruise missile program that is on the verge of forcing a paradigm shift in American military thinking and calculation. Central to China’s investment in anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities is the development and deployment of large numbers of accurate anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) across a wide range of ground, air, and naval platforms. According to one recent analysis, “Chinese sources assert that LACMs enable the PLA to reach targets as far as away as Guam, Darwin, and Diego Garcia.”

Due to China’s low cost of producing cruise missiles, they are believed to hold a 9:1 cost advantage over the cost faced by defenders—the United States, Japan, South Korea, etc. This could offer a powerful deterrent when considering basing expensive fifth generation fighters within striking distance of Chinese missiles.

Historically, the US flows combat capability into a theater on the eve of war. This approach assumes that an adversary permits the Time Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) flow—an assumption China is certain to challenge. Recent studies and war games produced by prominent Washington-based think tanks highlight the probability that China will launch pre-emptive missile strikes against American bases across the Pacific to destroy existing air assets and deny additional war planes from basing near China, which is particularly important for a short range tactical fighter like the JSF. Such an anti-access strategy is central to China’s war plan. 

With the F-35 central to American strategy in the region, critics argue a potential Chinese missile strike would devastate regional assets and force the US Air Force and Navy to operate from such distance that the F-35 becomes a non-factor in a conflict. Depending upon the perceived credibility of China’s A2/AD capability, this argument is of significant weight.  

According to critics, China’s missile program has left the first island chain largely indefensible for the United States and its Asian allies without significant additional investments in active and passive defenses and dispersal. Even worse, the United States is rapidly approaching a time when the second island chain will be at greater risk from China’s growing ballistic and cruise missile arsenal. A lack of defensible main operating air bases means that the short-legged F-35 is poorly suited for combat operations in the Asia-Pacific. It has yet to be proven that the F-35 can operate effectively from dispersal bases.

China’s missile program is a game-changer. For less cost and arguably greater impact, China is constructing a ballistic and cruise missile capability that will deny the US Air Force the capacity to field the short-range F-35s in the fight. Advocates of the JSF have no credible response for this new Chinese way of war.

Jamming

Short legs are not the JSF’s only problem. When it comes to conflict with a peer competitor, equally challenging is the aircraft’s limited jamming capability. As one recent story notes, the F-35’s radar jamming systems are unlikely to work against some new radar technology—under development in China and Russia. While Lockheed Martin suggests the F-35 is fully capable of jamming enemy signals to protect itself, in reality the F-35 will likely require additional jamming support from additional support aircraft that can block a wide spectrum of signals while moving to and from a target. This problem is well known; particularly since the aircraft’s jamming capability largely resides in the X-band. This means new radars under development in China and Russia, which utilizes L, UHF, and VHF wavelengths, cannot be jammed.

As Bill Sweetman has noted, before any fighter pilot activates the jamming capability, an adversary’s radar must detect the aircraft. The irony of this is, when the aircraft begins jamming a signal, its presence is revealed because the adversary can see the signal—even if a radar reflection is not visible. In essence, the ability to see the signal tells an adversary that a stealth aircraft is nearby, making targeting less challenging.

Stealth

Related to the discussion of jamming is the discussion of stealth, a major selling point for the JSF. If reports of Chinese and Russian radar developments are accurate and they are able to develop advanced radars that apply computing power to better utilize low-frequency L, UHF, and VHF wavelengths, the stealth properties of the F-35 no longer hide the aircraft from an adversary. Unlike the B-2, which does not have vertical stabilizers, the JSF may offer a significant radar return for new Russian and Chinese radars.

With radars far less expensive to field than fifth generation fighters, there is reason to believe that, once operational, Chinese or Russian-made low-frequency radars, specifically designed to detect the JSF, will proliferate among America’s adversaries. This too could greatly undermine the value of the F-35. 

Recommendations

For critics, a wide range of recommendations exists. Thus, to present the strongest case, the following recommendations are a compilation of those offered.

