The United States is slated to spend about one trillion dollars over the next thirty years to maintain and rebuild its nuclear arsenal. That breaks down to roughly $35 billion a year, a fortune in this time of limited defense spending. Is it worth it? Twenty-five years after the end of the Cold War, the United States simply does not need—and cannot afford—to rebuild every nuclear-armed missile, bomber and submarine in its arsenal to last another fifty years as if the U.S.-Soviet rivalry never ended. Moreover, pursuing an excessive arsenal runs the risk of igniting a new arms race with Russia that could needlessly undermine U.S. security. Moscow has announced its own plans to rebuild its nuclear forces, but faces even greater economic challenges.

“We are about to begin a new round in the nuclear arms race unless some brake is put on it right now,” former secretary of defense William J. Perry recently warned. Indeed, a new arms race has already begun in slow motion, with current plans taking decades to carry out. Multiyear contracts are being signed, such as the recent one with Northrop Grumman for a new strategic bomber, and billions of dollars are being spent. Before long, the programs will become too big to stop. The Obama administration’s arsenal-modernization plans are also raising concerns among America’s nonnuclear allies, who see the effort as inconsistent with the president’s stated nuclear-disarmament goals. Yet Washington needs the support of these allies to strengthen global nonproliferation efforts.

It’s past time for the Obama administration to take a hard look at where the U.S. nuclear arsenal is heading. Given Russia’s saber rattling in Europe, it’s tempting to overbuild in the mistaken belief of further insuring safety. But the actual risk of a nuclear war is low, and U.S. conventional dominance is unquestioned. The United States no longer needs such an expensive insurance policy against the Russian nuclear threat—and this fact provides a rare opportunity to save tens of billions of dollars.

Saving money is becoming increasingly important for U.S. national security. Last summer, an independent, bipartisan federal commission cochaired by Perry and retired general John Abizaid called the administration’s plans for the nuclear arsenal “unaffordable” and a threat to “needed improvements in conventional forces.” The good news is that the United States can safely scale back its plans for the nuclear arsenal, saving scarce defense funds and reducing the dangers of a new arms race.

During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union produced massive nuclear arsenals to deter each other from launching nuclear and large conventional attacks. Since the 1960s, these arsenals have been reduced by around 85 percent, and there is a growing realization that the only credible use for nuclear weapons by the United States or Russia is to deter a nuclear attack by the other. While the number of deployed nuclear weapons has plummeted, the nature of the nuclear threat has changed even more dramatically. The chance that the United States or Russia would actually use nuclear weapons against each other has significantly declined, almost to the point of irrelevance. Other than keeping Russia’s nuclear arsenal in check, nuclear weapons provide no advantages to the United States over conventional forces. And for defending against more likely attacks, such as terrorism or small-scale military operations, nuclear weapons are useless.

Some of America’s highest-ranking military officers share this opinion. Former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and retired general Colin Powell said that “the one thing that I convinced myself after all these years of exposure to the use of nuclear weapons is that they were useless. They could not be used.” Russian president Vladimir Putin’s Ukraine adventure is a case in point. The existing U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe did not keep Russia from annexing Crimea. Nor would more U.S. nuclear weapons push Russia back out. Beyond political rhetoric, nuclear weapons have played no role in this crisis. Moscow has increased its threats, but Putin does not seek a nuclear war with the United States. Such a war would only invite the destruction of Russia. In 2013, the commander of the U.S. Air Force Global Strike Command, Lt. Gen. James Kowalski, described the threat of a Russian nuclear attack on the United States as such a “remote possibility” that it is “hardly worth discussing.” “We’ve established a relationship with the Russians. We don’t have the ideological tension that we had during the Cold War. Which is not to say there aren’t points of tension, but they’re certainly not on the scale [they’ve] been in the past.”

The reduced risk of nuclear war with Russia means the United States does not need to fully replace each part of its current nuclear arsenal, which was designed to deter a geopolitical competitor that no longer exists. When the perceived risk of a nuclear conflict was at its zenith, the United States decided it needed a comprehensive insurance policy with sky-high premiums and multiple redundancies (known in the military as “hedges,” as in “to hedge one’s bets”). But we no longer require this expensive posture.

There are two main ways to save on nukes. First, the total number of nuclear warheads could be cut. The 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) sets a cap of 1,550 on U.S. and Russian deployed, accountable strategic warheads each by 2018. In addition, President Barack Obama announced in 2013 that he would like to reduce the U.S. strategic arsenal, in coordination with Russia, by another one-third, to around one thousand warheads. Such bilateral reductions could go even deeper, bringing security benefits to both sides. Unfortunately, Russia has rejected additional reductions for now. Until Moscow changes its mind, it will be politically difficult for Washington to significantly reduce its nuclear warheads below New START levels. But it is safe to expect that U.S.-Russian reductions will resume at some point. We can plan for this by not overbuilding delivery systems now.

