In April 2019, the entrepreneur, actor, and showman Volodymyr Zelenskyy was elected the sixth President of Ukraine with just under 75 percent of the vote. When he took office on May 20, 2019, he did so with the largest share of the vote that a Ukrainian presidential candidate had ever received in elections. At the age of forty-one, Zelenskyy was also by far the youngest head of state in Ukraine’s history—a decisive factor in his electoral success.

In the fall of 2024, Zelenskyy looks much older. His facial expressions and gestures have lost their former lightness. Unlike before 2022, the president hardly makes any jokes. His smile has become harder. Zelenskyy, like all Ukrainians, is suffering from the ongoing war with Russia.

The former showman also bears the burden of leading a nation facing an existential threat. Since 2022, Russia’s spokespeople have repeatedly made it clear that they reject Ukrainian claims of constituting an independent cultural community and nation-state. The enormous resources of the largest territorial state in the world have been mobilized for two and a half years to realize this prejudice. To save his country, Zelenskyy has to make morally difficult and often unpopular decisions every week. His main task today is to convince Ukraine’s allies not to abandon Ukraine and to provide it with sufficient weapons and money.

Former employees describe Zelenskyy as a quick learner with an inquisitive mind who can make decisions quickly. Despite all the changes, Zelenskyy exudes unyielding determination, just as he did on the first day of the war. In 2019, he announced in his inaugural speech in parliament: “In the next five years, I will do everything, dear Ukrainians, to stop you crying.” Today, it is all about bare survival.

Is Zelenskyy’s Power Legitimate?

Zelenskyy’s regular term of office as president expired after five years in May 2024. However, Ukrainian legislation—like that of other countries—does not provide for national elections in times of war. A nationwide poll conducted in February 2024, when the election campaign should have begun, found that 70 percent of the respondents believed Zelenskyy should stay in office until the termination of martial law.

Polls show that Ukrainians value their president because of his resistance to Russian aggression and his international efforts to support Ukraine. Nevertheless, Zelenksyy’s popularity, which surged in the spring of 2022, has fallen again in the last two years. In a survey at the end of May 2024, 56 percent rated Zelenskyy’s track record positively, while 37 percent either completely or partially disapproved of his work. Around half of Ukrainians also criticize the fact that the president has not fulfilled all of his election promises. Many see certain corrupt or incompetent people on his team as the reason for this. Others attribute the failure to the Russian full-scale invasion since 2022 (31 percent), Zelenskyy’s inexperience (27 percent), and the influence of the oligarchs (26 percent).

The Communicator

As a former entertainer, Zelenskyy proved to be an excellent communicator in and for his country, especially in the first year of the full-scale invasion. After the large war began on February 24, 2022, he used social media to communicate directly with his people and abroad. There was never even a question of him fleeing Ukraine in the wake of the Russian assault. On the contrary, the president famously filmed a speech in front of the seat of government in Kyiv to reassure the nation and the world of his resolve. Today, the head of state’s almost daily video communication creates a sense of common struggle and shared destiny of the political elite and wider population.

Zelenskyy’s appearances on the international stage and before the national parliaments of many countries have become legendary. Curiously, Zelenskyy’s speech to the Israeli parliament in March 2022 is considered one of his weakest performances in terms of foreign policy and rhetoric, even though Zelenskyy is of Jewish descent on both his mother's and father’s side and lost a large part of his family in the Holocaust.

While Zelenskyy continues to communicate successfully with foreign audiences to this day, his communication practices in his own country have come under increasing criticism since 2023. Ukrainian journalists accuse him of talking too much to foreign rather than Ukrainian media and avoiding difficult topics such as military mobilization or energy security. The leading Ukrainian newspaper, Ukrainska Pravda, received a hostile response from the president at his last press conference on August 27 because of a question about his entourage.

Zelenskyy has also been accused of window-dressing his latest cabinet reshuffle in September. The president spoke of renewal and emphasized: “It is very important that the government institutions now work as actively as possible—even more actively than before. At all levels.” However, the new ministers are not new faces. Most of them previously held high positions in the government, presidential administration, or regional administrations. Some ministers dismissed from the government moved to the presidential office, gaining rather than losing political influence. Such inconsistencies between rhetoric and practice feed mistrust.

Zelenskyy and his Environment

In a recent book about Valery Zaluzhniy, the former supreme commander of the Ukrainian armed forces, Liudmyla Dolhanovska (Zaluzniy’s former communications advisor) describes Zaluzhniy’s military career. According to Dolhanovska, Zaluzhniy communicated little with the Ukrainian media during his command to avoid conflict with the president, who had appointed the relatively young general as commander-in-chief in 2021. The presidential office constantly monitors ratings and wants to ensure no political competition for the incumbent president emerges. Nevertheless, Zaluzhniy’s popularity has risen rapidly since the start of Russia’s major invasion in 2022, despite his low media profile. This, many suspect, was the reason why Zaluzhniy was dismissed from military service in February 2024 and sent to London as Ukraine’s Ambassador.