Among critics, Pietrucha offers a set of recommendations that combine termination of the JSF program, modernization of existing fighters, and the development of a low-end capability as a solution to the nation’s tactical fighter requirements. While such a dramatic choice is likely untenable—for many of the reasons offered by advocates—capping the total purchase at approximately 1000 aircraft is feasible. A total buy of this size would meet the needs of US and allies while maintaining the economic viability of Lockheed Martin.

In partially pursuing the course suggested by Pietrucha, the United States can address its short term need for modernized tactical fighters while also freeing up additional funding for the acquisition of long range strike bombers, which are in far greater need of recapitalization—particularly for an Asia-Pacific conflict.

It is also important that the USAF develop the weapon systems that will enable the service to meet the threats outlined in America’s Air Force: A Call to the Future (July 2014). In its latest strategic look at the future, the Air Force does not specifically rank its capabilities or missions by importance, but it appears clear that long range strike serves as the central mission around which the Air Force must organize. Thus, focusing greater acquisition dollars toward long-range strike platforms is both prudent and the best way to ensure conventional and nuclear deterrence.

Additionally, aside from the Korean peninsula, Asia-Pacific airbases exhibit few of the characteristics that made NATO bases resilient to attack, not to mention the fact that China’s missile threat to America’s island bases is far more technologically advanced that anything fielded within the Warsaw Pact. Regardless of the impressive (and expensive) aircraft based at Kadena, Andersen, or other Air Force bases, the deterrent value of a “soft” base is minimal. Subject to precision attack from long distances, American bases in the Pacific might be more of a vulnerability than a strength.

It is important to remember that Chinese strategic thinking views a preemptive attack against offensive assets as a defensive act. When talking about vulnerable bases, this is important.

If the US is to maintain both a deterrent and actual capability to fight from these bases, critics suggest warfighters pay particular attention to a full array of both passive and active measures to both prevent such damage and increase the ability to absorb strikes. Although the context is different, there is precedent for USAF investment into forward air base operations—even during times of fiscal cutbacks. The US Air Force’s Forward Air Base Operations (FABO) initiative is one example of an effort designed to mitigate these risks through: internal and external base dispersal and distributed operations, passive and active defenses, and concealment, camouflage, and deception.

In short, when the USAF is forced to operate from close range, because it devoted limited acquisition dollars to short range tactical fighters, rather than the long range strike platforms required in the Asia-Pacific, finding a safe place to land, refuel, and take off becomes much more hazardous. Absent massive investments in base hardening, F-35s on Asian ramps will become very attractive targets.

Conclusion

In our final analysis, both sides in this debate offer compelling arguments that cannot be ignored. For advocates, history offers a powerful reason to pause before calling for the termination of the JSF program. The similarities between criticism of the F-14, F-15, F-16, and F-35 program are striking. In many cases, one aircraft’s name could be easily replaced by another’s and the criticism would sound the same. For critics, overcoming the tyranny of distance with a combat air force comprised largely of JSF’s flown from vulnerable bases is a valid concern that must be addressed.

Given that both sides offer good points, Americans may be left to wonder where the truth lies. As is often the case, the truth is likely somewhere in the middle. In our view, the most likely outcome is a reduced F-35 buy that is large enough to sustain the program’s cost effectiveness, particularly for international partners, while also making additional funding available for LRS-B and other acquisition programs. If flyaway costs come down faster than expected and the jet’s technical challenges are solved quickly, the domestic and international buy may grow.

With no consensus or popular solutions readily available, it is our hope that prudence prevails over partisanship and national interest over special interests. Our single greatest hope is that both advocates and critics are willing to change their views if facts warrant. Taking a stand on the JSF and refusing to budge only harms our ability to most effectively pursue American interests.

Adam Lowther is a professor at the Air Force Research Institute and a non-resident senior fellow at the Center for the National Interest.

Col. Chris Wrenn is a member of the U.S. Air Force.

Image: Flickr/Official U.S. Air Force/CC by-nc 2.0