Second, while the two sides are temporarily stuck at New START warhead levels, the United States could reduce the number of new delivery systems it plans to build in the future. Fewer delivery systems do not necessarily translate into fewer deployed warheads, due to multiple redundancies in the system. For example, the United States developed a triad of nuclear delivery systems—land-based missiles, sea-based missiles, and long-range bombers—each functionally independent from the other. In the unlikely event that any one leg of the triad fails, the others could fill the gap. There are even more hedges built into each leg—each ballistic missile system has multiple types of nuclear warheads, the bomber force carries both gravity bombs and nuclear-armed cruise missiles, and there are more submarines deployed than needed. This belt-and-suspenders approach to nuclear forces may have made sense during the Cold War, but it has become an unneeded luxury.

Some have suggested that the United States no longer needs a triad, and could do just fine with a dyad or monad. In 2012, retired general James Cartwright, who led U.S. Strategic Command between 2004 and 2007, and former senator Chuck Hagel (who’d go on to become secretary of defense) coauthored a report for Global Zero, which recommended that U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) be eliminated due to their inherent vulnerability and lack of targeting flexibility. U.S. strategic bombers could see their nuclear role eliminated too, as they are not armed with nuclear weapons on a day-to-day basis and already play a limited nuclear role. A white paper issued by the Cato Institute in 2013 recommended that the United States keep only submarines, which are the most survivable leg of the triad. Still, political reality suggests that Washington is not about to dispense with the triad, which is supported by the president and by both parties in Congress.

Any politically feasible plan will start with keeping the triad, but there is growing support in Washington for trimming some secondary redundancies and “luxury” items in U.S. nuclear delivery systems. Do not confuse this with tinkering at the margins. The money at stake is immense, and the savings—roughly $75 billion in the next decade alone—come without compromising U.S. nuclear priorities.

Scaling back plans to replace the current fleet of Ohio-class nuclear-armed submarines is one of the most profound cost-saving measures the Pentagon could undertake. According to a 2015 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report the acquisition cost of the replacement program, including research and development, is estimated to be $139 billion in then year dollars. By reducing the current fleet to eight and building eight new subs instead of 12, the Navy would save approximately $21 billion over ten years, and an additional $30 billion in the 2030s, according to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).

Under New START the Pentagon plans to deploy approximately one thousand nuclear warheads on submarines. Eight submarines can meet this requirement (each sub could hold 128 warheads). So why buy twelve? The “need” for twelve subs has more to do with how promptly the missiles could strike their targets. More subs means they could be stationed within striking distance of their targets in China and Russia, ready to fire at a moment’s notice. This “quick launch” requirement is based on Cold War thinking that should now be relaxed. Instead of forward-deploying subs, they should be kept out of harm’s way, as an assured retaliatory force if ever needed. This approach would utilize their comparative advantage as second-strike weapons.

A potential adversary would have no way of targeting America’s deployed submarines in a first strike scenario. Even if Moscow were to wipe out all U.S. ICBMs and bombers (an impossible scenario), it would know full well that the entire U.S. arsenal of submarine-launched ballistic missiles could be knocking at its door in a matter of hours or days. The Navy admits that it cannot afford to sustain a three-hundred-ship fleet while also building twelve new subs. But instead of scaling back its plans, the service is seeking to fund the replacement for the Ohio-class subs from outside its budget. This is no way to run a military branch. Congress needs to enforce budget discipline and encourage the Navy to live within its means. Unfortunately, some on Capitol Hill are heading in the opposite direction by creating a special bank account for extra Navy money, the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund. As the undersecretary of defense Frank Kendall said in 2014, budget gimmicks, like the sub fund, don’t actually solve anything. He explained,

At the end of the day we have to find money to pay for these things one way or another, right? So changing the accounting system doesn’t really change that fundamental requirement. We still need the money and it has to come from somewhere.

Other branches of the armed forces also have plans that outpace needs. The Air Force awarded a contract to Northrop Grumman in October to design and build a replacement for its long-range strategic-bomber fleet, which currently includes the B-52 and B-1, expected to continue flying until at least 2040, and the stealthy B-2, expected to remain on active duty until 2058, if not longer. But why now? Given the decades of service left in the current bomber fleet, the new bomber program can safely be delayed until 2025, according to CBO. Doing so would generate $34 billion of savings over the next ten years. That estimate is based on the Air Force’s plans to build one hundred planes at a cost of $550 million each, not including $21 billion for research and development. With these numbers taken into account the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment estimates that the fleet will cost approximately $111 billion to procure through 2039.

The Air Force has a dismal record of delivering on its cost promises. When developing the B-2 bomber, also built by Northrop, the Air Force heralded it as the future of aviation technology and planned to build a fleet of 132 planes for $571 million per unit in 1991 dollars. That didn’t happen. The cost of the program ballooned to $2.2 billion per plane, forcing the first Bush administration to stop production after only twenty-one planes were built. In addition to the B-2 fiasco, the Air Force has experienced a series of delays and massive cost overruns in the F-35 program. According to an April 2015 report from the Government Accountability Office, the program’s initial cost estimate of $233 billion has increased by 68 percent to $391.1 billion. While the cost has skyrocketed, the amount of planes to be purchased has dropped by more than 16 percent.

