The idea of an emerging multipolar world order has become a buzzword in the post-pandemic global geopolitical discourse. Politicians, strategic experts, diplomats, and business leaders from diverse backgrounds solemnly intone that multipolarity is the future of world order. Among them, UN secretary-general Antonio Guterres suggested that “the post-Cold War period is over, and we are moving towards a new global order and a multipolar world.” German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, in his nation’s National Security Strategy, wrote that “the global order is changing, new centers of power are emerging, and the world in the 21st century is multipolar.”

Russia and China proclaimed the imminence of the multipolar world order in a joint statement from February 2022 and the deliberations at BRICS+ and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Other proponents of a multipolar world order include Brazilian president Lula Da Silva, Indian prime minister Narendra Modi, French President Emmanuel Macron, and the European Union (EU) representative for foreign affairs, Josep Borell.

Is this rapidly congealing piece of conventional wisdom true? Is the world really moving from unipolarity to multipolarity? There are varying opinions on the subject.

Jo Inge Bekkevold, a former Norwegian diplomat, argues in a Foreign Policy article from last year that the world shows more signs of bipolarity and “it is simply a myth that today’s world is anywhere close to multipolar.”

Using the matrix of military and economic indicators, he summarizes that only two powers (i.e., the United States and China) have the “economic size, military might, and global leverage to constitute a pole.” The two powers account for about half of the world’s defense expenditure, and their combined GDP nearly “equals the 33-next largest economies of the world.” Although India was the third largest spender on defense in 2021, according to the SIPRI database, its total expenditure is only one-fourth of China’s. Japan has the third largest economy, but its GDP is less than one-fourth of China’s. Germany, India, France, and the UK’s shares are even smaller than that of Japan. Of the challenges emanating from blocs like the EU, BRICS, and the RIC (Russia, India, and China) Forum, Bekkevold contends that these organizations are not coherent. They are a divided lot and suffer from internal rivalries.

Refuting the rigid criteria centered on economic and military indicators, Emma Ashford and Evan Cooper of the Stimson Center disagree with Bekkevold’s claims and argue for multipolarity. In a paper published by the Stimson Center, they conclude that “The United States simply does not hold the level of military and economic power it did during the early decades of the Cold War. Nor does today’s China match the Soviet Union at its peak.”

Hugh De Santis, a former U.S. diplomat, in a National Interest article, discusses at length how the ongoing geopolitical transformation is leading us towards a multipolar world, where power is no longer confined to one or two powerful states and is more diffused among several powerful nations followed by the middle powers jockeying for the same position. With 750 military bases spread over eighty countries and a vast network of alliances, treaties, strategic partnerships, and technologically advanced armed forces, the U.S. military footprint has no parallel. However, even with such a globe-spanning fighting force, Washington, DC failed to 1) deter Russia from invading Ukraine, 2) achieve a decisive victory over the Taliban, 3) check China in the Taiwan straits, and 4) force rogue states like Iran and North Korea to abandon their nuclear weapons programs. 

In particular, the Ukraine war has severely dented U.S. credibility. There are serious doubts among the NATO members about the United States’ commitment to protecting their sovereignty. China emerged as the largest beneficiary as the war made Russia and China close strategic partners, further weakening the U.S. position. Russia’s recent gains on the Ukrainian front seem to have convinced the U.S. experts in the Republican camp that pushing Russia further into the Chinese camp will be a diplomatic disaster. A Trump victory could mean a new approach. But, it may be too late if Russia secures its gains by November.

The United States’ main adversary, China, is modernizing its army at an alarming pace, expanding its nuclear arsenal, developing ICBMs, SLBM (long-range sea-launched ballistic missiles), 350 new missile silos, and DF-17 medium-range missiles with hypersonic glide vehicles. China has the world’s largest navy equipped with nuclear submarines and SLBMs that can target several states of the American mainland. Beijing is also building military bases in Africa, the Middle East, the Indian Ocean, and the South Pacific.

Russia, America’s traditional adversary, with its expected growth rate of 2.6 percent in 2024, is also developing its arsenal, modernizing the Iskandar M short-range ballistic missile, 9M729 cruise missile, and developing Sarmat ICBM and nuclear-powered drones releasable from the submarines. Rogue states like Iran and North Korea are also cozying up to Russia and China, which will likely lead to them getting access to high-end missile and satellite technology. In the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union controlled 40 percent of the global military and economic power; however, today, the share for China and the United States has come down to 30 percent.

