Second, rather than expecting every F-35 to roll off the assembly line with the exact same capabilities, we should allow for a number of versions that incorporate new technology as it is developed. With the F-16, 138 versions were produced which were not retrofitted every time a new capability was developed. Instead, older aircraft performed the missions they were best suited for and waited until a regular block upgrade was scheduled. Only then were early, and less capable, F-16s given the latest technology—keeping costs down.

Third, affordability is largely dependent upon the number of aircraft produced. Increasing the number of international partners and approving wider sale of the aircraft internationally will go a long way toward decreasing fly-away costs. With Russia and China acting increasingly assertive, there is every reason for allies in Europe and Asia to take a hard look at the JSF as a core component of their national defense.

For advocates of the F-35, the growing chorus of critics is little different from that of F-14 critics in the late 1960s and early 1970s, F-15 critics in the 1970s and early 1980s, or F-16 critics in the 1980s. In each case, an aircraft that was over budget, behind schedule, and facing technical challenges went on to become a vaunted fighter that today’s JSF critics believe are a better option for the United States. Critics were wrong then, and they are wrong now.     

F-35: Albatross of the Asia-Pacific

Perhaps the strongest argument made by critics suggests that the JSF is the wrong aircraft for a potential conflict in the Asia-Pacific. Among the most detailed and credible critiques of the F-35s relevant capability shortfalls comes from Col Michael W. Pietrucha, who wrote a blistering article, “The Comanche and the Albatross,” which appeared in Air & Space Power Journal earlier this year. He thoroughly highlights some of the relative weaknesses in the JSF as a tactical fighter, many of which are relevant because of the likelihood that the F-35 will play a central role in a potential Asia-Pacific conflict.

In short, Asia-centric critics argue the F-35 suffers from three critical weaknesses. First, it lacks sufficient range to be relevant in an Asia-Pacific fight, particularly where basing within the first island chain is vulnerable. Second, the JSF’s jamming capabilities may prove inadequate to the task without significant additional investment. Third, developments in Russian and Chinese radar technology are likely to limit the stealth capability that makes the F-35 an attractive aircraft.

The Challenge of Short Legs

The “tyranny of distance” is a major factor for combat operations in the Asia-Pacific region. The F-35 is estimated to have a combat mission radius of 584 nautical miles—two hundred miles less than the F-15E. Such short legs are problematic because of the distances between the first and second island chains and anticipated areas of operation. The geography of the challenge results in basing becoming a center of gravity for the US.

To hold US basing at risk, on land or at sea, China has embarked on a ballistic and cruise missile program that is on the verge of forcing a paradigm shift in American military thinking and calculation. Central to China’s investment in anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities is the development and deployment of large numbers of accurate anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) across a wide range of ground, air, and naval platforms. According to one recent analysis, “Chinese sources assert that LACMs enable the PLA to reach targets as far as away as Guam, Darwin, and Diego Garcia.”

Due to China’s low cost of producing cruise missiles, they are believed to hold a 9:1 cost advantage over the cost faced by defenders—the United States, Japan, South Korea, etc. This could offer a powerful deterrent when considering basing expensive fifth generation fighters within striking distance of Chinese missiles.

Historically, the US flows combat capability into a theater on the eve of war. This approach assumes that an adversary permits the Time Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) flow—an assumption China is certain to challenge. Recent studies and war games produced by prominent Washington-based think tanks highlight the probability that China will launch pre-emptive missile strikes against American bases across the Pacific to destroy existing air assets and deny additional war planes from basing near China, which is particularly important for a short range tactical fighter like the JSF. Such an anti-access strategy is central to China’s war plan. 

With the F-35 central to American strategy in the region, critics argue a potential Chinese missile strike would devastate regional assets and force the US Air Force and Navy to operate from such distance that the F-35 becomes a non-factor in a conflict. Depending upon the perceived credibility of China’s A2/AD capability, this argument is of significant weight.  

According to critics, China’s missile program has left the first island chain largely indefensible for the United States and its Asian allies without significant additional investments in active and passive defenses and dispersal. Even worse, the United States is rapidly approaching a time when the second island chain will be at greater risk from China’s growing ballistic and cruise missile arsenal. A lack of defensible main operating air bases means that the short-legged F-35 is poorly suited for combat operations in the Asia-Pacific. It has yet to be proven that the F-35 can operate effectively from dispersal bases.

China’s missile program is a game-changer. For less cost and arguably greater impact, China is constructing a ballistic and cruise missile capability that will deny the US Air Force the capacity to field the short-range F-35s in the fight. Advocates of the JSF have no credible response for this new Chinese way of war.

Jamming

Short legs are not the JSF’s only problem. When it comes to conflict with a peer competitor, equally challenging is the aircraft’s limited jamming capability. As one recent story notes, the F-35’s radar jamming systems are unlikely to work against some new radar technology—under development in China and Russia. While Lockheed Martin suggests the F-35 is fully capable of jamming enemy signals to protect itself, in reality the F-35 will likely require additional jamming support from additional support aircraft that can block a wide spectrum of signals while moving to and from a target. This problem is well known; particularly since the aircraft’s jamming capability largely resides in the X-band. This means new radars under development in China and Russia, which utilizes L, UHF, and VHF wavelengths, cannot be jammed.

As Bill Sweetman has noted, before any fighter pilot activates the jamming capability, an adversary’s radar must detect the aircraft. The irony of this is, when the aircraft begins jamming a signal, its presence is revealed because the adversary can see the signal—even if a radar reflection is not visible. In essence, the ability to see the signal tells an adversary that a stealth aircraft is nearby, making targeting less challenging.

Stealth

Related to the discussion of jamming is the discussion of stealth, a major selling point for the JSF. If reports of Chinese and Russian radar developments are accurate and they are able to develop advanced radars that apply computing power to better utilize low-frequency L, UHF, and VHF wavelengths, the stealth properties of the F-35 no longer hide the aircraft from an adversary. Unlike the B-2, which does not have vertical stabilizers, the JSF may offer a significant radar return for new Russian and Chinese radars.

With radars far less expensive to field than fifth generation fighters, there is reason to believe that, once operational, Chinese or Russian-made low-frequency radars, specifically designed to detect the JSF, will proliferate among America’s adversaries. This too could greatly undermine the value of the F-35. 

Recommendations

For critics, a wide range of recommendations exists. Thus, to present the strongest case, the following recommendations are a compilation of those offered.

Among critics, Pietrucha offers a set of recommendations that combine termination of the JSF program, modernization of existing fighters, and the development of a low-end capability as a solution to the nation’s tactical fighter requirements. While such a dramatic choice is likely untenable—for many of the reasons offered by advocates—capping the total purchase at approximately 1000 aircraft is feasible. A total buy of this size would meet the needs of US and allies while maintaining the economic viability of Lockheed Martin.

In partially pursuing the course suggested by Pietrucha, the United States can address its short term need for modernized tactical fighters while also freeing up additional funding for the acquisition of long range strike bombers, which are in far greater need of recapitalization—particularly for an Asia-Pacific conflict.

It is also important that the USAF develop the weapon systems that will enable the service to meet the threats outlined in America’s Air Force: A Call to the Future (July 2014). In its latest strategic look at the future, the Air Force does not specifically rank its capabilities or missions by importance, but it appears clear that long range strike serves as the central mission around which the Air Force must organize. Thus, focusing greater acquisition dollars toward long-range strike platforms is both prudent and the best way to ensure conventional and nuclear deterrence.