Former foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba also developed his own distinct profile during his 2020–2024 term of office. According to some theories, Kuleba’s publicity also earned him a dismissal. However, Kuleba’s recognition comes from abroad rather than at home, and—unlike Zaluzhnyi— he is not a charismatic figure in Ukrainian domestic politics. After four and a half years as foreign minister, Kuleba enjoyed the second-longest term of any Ukrainian in this office. His time was surpassed only by former foreign minister Pavlo Klimkin, who lasted just over five years, from 2014 to 2019.

The New Leadership

Zelenskyy’s assumption of power in 2019 was particularly comprehensive, as he was the first president of Ukraine whose party also won an absolute majority in the Ukrainian unicameral parliament Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Council). This initially enabled Zelenskyy to ignore the opposition. However,his party “Servants of the People” subsequently disintegrated. Due to martial law, new elections have not been possible since 2022. Therefore, like his predecessors, Zelenskyy is now forced to seek majorities for laws through factional alliances.

The most controversial figure in Zelenskyy’s circle today is Andriy Yermak, head of the Presidential Office since February 2020. Over the years, the Ukrainian leadership has faced increasing criticism that Yermak is concentrating power in his hands—at least in the perception of many journalists and commentators. Yermak claims that he only does what the president tells him to do, and Zelenskyy has confirmed this claim. However, there is a growing perception in Ukraine that an unelected civil servant has become the secret ruler of Ukraine.

The major government reshuffle in September 2024 is also being interpreted as a consolidation of Yermak’s grip on the organs of power. Investigative journalist Yuri Nikolov wrote about the latest cabinet reshuffle: “Today, no one talks about whose person [i.e. which oligarch’s] one is, who appoints whom or who controls the [money] flows. The debates now only revolve around the degree of loyalty to Yermak.” Some people may consider such a reduction in the influence of competing business tycoons as a result of the concentration of power to be a welcome development.

In some cases, professional experience seems to play, at first glance, little role in appointments. For example, the diplomat and former Presidential Office official Mykola Tochytskiy was appointed Minister of Culture and Strategic Communications, although Tochytskiy has hardly any experience in the cultural sector. This could mean that strategic communication—Tochytskiy’s field of specialization—will now become more important for the Culture Ministry. Vitaliy Koval, who moved from the State Property Fund to head the Ministry of Agriculture, gained some experience in the agricultural sector as the five-year head of an agricultural company active in grain trading.

The dismissal of the head of the state energy company Ukrenergo Volodymyr Kudrytskyi is probably the most controversial personnel decision of recent weeks. Kudrytskiy is regarded as a competent expert who built up a transparent state-owned company and worked effectively with Western partners. The question now is whether his successor will be able to fill this gap.

On the other hand, the Ukrainian press also praised some of the new ministers appointed in September for their organizational skills. These include Herman Smetanin, the former head of the state arms company Ukroboronprom, who was appointed Minister for the Development of Strategic Industries. Oleksiy Kuleba (no relation to Dmytro Kuleba), the former deputy head of the Presidential Department for Regional Policy with a good reputation, was appointed Minister for Municipal Development, Territories, and Infrastructure.

Iryna Vereshchuk moved from the post of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for the Reintegration of Occupied Territories to the Presidential Office as the person responsible for social issues. She is one of the few Ukrainian government employees with relevant experience in local politics. From 2010 to 2015, Vereshchuk was mayor of her hometown of Rava-Ruska on the Ukrainian-Polish border.

Olha Stefanishyna, the Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration, who is well-known in the West, is now also Minister of Justice. This has not only increased Stefanishyna’s scope of power but also her ability to drive forward Ukraine’s accession to the EU through her ministry. What is pleasing about this development is that two prominent Ukrainian female politicians, Vereshchuk and Stefanishyna, have survived the government reshuffle politically and have been able to strengthen their positions.

A Hardened Leader

The war has hardened Zelenskyy—as is easy to see from his face and body language. Zelenskyy’s experience as a TV showman has played a useful role in inspiring international support and Ukrainian resistance. Now that the defensive struggle has become a war of attrition, however, a different kind of leadership is needed. Different tasks, such as sustainable resource mobilization and management, are paramount today. For this, Zelenskyy needs a different apparatus than three years ago. Whether or not the recent leadership change will meet this challenge is a crucial question for Ukraine.

Zelenskyy himself must also become a different leader than he was at the beginning of the war. The majority of the population still supports him due to his unquestionable steadfastness and public presence. However, doubts are growing regarding whether Zelenskyy is the right choice as head of state for a long confrontation with Russia—a skepticism expressed, among other things, in General Zaluzhniy’s high popularity. So far, Zelenskyy's ability to learn and adapt has been helpful. Perhaps this will also enable him to fulfill his new role as a wartime president.

Julia Kazdobina is a Senior Fellow in the Security Studies Program of the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism” in Kyiv. Follow her on X: @JuliaK_Ukraine.

Andreas Umland is an analyst at the Stockholm Center for East European Studies at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs.

Follow him on X: @UmlandAndreas.

Image: Oscar Gonzalez Fuentes / Shutterstock.com.