In terms of economics, Moscow and Washington, with their allies, owned 88 percent of global GDP in 1950. However, today, their share is only 57 percent. The U.S. share of the worldwide GDP has halved from 50 percent in 1950 to marginally higher than 25 percent today at the market exchange rates. In PPP terms, it is only 15 percent, whereas Asia-Pacific countries’ share stands at 45 percent, of which China contributes 19 percent. Likewise, American universities and corporations are also being challenged in the top ten rankings by emerging economic heavyweights like China and India. In a Times Higher Education survey, the number of American universities in the top 100 rankings declined from forty-three in 2018 to thirty-four in 2022. According to the Forbes global list of corporations, there were eleven American and zero Chinese corporations in the top twenty rankings. In the 2023 Forbes list, American firms in the top twenty numbered only nine, while China’s had risen to six. Today, India, having emerged as the fifth-largest economy at market prices and third-largest at PPP, accounts for 7.5 percent of global GDP.

China is also chipping away at America’s technological dominance. In 1960, U.S. investment in R&D was 69 percent of the global investment, which has shrunk to 25 percent in 2020. On the other hand, China’s share has increased from 5 percent in 2000 to 24 percent in 2020. Moreover, China boasts the highest number of patents and the largest market for electric vehicles. On the other hand, China is suffering from a slow growth rate because of the lack of domestic demand, declining exports, an aging population, and a dictatorial government. However, China maintains a lead as the largest trading partner for 120 countries and America’s third-largest export market. It is also the largest purchaser of American bonds. Controlling 70 percent of the extraction and 90 percent of the processing of rare earth minerals, China also has overwhelming control over global supply chains.

Heavily sanctioned countries like Iran also have not been reined in yet. Tehran has increased uranium enrichment by up to 60 percent, close to weapons-grade level. It has signed a twenty-five-year comprehensive cooperation agreement with China. With its array of proxy terrorist groups like the Houthis and Hezbollah, Tehran has emerged as a major player in the Middle East. It is also supplying drones to Russia. Turkey’s Erdogan nurtures dreams to revive the glory of the Ottoman Empire. Its dealings with the United States and the West are highly transactional, not of servility and docility. Though Ankara has supported the inclusion of Sweden in NATO, it has refused to buckle under U.S. pressure in supporting sanctions against Russia. 

India, an emerging middle power in the league of Turkey and Brazil, also refused to follow the American diktat on the Ukraine conflict and refused to condemn Russia. Despite U.S. pressure, India continued to buy the discounted Russian oil and maintain its robust trade relations with China. However, to balance China, its prime adversary, New Delhi has joined the U.S.-led Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and other mini-laterals drawn up on Washington’s initiative.

Finally, one can always talk about the rise of new blocs like BRICS and SCO and alternate multilateral institutions like BRICS Investment Bank, China Infrastructure Investment Bank, and global China-led strategic connectivity projects like BRI challenging the Western-led liberal/democratic world order. However, besides these rival and alternate institutions, the chinks in the armor of the United States and its allies are also markedly visible. There are significant apprehensions among the European states about the future of NATO and the U.S. response to Russia and China if Trump comes to power. Germany has already allotted €100 billion for a revamp of military spending. The possibility of EU members developing their own defense capabilities, including the acquisition of nuclear capabilities against perceived Russian revisionism, is strong and aligns well with other multipolar trends.

Multipolarity: Conceptions and Discomforts

In light of the facts and analysis presented above, it can be safely concluded that the United States does not hold the same military might, economic size, and diplomatic clout it enjoyed during the Cold War and throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Likewise, China’s overall influence cannot be compared with that of the Soviet Union at its peak. One can also witness the rise of a set of middle powers like Brazil, India, Turkey, Indonesia, South Korea, Japan, etc.

The multipolarity of the world order has already begun. On closer analysis, it can be observed that even during the Cold War, rigid bipolarity was somewhat overstated. The non-aligned bloc, led by countries like India, Egypt, Yugoslavia, and Indonesia, exercised significant influence in global politics.

It can be argued that the fundamental flaw is rooted in our definitions of polarity. Experts like Bekkevold use extremely narrow criteria of economic and military indicators while analyzing and defining a nation’s power. Such metrics can be misleading. However, the economic and military indicators constitute a major component of the comprehensive national power of any country, which is not all. States derive power from many other sources, such as their geography, internal government structure, civilizational narrative, and their leadership’s resolve and philosophical understanding of international relations.

Countries like India, Russia, Turkey, and China capitalize on the civilizational narrative in projecting power and strengthening their global diplomatic clout. After the recent gains on the Ukraine front, the Putin-led Russian Federation appears confident, no matter what the global media reports. Recently, at the Second Congress of the International Russophile Movement and Multipolarity Forum, Putin demonstrated his intellectual debt to Aleksandr Dugin’s vision of a civilizational states-centric multipolar world and reclaiming Russia’s identity as a civilizational state with its sphere of influence. In his address, Dugin said that the era of the West’s sole hegemony is over. Sharing his thoughts on multipolarity, he stated:

In this world, there are only Western values. Only one political system—liberal democracy. Only one economic model—neoliberal capitalism. Only one culture—postmodernism. Only one conception of genders and family—LGBT. Only one version of development—technological perfection up to post-humanism and the complete displacement of humanity by AI and cyborgs... Multipolarity is an alternative philosophy. It is based on the fundamental objection: the West is not all of humanity but only a part of it—a region, a province. It is not the civilization in the singular, but one of several civilizations.

