It wasn’t at all surprising that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was one of the first foreign leaders to congratulate Donald Trump on his election win, calling it a “huge victory.” In a congratulatory statement, Netanyahu made little effort to hide his preference for Trump, “Your historic return to the White House offers a new beginning for America and a powerful recommitment to the great alliance between Israel and America.”

Indeed, other Israeli officials hailed Trump’s victory as a win for their country, reflecting on his record of strong support for Israel during his first term in office, when he reversed decades of American policy in the Middle East by recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and moving the U.S. embassy to the city. Netanyahu then praised Trump for the move, comparing him to President Harry Truman, British foreign secretary Lord Balfour, and Persian emperor Cyrus the Great.

At the same time, polls showed Israelis massively favored Trump over his Democratic opponent, Vice President Kamala Harris, in the U.S. election. Many Israelis were concerned over the growing criticism of Israel among Democrats in contrast to the Republicans’ enthusiastic support for the Jewish State.

Trump 1.0: Make Israel Great Again

President Trump strongly backed Israel during his first term as president. In addition to recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, the first Trump administration became the first country in the world to recognize Israel’s sovereignty over the long-disputed Golan Heights.

Also, in 2018, the Trump administration cut off funding to the UNRWA, the UN agency that assists millions of Palestinian refugees (which Israel has accused of aiding Hamas’ terrorism).

Trump’s support for Israel reflected his personal attachment to the Jewish State, including family ties through an ardent Zionist son-in-law, Jared Kushner, with business interests in Israel who joined his administration as a top advisor, well as a history of close friendship with Netanyahu.

At the same time, Trump’s championing of Israel’s cause is in line with the Republican Party’s traditional support for the Jewish State, driven in part by the connection that Evangelical conservatives have with Israel. On the personnel level, Trump’s two top foreign policy advisors during his first term, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and National Security Advisor John Bolton, were enthusiastic supporters of Israel, as was Vice President Mike Pence.

Moreover, support for Israel didn’t project only Trump’s personal and political views. It is also aligned with his strategic perspective that sees Israel as a key non-NATO ally that shares interests in containing the threat of radical regional players and helps maintain American hegemony in the Middle East.

Trump did criticize U.S. military interventions in the Middle East, and in particular the Iraq War, during his earlier election campaign, which reflected the more inward-looking public opinion.

But after coming to office, Trump didn’t propose disengaging from the region, and, in fact, he seemed to promote an activist U.S. agenda in the region under which Washington joined Israel and the Arab Gulf States in fighting Iran—as long as it did not require direct U.S. military intervention. Hence, he did not take military action after the Iranian attack on Saudi oil facilities in September 2019.

However, the geostrategic and regional environment made it cost-effective to support Israel at that juncture. The United States didn’t face any serious challenge from outside global powers in the region while the Arab Gulf states, led by Saudi Arabia, were seeking American guarantees to their security vis-à-vis Tehran, including by establishing ties with Israel.

During Trump’s first term in office, the number of Arab states that maintained diplomatic relations with Israel went from two to six. The Abraham Accords of 2020, which the Trump administration helped negotiate, brought Bahrain and the UAE into the fold. Morocco and Sudan joined later.

At the same time, President Trump unveiled his Middle East peace plan, produced with the help of Kushner, which gave Israel most of what it wanted while offering the Palestinians the possibility of a state but with limited sovereignty.

“My vision presents a win-win opportunity for both sides, a realistic two-state solution that resolves the risk of Palestinian statehood to Israel’s security,” the president said at a White House ceremony in which he unveiled the plan.

But embracing a realpolitik approach that placed issues of human rights on the bottom of his agenda, the Trump administration refrained from criticizing Israel’s handling of the occupation of the West Bank, or for that matter, from expressing any sympathy for major Palestinian concerns that did not affect U.S. interests. That attitude clearly seemed to be in line with the interests of Israel, whose government insisted that the Palestinian issue should not be placed on the top of the international agenda. 

Moreover, under the first Trump administration, there was a clear strategic alignment between the United States and Israel when it came to Iran and its nuclear program and aggressive regional conduct. Hence, President Trump ditched the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a nuclear deal signed in 2015, and promised to negotiate a better one by applying “maximum pressure” on the Islamic Republic through punishing diplomatic and economic sanctions.

President Trump’s tough approach toward Iran was demonstrated in his decision to order the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, an Iranian major general and commander of the Quds Force, one of five branches of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

In addition to battering Iran’s economy, the first Trump administration attempted to isolate the country by building closer ties between its main Arab adversaries, like Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The indications at that time were that the Saudis would agree to recognize Israel and establish diplomatic ties with it even without Israeli commitment to establish an independent state.

From that perspective, the Abraham Accords were part of that U.S. strategy. Indeed, at the time, Trump administration officials said that they had hoped that Saudi Arabia would eventually sign the accords and recognize Israel. The Biden administration eventually embraced this approach without much success.

Trump 2.0: A Changing Strategic Environment

As President Trump begins his second term in office, it is clear that when it comes to the Middle East, the Middle East’s balance of power in the Middle East has shifted, as have American global and regional priorities. That means Trump 2.0’s Middle East policy will have to adjust to the new realities and cannot simply repeat that of the first term.

On a geostrategic level, while Trump was away, a Second Cold War commenced with Russia’s attack on Ukraine. An alliance of convenience between Moscow and Beijing was formed, to which North Korea and Iran have linked their interests in what is referred to as the “axis of upheaval,” the “quartet of chaos,” the “CRINKs,” or the “CRANKs.”

Against the backdrop of the contest with China, two regional wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, and the challenges posed to the United States and Western interests by the CRINKs and their satellites, America is now diplomatically and militarily overstretched. It has spread its resources thin on three fronts: East Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. And as Trump warned during the election campaign, it may be drawn into “World War Three.”

From that perspective, the October 7 attacks against Israel should be seen not only as just another chapter in the history of the region’s tribal wars but also as part of an orchestrated attempt by Iran through Hamas and Hezbollah to devastate Israel’s deterrence power, and in the process challenge the regional hegemony by its patron, the United States. At the same time, growing military ties between Russia and Iran and expanding Chinese involvement in the Middle East, through its economic ties with Riyadh and Tehran and diplomatic action, suggest that unlike during the first Trump administration, the United States is now facing real competitors in the region.

The war in Gaza and Israel’s growing isolation in the international community has also exposed growing differences between the United States and its European allies over Middle East policy. European attitudes toward Israel tend to be more critical, suggesting to some that “Israel will split the Western alliance.”

Washington’s ability to maintain its Pax Americana in the Middle East is, therefore, eroding just as its geostrategic power is being tested in Ukraine by Russia and the South China Sea.

Israel’s response to the October 7 attack has weakened the ability of Iran to assert its position in the Middle East. In the short run, while relying on U.S. support (including $18 billion in military aid), Israel has succeeded in diminishing the power of both Hamas and Hezbollah. In doing so, it has emerged as the leading military power in the Levant and has responded effectively to Iran’s attack against it.

However, the October 7 attack and its aftermath exposed the reality of American military overstretch. For example, the U.S. Navy had to move its team of aircraft carriers from East Asia to the Middle East and back.