Additionally, aside from the Korean peninsula, Asia-Pacific airbases exhibit few of the characteristics that made NATO bases resilient to attack, not to mention the fact that China’s missile threat to America’s island bases is far more technologically advanced that anything fielded within the Warsaw Pact. Regardless of the impressive (and expensive) aircraft based at Kadena, Andersen, or other Air Force bases, the deterrent value of a “soft” base is minimal. Subject to precision attack from long distances, American bases in the Pacific might be more of a vulnerability than a strength.

It is important to remember that Chinese strategic thinking views a preemptive attack against offensive assets as a defensive act. When talking about vulnerable bases, this is important.

If the US is to maintain both a deterrent and actual capability to fight from these bases, critics suggest warfighters pay particular attention to a full array of both passive and active measures to both prevent such damage and increase the ability to absorb strikes. Although the context is different, there is precedent for USAF investment into forward air base operations—even during times of fiscal cutbacks. The US Air Force’s Forward Air Base Operations (FABO) initiative is one example of an effort designed to mitigate these risks through: internal and external base dispersal and distributed operations, passive and active defenses, and concealment, camouflage, and deception.

In short, when the USAF is forced to operate from close range, because it devoted limited acquisition dollars to short range tactical fighters, rather than the long range strike platforms required in the Asia-Pacific, finding a safe place to land, refuel, and take off becomes much more hazardous. Absent massive investments in base hardening, F-35s on Asian ramps will become very attractive targets.

Conclusion

In our final analysis, both sides in this debate offer compelling arguments that cannot be ignored. For advocates, history offers a powerful reason to pause before calling for the termination of the JSF program. The similarities between criticism of the F-14, F-15, F-16, and F-35 program are striking. In many cases, one aircraft’s name could be easily replaced by another’s and the criticism would sound the same. For critics, overcoming the tyranny of distance with a combat air force comprised largely of JSF’s flown from vulnerable bases is a valid concern that must be addressed.

Given that both sides offer good points, Americans may be left to wonder where the truth lies. As is often the case, the truth is likely somewhere in the middle. In our view, the most likely outcome is a reduced F-35 buy that is large enough to sustain the program’s cost effectiveness, particularly for international partners, while also making additional funding available for LRS-B and other acquisition programs. If flyaway costs come down faster than expected and the jet’s technical challenges are solved quickly, the domestic and international buy may grow.

With no consensus or popular solutions readily available, it is our hope that prudence prevails over partisanship and national interest over special interests. Our single greatest hope is that both advocates and critics are willing to change their views if facts warrant. Taking a stand on the JSF and refusing to budge only harms our ability to most effectively pursue American interests.

Adam Lowther is a professor at the Air Force Research Institute and a non-resident senior fellow at the Center for the National Interest.

Col. Chris Wrenn is a member of the U.S. Air Force.

Image: Flickr/Official U.S. Air Force/CC by-nc 2.0