Even India, a relatively quiet, non-aggressive, and rule-abiding state, has undergone a major change under Modi’s Hindu-nationalist government in its perception of itself. New Delhi now views itself as a unique civilizational state. Mohand Bhagwat, chief of the Hindu nationalist RSS, the main force behind the Modi government, has openly stated that India will realize its dream of Akhand Bharat (Greater India) in the next fifteen years, even though the RSS has never clearly defined what this term means in practice and sometimes implies it signifies cultural unity over the subcontinent rather than a specific territorial claim. 

In multipolarity, an equal power distribution among states does not come naturally. Two, three, or four powerful states and a range of middle powers can contest for eminence and influence. This situation can be defined as a state of unbalanced multipolarity. The current distribution of power in the world order approximates unbalanced multipolarity. 

Additionally, another misconception about multipolarity is the highly constricted and power-centric approach towards the concept of polarity. Reducing the idea of multipolarity to a balanced or unbalanced distribution of power among various states is oversimplification. The current trends towards multipolarity also emanate from the unmet expectations of the countries of the Global South from the West-led unipolar or bipolar world order. 

Dr. Jaishankar, India’s external affairs minister, calls it a “world order that is very, very deeply Western.” The countries of the Global South nurture many grievances against multilateral institutions like the UN and global financial institutions like the World Bank and IMF. Their discomfort with the universalization of Western values and Western double standards in enforcing them has come to a point of frustration where the Western leadership has lost credibility. Hence, the Global South seeks redistribution of power. Given this, alternate institutions like China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the BRICS Development Bank may be seen as preferable substitutes.

Multipolarity: India vs the West

Given that multipolarity seems like an established fact, is it a good or bad state of affairs? Many Western scholars and politicians are particularly disturbed by the multipolar world order. As discussed above, several scholars prefer to use the narrow matrix of military and economic indicators to disprove the idea of multipolarity. Republican politicians prefer to increase spending on military and defense and use brute force in foreign policy to bring back America’s unipolar moment.

The Western world’s discomfort with multipolarity arises from an overwhelmingly Hobbesian understanding of society and inter-state relations. The realist school of IR, rooted in the Hobbesian worldview, argues that humankind is essentially selfish in nature. Fundamentally driven by this selfish and brutish nature, mankind always makes rational decisions to maximize personal gains. According to the realist school, mankind is destined for conflict. In International Relations, the fulcrum of the realist school is the balance of power between different nations. With this premise, the multipolar world order is inevitably chaotic, uncertain, and disorderly in the Western understanding. In the absence of clear superiority of one or two great powers over the others, the powerful states form alliances with various powers to safeguard their strategic interests. However, such alliances are highly vulnerable and prone to significant shifts if the great powers change allegiance. Such a situation occurred in the pre-World War I and inter-war period.

However, in Indian metaphysics and epistemology—from which its strategic thought originates— the fundamental understanding of human nature is starkly different from that of Western perspectives. Indian philosophical thought suggests that the reality is Trigunatmak, i.e., a combination of three attributes. It is the combination of Sat (tendency towards selfless service, piety), Rajas (tendency towards movement and activity), and Tamas (darkness, rigidity, and lethargy).

At any time, human nature is the product of different permutations and combinations of these three attributes. Hence, humankind is neither selfish and violent in an absolute sense nor selfless and nonviolent in an absolute sense. It is both selfish and selfless, violent and nonviolent, with different permutations and combinations from person to person. Having said that, war is not the ultimate destiny of mankind. Hence, the balance of power cannot be accepted as the key underlying theoretical framework of geopolitics.

In the Indian worldview, multipolarity can be seen as a naturally obtained situation in the international order. It is a system, a global order in which multiple civilizational states exist as the fundamental poles. Multipolarity implies a plurality of values, civilizational ethos, cultural norms, beliefs, and religions. Dictatorship and democracy can coexist in the same world. It also implies tolerance for such plurality and diversity.

India’s first interface with the multipolar world order was in the later Vedic age (900-600 BC). In the later Vedic age, sixteen Mahajanpadas existed in India. These were territorial states from northern Afghanistan to the borders of Myanmar. They included Gandhara, Kamboj, Kuru, Panchala, Anga, Magadha, Mathura, Kosala, etc. Most of these states were monarchies; however, many were republics, too, boasting an early form of electoral democracy. A close look at the inter-state relations in the later Vedic set-up unravels the fundamentals of India’s approach towards multipolarity. The notion of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam lays the basic theoretical framework of world order in Indian strategic thought. It means “the world is one family.” There are powerful states that are accepted and treated more as the leaders and the elders in the family instead of hegemons. 