Delaying the new bomber would give the Air Force more time to accurately evaluate the costs of the program. The CBO predicts that even with a ten-year delay, the new bomber would still be completed in time to replace the current fleet when it reaches the end of its service life. Moreover, the delay would allow the new bomber to incorporate technological advances made during that time. According to the CBO, “Taking advantage of future technological developments can be particularly valuable for weapon systems that are expected to be in use for several decades.

The new bomber would carry two types of nuclear weapons: a rebuilt gravity bomb (the B61-12) and an Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM). The current ALCM, carried by B-52 bombers, is scheduled for retirement in 2030, and plans to replace it are underway. Although there is no official price tag on the project, experts estimate that research, development and procurement will cost approximately $15 billion over the program’s lifespan. Updating the warhead to fit the next generation cruise missile, known as the Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO) weapon, will bring the total closer to $25 billion. Cutting the LRSO now will save approximately $5 billion of this figure over the next ten years.

The new bomber is being designed to penetrate enemy air defenses, so it needs gravity bombs that can be dropped from above, like the B61. It does not need a nuclear standoff missile like the LRSO, which would be shot from outside enemy airspace. Bill Perry, who oversaw Pentagon development of the nuclear cruise missile 35 years ago, is now calling for its replacement to be cancelled. Perry and his Pentagon colleague Andy Weber urged President Obama in October to “cancel the current plan to develop and buy 1,000 to 1,100 new nuclear-capable air-launched cruise missiles.” Standoff nuclear attacks, if we ever need them, can be conducted just as effectively by submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Having cruise missiles on the new bomber would be a “hedge” in case the bombs could not be used, just as the bombers themselves are a “hedge” in case the other legs of the triad are unavailable. We do not need a hedge on a hedge.

Washington should rein in plans for the U.S. ICBM program as well. The Arms Control Association recently reported that the Air Force is developing a replacement for the current Minuteman III ICBM force. Dubbed the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent, the Air Force projects the new missile to cost $62.3 billion over twenty-nine years (about $2.1 billion per year). This estimate differs substantially from a detailed 2014 RAND study that favors extending the life of the current Minuteman III, which RAND analysts found to be “a relatively inexpensive way to retain current ICBM capabilities.”

The RAND report found that keeping the Minuteman IIIs in current silos is the cheapest option, a program that would still cost up to $90 billion over thirty-nine years (about $2.3 billion per year). In comparison, RAND estimated that building a new silo-based ICBM would cost up to $125 billion ($3.2 billion per year) and a mobile version (rail or road) would cost up to $219 billion ($5.6 billion per year).

Forgoing a new missile would thus save the Pentagon roughly $15 billion over the next ten years, using the RAND numbers and assuming the program would have started in 2020. After 2025, extending the lifespan of the Minuteman III would save billions more. It is hard to imagine what would justify a military requirement for a new ICBM capability beyond that offered by a life-extended Minuteman III. As the RAND report points out, only Russia is capable of attacking all U.S. ICBMs. Such an attack is highly unlikely, as Moscow could not expect to escape a nuclear response, either from ICBMs or other U.S. nuclear forces in the strategic triad. Silo-based Minuteman IIIs are survivable against all other potential nuclear adversaries, including China, and will likely remain so for the foreseeable future. The Minuteman III is armed with either a W78 or W87 nuclear warhead, which both have yields of three hundred kilotons or more. The National Nuclear Security Administration is planning to develop an interoperable warhead to replace the W78, which is older, at a cost of $10-15 billion. But as Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris note in their report for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “simpler life-extension of existing designs could provide reliable warheads at a fraction of the cost.” The W78 can be retired and replaced by the W87, saving about $1 billion over the next decade. Enough W87 warheads have already been produced (more than five hundred) to arm the entire ICBM fleet.

A complete rebuild of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is neither justified by the external threat nor supported by the federal budget. Many of these systems would go into production in the mid-2020s, creating a budget bottleneck. Some of these programs will have to be delayed or cancelled. Waiting ten years to face this inevitable result will waste billions of dollars. A 2012 report from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) found that since 2001, the Pentagon has spent close to $50 billion on programs that were started but never finished. CSBA found that, “while the cancellation of individual programs may have been justified due to significant cost overruns or technical challenges, the aggregate effect is that a significant portion of DOD’s investment in modernization over the past decade did not result in force modernization.”

Let’s not do this again. The Cold War is over and the size of nuclear arsenals has been trending downwards. If the United States can wait to buy new systems, it will likely need fewer of them. As just one example, the Navy built eighteen Ohio-class submarines from 1981 to 1997 only to decide later that it needed just fourteen. Why? The Cold War ended, and U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals declined under the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. These four extra subs and their subsequent conversion to nonnuclear missions cost about $16 billion.

In 2009 President Obama laid out an ambitious vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. Today his administration is slated to invest a trillion dollars to rebuild the arsenal for the next fifty years. As Obama enters his last year in office, it is time to change course.

Tom Z. Collina is the Policy Director at Ploughshares Fund, a global security foundation in Washington DC, where Will Saetren is a Roger Hale Fellow.

Image: Flickr/James Vaughan