The powerful states, seen as family heads or leaders, were expected to exhibit moral behavior and benevolence and act in enlightened self-interest. The powerful states had an informal authority and aura respected by the other states. By sheer dint of their economic and military might, they could be flexible with rules and behavior, which in the first place were never rigidly defined; however, they were not expected to never act out of narrow selfish motives, show generosity, and act like benevolent patrons. In essence, the inter-state dealings and engagements were not based on a zero-sum game; instead, the purpose was to ensure a win-win situation for all and maintain balance and order.

At the same time, they could punish other states, such as the family head punishing errant and misguided family members. Consequently, the powerful states attacked smaller states or the adversaries; however, the reasons were not fixated on selfish and petty economic and imperial motives. In many cases, the reasons were moralistic in nature.

With this baseline framework, the powerful states acted more like Vishwamitra or Vishwaguru. Recently, Modi called India a Vishwamitra, a friend of the world. Vishwaguru, a commonly occurring word among various scholars of Indian religious and philosophical thought, means the “master” or “teacher of the world.” In a spiritual country like India, the emphasis has always been on a moral or spiritual victory known as Dhammavijay or Dharmavijay. The ultimate power is not material; it is moral or spiritual. Hence, for any country, economic size and military might are crucial components of its comprehensive national power. However, the ultimate measure of power is their ability to translate the hard power into robust global diplomatic influence and clout. Economic and military power can enable a country to become an aggressor and help in military or economic conquest. Still, it is only the moral and spiritual power that can make a nation like India a Vishwamitra or Vishwaguru who enjoys the trust of the entire community and can lead them without double standards.

Hence, India sits comfortably well with the multipolar world order. During the bipolar world of the Cold War, India refused to join the capitalist and communist blocs and pursue an independent foreign policy, giving birth to the non-aligned movement. This policy of non-alignment originated from India’s civilizational alignment with multipolarity. In India’s current diplomacy, the non-alignment has transformed into a multi-alignment trajectory, as a part of which India continues to pursue an independent and principled foreign policy based on the harmonious balance of its national interests and moral considerations.

New Delhi maintains relations with various nations, including those in the rival camps. For example, India has cordial relations with Israel and Iran and with Saudi Arabia and Iran. India and the United States have a natural partnership premised on the shared beliefs in liberal and democratic world order, the rule of law, human rights, and freedom of expression; however, it calls its civilizational relationship with Russia a “special and privileged strategic partnership.” Russia continues to be its major arms and oil supplier. Despite its border clashes with China and the U.S.-China tensions, India maintains a robust trade relationship with Beijing. Despite American inducements, India has not yet signaled a complete shift towards Washington. In its inherent comfort with multipolarity, India rejects great power politics. It seeks reforms in multilateral institutions to reflect more diversity and achieve inclusive cooperation. With this line, India is well-suited to position itself as a leader of the global south, which is once again an extension of its leadership of the non-aligned movement. Notably, under India’s G20 presidency, the African Union became a full member of the G20.

Independent and principled foreign policy guarantees a certain degree of credibility for India, which was amply visible in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. Despite intense pressure from the West, India refused to join the Western world in anti-Russia sanctions. As a result, Prime Minister Modi enjoys credibility with both camps and is considered the most suitable choice to play the role of mediator and peacemaker. U.S. Secretary of State Blinken himself acknowledged that India, along with China, played an essential role in deterring Putin from the use of nukes.

Perhaps Washington can take a leaf out of New Delhi’s playbook and approach multipolarity with a constructive and optimistic perspective. Understanding power distribution in purely “zero-sum-game” terms is not the best approach to multipolarity. Experimenting with a new style of diplomacy based on bilateralism and minilateralism can be very effective in making a multipolar world order beneficial by leveraging its influence in that world. Once again, India is navigating the great power politics through bilateralism and mini-laterals. The United States can explore this Indian approach, increase development aid, take the lead in reforming multilateral institutions, help post-war reconstruction, desist from protectionist trade policies, and accept value plurality. To sum up, in a multipolar world, there is ample scope for leaders to act as Vishwamitras and Vishwagurus—not as hegemons.

Dr. Abhinav Pandya is a founder and CEO of Usanas Foundation, an India-based geopolitical and security affairs think-tank, and the author of Radicalization in India: An Exploration and  Terror Financing in Kashmir. He has a Ph.D. from OP Jindal University and an MPA from Cornell University.

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